At the outset, it needs to be understood that Washington has available to it limited options. The litany of real and perceived differences that exist between these two countries, within the context of a long past history of enmity, is not a situation easily mitigated by any outside state. Nonetheless, in view of the present ongoing changes taking place in Europe, there are possibilities to exert U.S. influence in the areas of security which could contribute to a rapprochement in Franco-German relations. Specifically, possible areas for U.S. attention relate to the ongoing study to reorganize NATO military structures and the perennially divisive (if not indeed, "Politically in-Correct") out-of-area issue. Reforming NATO's Command and Control Structure Regarding French and German perceptions of NATO, both can be said to have had almost mutually exclusive stands regarding Paris' position in the Alliance. The Federal Republic has long attempted to encourage the French to reenter NATO wartime command and control arrangements and structures (and thereby increase their conventional defense of Germany), just as Paris assiduously has refrained from acquiescing to Bonn's initiatives. Indeed, one of the principal rationales behind the Federal Republic's support for bilateral security ties with France has been to attempt to draw Paris back into NATO structures. [19] Within the context of the reform of NATO's strategy, force structures, and wartime command and control arrangements, it is apparent that Bonn is very keen to remain within NATO. No major political party in the Federal Republic advocates either its leaving the alliance, or the immediate removal of alliance forces from its soil. [20] Continued membership in NATO contains the assurance to Bonn's neighbors that the Bundeswehr will remain firmly integrated within NATO wartime command and control structures, thereby vitiating the need to create a Generalstab and associated national command and control structures (not to mention national war planning above corps level) with all the emotional sensitivities such acts would produce in Europe. Moreover, one needs to recall that the Soviet Western Group of Forces, with its approximately 300,000 Soviet soldiers (plus dependents), will remain on the territory of the Federal Republic until the end of 1994. Should tensions develop while these forces are in the process of withdrawing from the Federal Republic, the deterrent value of NATO forces is incalculable. Thus, despite Chancellor Kohl's support for political integration within the EC, it is clear that Bonn continues to see its basic security requirements being met by continued membership in NATO, as opposed to the EC or the WEU. This position, of course, places France in a difficult dilemma. One would suspect that the rationales for Paris to rejoin NATO structures would be strong. Reentry into some NATO command and control structures would enable France to work to ensure that the Federal Republic remains enmeshed in Western security structures and the United States maintains its military presence on the continent. Unfortunately, such options are extremely sensitive political issues in a country that continues to adhere publicly to Gaullist defense tenets of independence. While in recent years this "independence" has been shown to be rather qualified, it nonetheless remains an important domestic political factor. [21] It should not be surprising, therefore, that some within the French defense establishment during Jean-Pierre Chevenement's tenure as Defense Minister were reassessing the possibility of reentry into NATO structures. This has coincided with the ongoing NATO strategy review, in which France moved in March 1991 to participate. [22] While it is not yet known what Defense Minister Pierre Joxe's position is on this issue, let alone President Mitterrand's, whose ultimate authority in diplomacy and defense is supreme under the terms of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, it is evident that France will not make a significant move until such time that the governing political realities are clear, prior to committing itself to any reintegration. One can be assured that in view of the historical sensitivity of this issue (one should recall that the Mendes-France Government fell in February 1954 in part over the issue of French participation in the European Defense Community), [23] it is still an open question whether France will rejoin a reformed NATO command and control structure. It is within the context of alliance reform that U.S. efforts could contribute to France's reentry into alliance structures. While it would not be prudent, nor is it likely, for the alliance to concede to France's every wish, there are symbolic and actual reforms to be offered. For instance, it is not widely understood outside of the Francophone world that the term "I'OTAN" has taken on a considerable pejorative connotation over the years. While it is not being proposed that the term "NATO" ought to be dropped completely, it may be worthwhile to consider different nomenclature for elements of the alliance which are to be reformed. In other words, the United States and its allies could make it easier for French officials to sell to la classe politique, reentry to these structures, if it could be demonstrated that Paris was not rejoining the same alliance structures General de Gaulle rejected in 1966. It could well turn out that the present time is an auspicious time for France to rejoin NATO wartime command and control structures in view of the fact that the existing arrangements within NATO could be altered following the conclusion of the ongoing strategy review process. It is simply too early to speculate accurately as to what type of documents will replace MC 14/3 and MC 48/3, which embody the alliance's strategy of flexible response. [24] Nonetheless, security conditions point toward the possibility of reforming military structures which could be acceptable to France, particularly in regard to command and control arrangements. Moreover, one should not conclude that Paris is totally intransigent concerning command and control matters. In the Persian Gulf War, for example French forces; naval, air and ground, were "chopped" to U.S. allied commanders during the conflict. Conversely, French forces were given operational control over U.S. forces during certain periods in the campaign. [25] Thus, Paris may be more accepting of allied command and control arrangements under the right circumstances than previously thought. Indeed, it is difficult to accept how NATO's existing command and control arrangements can escape what could be substantial change. It is clear that there will be fewer in-place national corps in Central Europe over the coming years; from a current level of eight down to six main defense corps, in addition to the Rapid Reaction Corps. The Bundeswehr alone is to lose three or four divisions by 1994 and reduce its ground forces to 370,000 personnel within a three corps structure which will be integrated with the Territorial Army. [26] In such