Before laying out some of the potential options available to U.S. planners, one must reinforce the point that this discussion will not seek to identify the illusive "number" of U.S. personnel which are to eventually remain in Europe. Instead, the focus should be on developing a force structure that provides the necessary capabilities to fulfill the missions required of that forward presence. Under such an approach, a much broader range of options are then available to policy makers. At the same time, a focus on ensuring requisite capabilities assures our allies of a stronger U.S. commitment to European security. Commitments As indicated earlier, the United States is committed to participation in multinational forces. As currently articulated, the U.S. Army must maintain one corps headquarters with one U.S. division and appropriate levels of corps troops to participate with a German division within a U.S.-led multinational corps. The United States must also provide one division to serve in a German-led multinational corps. Either of the two divisions could be called upon to participate in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. These commitments establish the skeleton of our forward presence--a "corps" sized formation remaining in Europe. Defining the "Corps." The organization of a corps is currently being redefined, particularly within the Central Region where the "corps" has long been recognized as the "coin of the realm" of an army's force structure. For example, NATO is moving toward creating multinational corps where national contributions will be at the division and brigade level. However, U.S. Army doctrine is currently under revision and it is not clear that the current definition of the corps (i.e., based on divisions) will be retained. Indeed, participation in the doctrinal discussions ("AirLand Operations") [20] argue for a move toward a corps based proportionally more upon brigade structures. Thus, in addition to different definitions of what constitutes a "corps" in Europe, the "Capable Corps" as currently envisaged may not be necessary to provide reassurance to our allies. Over time, therefore, and in an era of both reduced risks and national force structures in Europe, smaller formations may provide a new base line for credibility. Even within such new parameters, the eventual size and composition of that "corps" could vary considerably. Indeed, the permutations of the composition of the divisions and corps are nearly inexhaustible. For example, in the face of the past threat, particularly in Central Europe, complete units were needed to demonstrate national resolve and credibility. In the future, a similar level of commitment may be possible without the physical presence of entire units in Europe. Given the warning times anticipated in Central Europe, it may be possible to introduce large-scale reinforcements from CONUS within times anticipated. Such conditions could allow for a smaller physical presence of combat forces in Europe (e.g., one or two maneuver brigades per division flag, as well as appropriate corp "slice"), and minimal troops needed to ensure rapid reinforcement to flesh out the corps during a period of increasing tensions. Reinforcement The ability to introduce large-scale reinforcements rapidly into Europe obviously depends upon balancing a variety of factors: the degree of accepted risk; available warning and reaction times; levels of personnel and facilities to receive, forward, and integrate reinforcements, and prepositioned equipment. Here, the importance of U.S. equipment held in Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) cannot be overlooked. Designed to meet the requirements of reinforcing Europe 'in the face of the cold war threat, substantial amounts of equipment stocks have been built up in Central Europe. This equipment could obviously facilitate rapid reinforcement from CONUS and, therefore, make the U.S. commitment to reinforce Europe more credible to both allies and potential foes. More importantly, perhaps, POMCUS stocks and the personnel required to maintain them provide a physical manifestation of U.S. commitments to European security. The continued maintenance of adequate POMCUS facilities and stocks in Europe to support anticipated levels of reinforcement should, therefore, remain a goal of U.S. policy. At the same time, U.S. POMCUS stocks will allow the United States to maintain roughly equivalent force generation capabilities with its major allies. Again, this may not be as difficult as it first appears. For example, the Bundeswehr is to shrink to a peacetime strength of 370,000, with a potential to mobilize to 900,000 during wartime, and the brigade and divisional force structures of the German Army will be split almost equally between active and mobilization-dependent formations. [21] The United States could maintain a smaller physical presence in Europe and still possess force generation capabilities equivalent to our allies. [22] There are, however, at least two risks inherent in relying too heavily on reinforcing forces at the expense of in-place units. First, while units may be withdrawn from Europe, there is no guarantee that they will be available for future reinforcement of Europe. Given fiscal constraints and recent historical example, it is likely that many units withdrawn from Europe will be eliminated from the U.S. Army's overall force structure. [23] Units withdrawn from Europe and eliminated from the force structure cast a shadow of doubt over U.S. reinforcement capabilities, and, hence, over the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European security. Second, a point may be reached where the level of residual forces in Europe no longer represents a credible level of commitment in the eyes of our European allies or potential foes. Where this number lies cannot be known at this time and, undoubtedly, will be the subject of considerable debate. [24] But, in that debate the United States must not decide alone. At reduced levels of forces in Europe, the United States will no longer be able to make what may be perceived as unilateral decisions. It will be important for the United States to consult its European allies and understand what the members of the Alliance perceive to be a credible U.S. contribution-both politically and militarily. Rotations