The U.S. Government is clearly committed to providing a credible forward presence in support of its security obligations in Europe. Supporting that commitment will fall most heavily on the U.S. Army, for, in the final analysis, land power will provide the greatest symbolic credibility. As currently articulated by the Bush Administration, this commitment will be manifested by the U.S. Army through the presence of a corps headquarters, two divisions, the requisite corps troops to support operations of a combat capable corps, and the ability to execute large-scale reinforcement of Europe. At the same time, the Bush Administration has advocated a forward presence of roughly 92,000 personnel in Europe to man the skeletal force structure in a manner that would ensure a combat capable corps, and, hence, provide a credible commitment to friends and potential foes, alike. Equally possible, however, is that future fiscal and political events in the United States could make the attainment of such personnel figures highly unlikely in the long term. In short, therefore, sacrifices may have to be made and it is incumbent on the U.S. Army to begin planning now for such a possibility. Moreover, a potential gap between force structure requirements and personnel authorizations could cast a shadow over the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European security and, therefore, adversely affect U.S. political influence. Therefore, in designing the future U.S. forward presence in Europe, it is crucial that the U.S. Army not focus attention simply on numbers. Far more important is the requirement to identify capabilities that will convince our allies of the U.S. commitment to European security and, then, to adjust the numbers to ensure those capabilities. A delicate balance will have to be maintained between combat forces and personnel needed to facilitate theater reinforcement from CONUS, as well as combat support and combat service support units needed at echelons above corps for sustained combat operations to ensure that all required capabilities can be executed. A time may arrive, however, when U.S. personnel levels may not be capable of effectively carrying out all missions. When this point is reached, U.S. forward presence in Europe should focus on the reinforcement mission. For, it is the ability of the United States to reinforce rapidly and to establish a credible combat force that contributes most to a credible U.S. forward presence. Moreover, reinforcement infrastructure takes longer to rebuild and, therefore, represents a clearer commitment to European defense. Again, the numbers required to perform these missions will vary and will depend on the dynamic balance between residual combat force potential and reinforcement requirements. Recommendations Greater attention needs to be focused on establishing the residual capabilities required of the future U.S. Army presence in Europe, vice absolute numbers of individuals forward deployed, as is currently the case in the on-going political debates. In short, ways and means must be fully integrated, rather than means driving the process. Irrespective of the eventual size of the residual U.S. presence in Europe, a balanced force structure of all three services will be needed to provide a credible presence in the eyes of European allies, as well as potential foes. Within the U.S. Army commitment to Europe, a similar balance must be maintained between warfighting capabilities and reinforcement and sustainability requirements. Should personnel numbers fall to levels incapable of sustaining such a balance, priority should be given to reinforcement and sustainability, as these capabilities represent a fuller expression of the U.S. commitment to our European allies. The United States: must maintain sufficient elements of the existing infrastructure in Europe, to include personnel, that will permit reinforcement options at levels currently envisaged; and, should negotiate for increased host nation support for these capabilities. In designing the residual warfighting structure, innumerable options are available. That said, the following represent the minimal capabilities required: a corps headquarters/planning staff to command the U.S.-led multinational corps in AFCENT; sufficient corps troops to support peacetime operations, to provide adequate combat support and combat service support during conflict, and to facilitate rapid reinforcement; two U.S. division headquarters/planning staffs; one for service in the U.S.-led corps, the second to participate in the German-led corps to which the United States has committed; the exact composition of the two divisions and corps troops can vary substantially, depending upon the numbers of personnel available. Again, focus should be on retaining key capabilities, vice pure numbers of personnel; one of the two divisions could also fill the U.S. role in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; and, sufficient personnel and infrastructure to integrate CONUS-based reinforcements into operational plans and structures upon arrival in theater. The percentage of U.S. participation in the numerous NATO and international headquarters should be maintained. While U.S. headquarters in Europe will undoubtedly be reduced, and some eliminated, a certain level of peacetime command and control headquarters and organizations will still be