Despite the massive changes brought on by the end of the cold war, U.S. vital interests throughout the world remain largely constant. Nowhere is this more true than in Europe, where the metamorphosis in that region's security environment has been dramatic. To cope with these altered conditions in regional security, while protecting vital interests, NATO and U.S. strategy have changed profoundly. [1] For the Atlantic Alliance, increased attention is now focused on forward presence, crisis management, rapid reaction forces, and multinational formations, and away from "Flexible Response" and "Forward Defense." U.S. national strategy will continue to rely ultimately on nuclear deterrence, but in the conventional arena will parallel NATO's strategy and shift toward reduced forward presence, improved crisis response capabilities, and reconstitution, as well as a smaller, restructured residual force. [2] Ascertaining what will constitute "forward presence" lies, perhaps, at the crux of the new National Security Strategy, for the level of forward presence largely dictates the scope of the remaining elements of the strategy; i.e., size of contingency forces based in the continental United States (CONUS) needed for crisis response, reinforcement capabilities, mix of the active and reserve components, and reconstitution. Because Europe remains the region most vital to U.S. national interests, the question of the U.S. military presence there is a matter of no small consequence. That a U.S. military presence is needed in Europe for the foreseeable future is generally accepted in both Europe and the United States. Many key leaders in Europe remain convinced that a U.S. military presence (of some undefined size) is a sine qua non for continued stability on the "Old Continent" and are actively lobbying for retention of U.S. military forces. The Bush Administration has acknowledged the concerns of U.S. allies, as well as the strategic importance of Europe to the United States, and has argued vigorously for a continued significant U.S. presence in the region. Nor is this key point lost on the loyal opposition. Democratic presidential hopeful Governor Bill Clinton is also on record supporting a sizeable continued U.S. military presence in Europe. [3] But, the eventual size of the U.S. forward presence in Europe has yet to be established and is the subject of an increasingly intense debate. To contribute positively to the current debate over forward presence, therefore, this report will attempt, first, to review briefly the current definition of forward presence in Europe; second, to discuss the general capabilities required of U.S. forces in Europe under the new security conditions; third, to redefine more clearly forward presence in Europe; and, fourth, to provide options for future force structures in Europe to support forward presence. This report is limited the U.S. Army in Europe, for, in the final analysis, the physical presence of land power (vice air or maritime) will provide the greatest symbolic credibility to our European allies and potential foes. U.S. Forward Presence in Europe as Currently Defined The National Military Strategy of the United States def i nes forward presence as "...forces stationed overseas and afloat ... periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts." [4] Because of this rather all-encompassing description, forward presence currently has the unavoidable characteristic of being all things to all people. For example, the Bush Administration has proposed a force of 150,000 to remain in Europe, while Democratic presidential hopeful and former Governor of California, Jerry Brown, has (flippantly, perhaps) suggested that a residual force of 1,000 would be sufficient.5 [5] Such divergent numbers obviously represent opposing poles of the debate. But determining which pole will exert the stronger attraction is a critical question. Key congressional leaders, for example, have indicated potential support for numbers well below the administration's position (i.e., 50,000 to 75,000). [6] Because the credibility of U.S. forward presence depends upon perceptions (of both friends and potential foes), it may not be appropriate to define forward presence categorically as being tied to some arbitrary number of personnel to be stationed in Europe. Whether, in its national debate, the United States finally decides to finance 1,000 or 75,000 or 150,000 troops stationed in Europe may be the critical issue because numbers take on a symbolic importance of their own. That said, it is important to refocus on the identification of the capabilities required of residual U.S. forces in Europe and how those forces are structured, stationed, and incorporated into NATO's future multinational forces to support U.S. national security strategy. For, only by ensuring the full integration of ends, ways, and means (instead of standing the strategic process on its head by concentrating first on means and then adapting ways and ends) can the future U.S. military presence in Europe best insure U.S. national interests in the region. Back to Table of Contents Defining US Forward Presence in Europe Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com