A further means of putting flesh on the skeleton is for units from CONUS to rotate periodically to Europe and operate under the command and control of their parent units in Europe. Units could also deploy to Europe for the purpose of exercising with their forward deployed parent unit, as well as to gain familiarity with terrain and allied militaries. [25] While a potential option, the associated costs of transporting units to and from Europe are not inconsiderable and must be recognized. For example, to maintain a 6-month brigade- sized rotation may require as many as three brigades in the force structure. [26] However, in declining defense budgets, funds simply may not be available to support such a deployment scheme. Finally, human costs must be taken into account. Frequent or lengthy rotations to Europe can have adverse effects upon morale. Any reductions in deployment schedules or significant cancellations may cast doubt on the credibility of our commitment. A More Reduced Forward Presence Another option is simply to have a smaller skeleton. For example, the United States would commit itself solely to the leadership of one multinational corps in Europe, with one division and, importantly, all of the corps assets (combat, combat support, and combat service support) to sustain the corps. Such an option would result in substantial economies, but could, however, call into question Washington's political and military commitment. Moreover, the U.S. Army would be providing a substantial and expensive element of its overall force structure, an entire corps' combat, combat support and combat service support, to support one U.S. division. On the other hand, such a commitment could also indicate considerable support for the multinational concept. As a means of further demonstrating U.S. resolve, provisions could be made, given adequate finances, to reinforce the corps with an additional armored/mechanized division from CONUS during a time of increasing tension. The political costs of such an option could be substantial. First, allies may question the U.S. commitment to regional stability and security. Second, Bonn would surely oppose the lack of reciprocity in U.S. participation in multinational corps, i.e., subordination of a German Army division to a U.S. corps, without provision for a U.S. division serving under a German Army corps. [27] Third, the German-led "multinational" corps would no longer be multinational. As other nations are already fully committed to other multinational corps, the only potential participant nation is France. In view of the controversy surrounding the fall 1991 Franco- German initiative to create a European Corps, [28] and the fact that France still refuses to serve within the integrated military structure of NATO, such an option is probably not in U.S. interests. Finally, U.S. participation in a German-led multinational corps could be essential for continued political support for the Bundeswehr's maintenance of an active force of 370,000. The Gordian Knot Finally, the U.S. Army may eventually find itself at force levels where it is unable simultaneously to sustain an effective combat force and adequate reinforcement potential in Europe. Where that particular number falls is unknown and it may not be reached for a considerable time, but it will certainly require considerable analysis. Eventually, however, a point may be reached where the senior leadership of the U.S. Army must approach the administration to ascertain which mission has priority: in-theater combat capability or reinforcement .29 Equally important, the United States must seek guidance from its European allies concerning their expectations of types and levels of U.S. forces. When these decisions are considered, we recommend that the U.S. Army focus on reinforcement capability at the expense of forward deployed combat forces. The rationale behind this alternative is three-fold. First, our European allies will view a strong U.S. reinforcement capability as an expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. Second, and perhaps more important from a U.S. Army standpoint, rapid reinforcement capability is what will permit the establishment of a combat capable corps structure in Europe. Third, such reinforcement capability may be required for out-of-NATO-area operations. Should a decision be made to retain predominantly the reinforcement option, the capability to carry out that mission must be assiduously safeguarded, for the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe will be measured against that capability. However, given the reduced force levels in Europe that some anticipate, it may be unreasonable to assume that whatever remains of 21st TAACOM will be capable of providing the level of support needed for such operations, unless augmented from CONUS. [30] On the other hand, should 21st TAACOM be directed to maintain a full capability on the ground in Europe, a conscious decision may be required on the trade-offs between combat forces and combat support. For, in the constrained fiscal environment (and finite numbers of authorized personnel) the U.S. Army will likely face in Europe after 1995, there may not be sufficient forces to perform all missions equally well. And, a decision to increase the capabilities of the reinforcing mission may result in a decrease of the number of spaces available for combat force structure. This conclusion does not imply, however, that the current levels of theater support in Europe cannot be adjusted. At present, there is considerable reinforcement infrastructure in Europe, based on the long-held premise of deploying 10 divisions in 10 days to Europe. Given anticipated risks in that region, it is likely that both the number of divisions will be reduced and reinforcement time extended. These conditions should permit existing capabilities to be rationalized and responsibilities shared between the United States and host nations. Moreover, given this new security environment, now is the time to approach our European allies with a view to expanding host nation support arrangements in order to maintain adequate reinforcement capabilities, but at lower financial costs to the United States. [31]  Back to Table of Contents Defining US Forward Presence in Europe Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com