It should be evident that while Washington's influence in regard to ameliorating Franco-German relations is limited, it is significant, particularly during this period of alliance review. Fundamentally, both the Federal Republic and France need to identify clearly their own national aspirations within the altered European security landscape and only then can they discern the new terms of their bilateral relationship. All available evidence points toward both Paris and Bonn wanting to press forward with European integration as quickly as possible. This should be supported by Washington, assuming of course that such actions do not result in the United States becoming marginalized from European political and security affairs. As long as this condition is met and integration proceeds, it would be unlikely that European countries would seriously consider the likelihood of moving toward the renationalization of their respective defense policies. In light of these apparently favorable conditions, one could see where a passive approach on the part of U.S. officials toward Franco-German relations could easily prevail, particularly in view of the more pressing issues facing Washington. Such a course of inaction could be a fundamental mistake. Despite the current pressing importance of concluding a favorable and lasting peace settlement in the Persian Gulf, it needs to be recognized that in the final analysis, U.S. interests in Europe transcend all other regions. And, irrespective of the apparent favorable situation the Western Alliance enjoys vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, many uncertainties remain. The ultimate outcome of efforts toward political union in the EC, the emerging security ambiguity of the former members of the Warsaw Pact, and the perceived marginalization from the Central Region of the alliance members on the Flanks, [45] combine to demonstrate that NATO has very serious security and diplomatic challenges to overcome if it is to be successful in maintaining stability in Europe. A constructive role played by Washington is recognized by all in Europe as a sine qua non if atavistic enmity is to be avoided. Nonetheless, the role of U.S. forces and the modalities of their presence need to be rethought if the political basis for their very presence is not to be lost. Thus, the removal of force concentrations from urban areas, agreement to participate in multinational corps, and diminished exercise schedules are some relatively simple unilateral steps in this direction. [46] At the same time, however, as argued above, other options are available to U.S. officials in regard to alliance review and reform, which have not only the potential to be beneficial for U.S. interests, but also for improving the basis for Franco-German relations. While acknowledging that nations are expected to act in their own national interests, it would behoove Washington to use its influence to attempt to improve the conditions upon which continued allied security cooperation will be contingent. Thus in regard to France, existing wartime command and control arrangements in NATO need to be revisited if the alliance's military structure is to remain relevant in the eyes of alliance members. If France could be induced to reenter these structures, albeit at not too small a political price to discourage future "defections," then strong considerations should be given to such proposals. If the current trend in Europe continues toward defense integration, then Paris could make itself irrelevant to the European security debate if it misses its current opportunity to reintegrate itself into the Western Alliance. Concurrently, all indications point to the conclusion that the out-of-area issue is not one that is going to recede in the future and requires addressing by the alliance. Admittedly, this is a politically sensitive issue, particularly in the Federal Republic. However, solutions need to be found if the Western Alliance is to show that it is capable of changing to meet altered security conditions. After all, as Bonn found out in regard to the Persian Gulf War, countries with interests everywhere, but responsibilities nowhere, run the serious risk of relying upon others for their protection (with evidently little gratitude despite generous assistance) [47] with little or no influence as to the manner in which these conflicts are handled. [48] By approaching these security challenges within a collective arrangement, finite German and French defense resources can be saved, while contributing to European integration. To be sure, it is problematic whether the "solution" to these security issues by themselves would have the effect of improving relations between Paris and Bonn. Fundamentally, of course, such improvement in bilateral diplomatic relations is contingent upon a new political understanding between these two European Great Powers. Yet, it would be a mistake on the part of Washington not to take advantage of the current alliance strategy review to improve conditions wherever possible, which could have a positive influence on removing potential areas of disruption in European and transatlantic affairs. Admittedly, it would be naive to consider that the achievement of the above proposals would necessarily be a panacea for the Franco-German relationship. Notwithstanding this element of realism, to ignore the potentially ameliorating influence these reforms in security structures could have is to miss a rare historical moment to achieve a strengthened European security pillar, firmly entrenched in the transatlantic community. Back to Table of Contents Franco-German Relationship in the TransAtlantic Security Framework Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com