While it has generally been accepted in Western Europe that the vitality of the Franco-German bilateral relationship has been fundamental to European integration, U.S. policy toward this relationship over the years has been characterized by ambivalence and, at times, outright opposition. For instance, following the signing of the 1963 Elysee Treaty between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S. officials expressed disapproval of the accord, because it was felt that the arrangement introduced an unwanted element of "singularity" into European security and diplomatic affairs. [1] Consequently, Bonn's fidelity to the United States resulted in the full implementation of the security provisions of the treaty being delayed until January 1988. [2] Apparently, U.S. policy concerning Franco-German relations can be found in Helmut Sonnenfeldt's observation that Washington will support efforts at European integration only as long as it is not achieved at the expense of degrading transatlantic institutions (read NATO). [3] While this position might be interpreted as being passive to say the least, the fact remains that further integration in Western Europe depends upon a functioning and close Paris-Bonn dialogue. In consequence, it is very much in U.S. national interests to see intimate bilateral relations in this respect. To be sure, furthering European integration is not without its potential and actual costs to Washington, e.g., the Single Economic Act ("EC 92"). Nonetheless, the alternative to integration holds out the possibility, no matter how remote, of disunity in regional political affairs, and the accompanying chance of Western Europe countries "renationalizing" their defense policies-clearly an eventuality the Western Alliance in general is keen to avoid. As to the current condition of Franco-German relations, if the mid-to-latter 1980s witnessed the zenith of this relationship, [4] it is not going too far to argue that the state of present ties are poor at worst and ambivalent at best. There are three reasons for this situation. First, and clearly most important, the unification of the Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany has had the obvious effect of altering the political and economic balance of power within the European Community. Second, well prior to the unification of Germany, bilateral defense relations between Paris and Bonn had reached an impasse, due to French unwillingness to revisit the most basic, if not sacrosanct, tenets of Gaullist security policy. Third, the stalling in the Franco-German relationship is related to the current lack of consensus within Western Europe concerning if, and how, further European integration will proceed. This situation places the United States in a difficult position, of course. While it is evident that Western Europe is not on the verge of disunity, it is, nevertheless, clear that issues of a divisive nature require attention by these nations; if left unattended they could have a negative influence on efforts at integration. For example, out-of-area security considerations and reform of military structures within NATO, which could negatively affect certain members of the alliance, are just two security-related issues that will have to be successfully addressed if European integration is to be furthered. While it is optimistic perhaps to assume that a revitalized Franco-German relationship could in itself provide the necessary impetus for further constructive European integration, one could safely assume that achieving the vision of a politically unified EC without it would very difficult indeed. The purpose of this essay is to assess the current problems in Franco-German relations and outline possible options for U.S. policy which could have a positive influence on their mending. While acknowledging that Washington has a limited 'ability to "make" Paris and Bonn cooperate more closely in the future, there are, nevertheless, options available to the United States to exert a positive influence. Surprisingly, the one area where U.S. influence has the potential for being most constructive is in the area of security relations, in general, and alliance reform and addressing the out-of-area security issue, in particular. Back to Table of Contents Franco-German Relationship in the TransAtlantic Security Framework Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com