required (e.g., USEUCOM). Additionally, theater army support capabilities must be sufficient to support envisaged operations. Moreover, these organizations must be capable of being augmented and making the transition to a war headquarters, if required. Additional personnel may be required to initiate and sustain military-to-military contacts with the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Given existing, and potential for expanded, cooperation, substantial numbers of personnel may be required. Also, the level of participation by the individual states, and the decision of what form of permanent cooperative relationship will exist, may require the establishment of some form of joint military advisory group structure. ENDNOTES [1] See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communique S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991; National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991; and The National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992. [2] National Security Strategy of the United States, pp. 25-31; and The National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 6-8. [3] Apropos the issue of the desire of all of America's allies in NATO for the United States to retain forces in Europe, the reaction by European governments following President Bush's challenge to his colleagues at the Rome NATO Summit concerning the objective of European defense is instructive. See comments of Jean Musitelli, spokesman for French President Francois Mitterrand, The Washington Post, November 8, 1991. For more recent declarations see the activities of Britain's Ambassador to the United States, in James Adams Washington, "Rebel Allies Flex Muscles as Britain Tries to Save NATO," Sunday Times (London), May 10, 1992, p. 18; or Stanley Meisler, "Kohl to U.S.: Keep Troops in Europe," Los Angeles Times (Washington edition), May 6,1992, p. 2. Governor Clinton's position is not specific, but calls for fewer U.S. forces in Europe than proposed by the Bush Administration. See Army Times, March 23, 1992, pp. 12-13. [4] The National Military Strategy of the United States, p. 7. [5] In all fairness, it must be recognized that the Bush Administration figures are based on the assessment that the United States needs to retain a robust Army corps (to include corps headquarters, corps troops, and two divisions), supplemented by appropriate levels of air forces (currently 3 wings, or approximately 200-225 combat aircraft), maritime forces, and rapid reinforcement capability, combat capable U.S. Army corps, supplemented by appropriate air and maritime forces. National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 27 and National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 20-21. The argument here is whether the number of 150,000 personnel in Europe stipulated as necessary to provide such a forward presence is sustainable in today's fiscal environment. [6] For example, at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 1992, key congressional leaders indicated force levels of this size. See Marc Fisher, "Europeans Told of U.S. Isolationism," The Washington Post, February 10, 1992, p. Al. [7] In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, April 4,1949. [8] Concomitantly, it should be noted, such a U.S. presence may provide limited solace to our newly found friends in Central and Eastern Europe. [9] The U.S. contribution to the Immediate Reaction Force consists of the Airborne Task Force stationed in Vicenza, Italy. For background on the Alliance's new rapid reaction formations see the authors' Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems, SSI Special Report, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992. [10] The example of the commitment of VII (U.S.) Corps to OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM is an example of the degree of force that might be required. [11] Even in an era of reduced threat, the Central Region remains NATO's heartland. At the same time, it appears unlikely that permission could be obtained to station forces on the flanks, as these nations have been reluctant to permit stationing of foreign forces on their soil in the past and are not likely to change in the near future. For example, Norway has long prohibited the stationing of foreign forces in Norway during times of peace. Bruce George, ed., Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990, 2nd ed., Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, Ltd., 1989, p. 125. For an example of Turkish hesitation see Nilufer Yalcin, "A Federal System Cannot Be Established in Turkey," Milliyet (Istanbul), January 22, 1992, p. 10 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FB/S)-WEU-92-020, January 30,1992. Even if such permission could be obtained, moving costs would likely be prohibitive. [12] Additionally, the United States may participate with the Federal Republic in contributing a brigade each to the Belgian-led multinational corps. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin C. Powell, speaks of only two divisions being stationed in Europe. Therefore, it is likely that one of these divisions will have the additional mission of supporting the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; or, another unit would have to be made available from CONUS. For Powell's remarks see, General Colin C. Powell, "Let's Not Break the Force," Defense 92, April/May 1992, pp. 16- 17. Given the flexibility inherent in assigning units to the corps support structure, final totals of personnel could vary considerably, depending upon the number and type of units assigned. Historically, however, theater and corps support activities have accounted for roughly one-half to two-thirds of the strength of the U.S. Army's presence in Europe. Therefore, at a limit of 92,500 U.S. Army personnel in Europe, approximately 50-60 thousand would be absorbed at echelons above division. [13] For example, while risks are greatly reduced relative to the past, some residual risks could prove formidable given anticipated force structures. Moreover, warning times may not be as long as many perceive and strategic lift may not be able to meet the demands of the moment. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the on-going civil war in Yugoslavia offer only two of several pertinent examples. [14] See note 11, above. [15] The dispatch of the VII (U.S.) Corps from Europe to Saudi Arabia in support of OPERATION DESERT STORM is an excellent example of what may come to pass. [16] On the other hand, should sufficient fa9t sea lift be procured, such augmentation could come from CONUS. [17] For brief description of contingency forces, see The NationalMilitary Strategy of the United States, pp. 23-24. [18] Logistical support operations, particularly, the trans-shipment of supplies from CONUS through Europe to OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM carried out by USEUCOM are an excellent example. [19] See, Angus Watt, "The Hand of Friendship: The Military Contacts Programme," NATO Review, Volume 40, No. 1, February 1992, pp. 19-22. [20] See, AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, Final Draft, June 13, 1991. [21] Note that this is a significant decrease in the previous envisaged wartime size of the Bundeswehr which was 1,300,000. See, DPA (Hamburg), February 19, 1992 in, FB/S-WEU-92-034, February 20, 1992, p. 9. For a description of the new force structure of the German Army see, Erhard Drews, et al., "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung, Konzeption und Elemente der Heerestruktur 5," Truppenpraxis (4), 1991, pp. 356-367. [22] Such a capability is contingent upon procuring requisite levels of strategic air and sea lift to support such reinforcement. [23] For example, units withdrawn from Europe such as the 8th Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Division, as well as smaller organizations, have been eliminated from the overall force structure. In an era when fiscal constraints may see further reductions in the end strength of the U.S. Army, any further withdrawals from Europe will also likely be eliminated. [24] It must be pointed out that such a debate over the "requisite" size of the U.S. physical presence is nothing new. Such discussions have taken place throughout the history of the Alliance; e.g., what level of troops constituted a credible "trip wire" for Massive Retaliation; or, what level of forces provided a credible pledge of U.S. support under the doctrine of Flexible Response. [25] Although on a scale much smaller than could be anticipated in Europe, the experience with Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras and Central America provides an excellent example of such operations. [26] This figure is a function of one brigade deployed, one brigade recently returned, and one brigade preparing to deploy. [27] Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General John Galvin raised this issue in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 24,1992. See William Matthews, "Galvin: U.S. Military Would 'Lose Control' of Faster Withdrawal," Army Times, April 13, 1992, pp. 27, 30. [28] See, The New York Times, October 20,1991. For a critical view of this proposal see Michael Inacker's article in Rheinischer MerkurlChrist und Welt (Bonn), October 25, 1991. Note that the French government in February 1992 assured the Bonn government that this corps would fall under NATO command and control in the event of a NATO member being attacked, while, for out-of-area campaigns, it would fall under WEU command. Whether this has clarified the issue of the WEU's future military relationship with NATO, or only made it more complicated, remains to be seen. See, Defense News (Washington, DC), March 2, 1992, p. 2. [29] It is instructive to note that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has already indicated a need to review the number and scope of missions currently assigned to the U.S. military. See Neil Munro, "Powell: Military Must Cut Missions," Defense News (Washington, DC), April 6, 1992, p. 3. [30] U.S. Army, Japan offers an excellent example, albeit on a reduced scale, of such augmentation. [31] For instance, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William Taft VI, asked NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO infrastructure funds be used to support the maintenance of some U.S. facilities in Europe. Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Holst has publicly supported this proposal. See, Defense News (Washington, DC), February 17,1992, p. 3. Back to Table of Contents Defining US Forward Presence in Europe Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by US Army War College. 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