a situation, the creation of multinational corps and in consequence, the likely dissolution of the "layer-cake" forward deployment of forces in Germany concept, will produce new and different command and control requirements. [27] Should a strategy be adopted by the alliance based upon "reconstitution," then it is possible to loosen existing command and control arrangements. For instance, one could envisage future NATO command and control arrangements in wartime being developed to match the operational tasks and forces chopped to allied commanders, as opposed to predetermined structures. Examples of such structures include command and control defined by functional, specialized and maneuver requirements, as opposed to solely geographical. Should Washington decide that having France back in the military structure of the alliance is worth the cost of a looser command and control structure and the Soviet military threat continues to diminish in immediacy, encouraging France to join in the redefinition of NATO's military structures could provide the necessary impetus for France to reintegrate itself into NATO. President Mitterrand's April 13, 1991 speech to the Ecole de Guerre where he acknowledged that "for the present and for many years to come, Western Europe's defense can only be envisaged in the context of respect for the Atlantic Alliance," obviously points toward a new approach by Paris toward NATO; albeit many difficult obstacles remain to be overcome. [28] The Out-of-Area Issue If Paris is guilty of over-sensitivity regarding defense independence, than Bonn is culpable of being politically unable to accept responsibility for out-of-area security responsibilities. Chancellor Kohl has publicly committed himself to allow Bundeswehr forces to be sent outside the European theater in the future [29] and the deployment of German forces to Iran in April 1991 would appear to have created a needed precedent for such operations. [30] Notwithstanding these events, Bonn's position toward out- of-area issues will surely remain a sensitive political issue. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons, not the least being that German views are increasingly not being mirrored. [31] by its traditional allies. Population growth that far outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome (vide Christian), East Europeans who are willing to integrate themselves into European society. At the same time, West European investment and aid are being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an inrxeasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists with increasing access to long-range weapons of mass destruction. This situation is widely recognized in France as posing a potentially serious threat to French security. [32] Any meaningful bilateral security relationship between Paris and Bonn must have provisions for meeting these potential threats jointly. In view of the commitment by Chancellor Kohl to seek alteration of the Basic Law, it would appear safe to assume that the Federal Republic's response to the Persian Gulf War was sui generis. It is simply asking to much too assume that a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, and perhaps in time even a SPD-led coalition government, would refuse to send forces to a conflict on the periphery in the future. If anything is certain, Bonn will be unlikely to attempt to "buy" its way out of a future campaign in light of the Persian Gulf experience where allied criticism of German policy increased as financial contributions to the war effort rose. [33] Notwithstanding the immense domestic economic challenges and security problems which exist in eastern Germany (i.e., the continued presence of the Soviet Western Group of Forces), nor to ignore the severe sensitivity in the country concerning the use of military force, future governments will surely be more receptive to participation with traditional allies in such conflicts. After all, to refuse to act in these campaigns is nothing less than an act of self-singularization and hardly in accord with attempts to forge unified diplomatic and security policies within the EC. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the prospect of equipping even a small element of the Bundeswehr for self-supported and sustained operations outside of central Europe could not be directed at the Federal Defense Ministry at a worse time. Simply stated, power projection and accompanying requisite combat support and logistic support are expensive capabilities. At present, the Bundeswehr is confronted with the requirement to reduce personnel levels from its current size of 515,000 to 370,000 by the end of 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet- German agreement reached between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev at Stavropol in July and codified by treaty in September 1990. [34] The Federal Defense Ministry is also faced with the challenge of planning for the defense of the new Laender of the Federal Republic, without NATO forces stationed in the east. One can safely conclude, therefore, that it is unlikely that the Bundeswehr will be in the position to equip and train itself unilaterally for these types of campaigns outside the Central Region for some time. [35] Nevertheless, press reports of Bonn's intentions to create a three brigade (with air support) force, to be contributed to a proposed NATO rapid action force, is clearly a step in the right direction. [36] Concurrently, other options for a multinational approach to these types of conflicts appear to be limited for a variety of political reasons. Despite the fact that NATO is in the midst of what could be fundamental reform and perhaps in search of new missions in the post-cold war world, it could prove to be fruitless to press fdr the formal inclusion within the alliance of out-of-area responsibilities. [37] There is too much emotional baggage in Europe which will work against such an eventuality and indeed, it is unwarranted. The final chapter on the history of the cold war has yet to be written and the events in the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union during winter 1990 point toward the likelihood that NATO will continue to have considerable relevance in its traditional role to its members for some time to come. [38] Thus, given the importance of maintaining consensus for the continuation of NATO on its most important mission, introducing such a divisive issue as out-of-area responsibilities could be counterproductive, especially at a time when the alliance is undergoing review. Short of creating some new security organization that will deal with the issue of extra-regional security, it becomes apparent that the WEU is the appropriate forum in which to deal with these issues. As the sole Western European organization that 1) concerns itself with its members' security, and 2) is interested in dealing with the out-of-area, the WEU is well situated to play a leading role in addressing its members' security concerns. [39] If one assumes that the WEU is the appropriate organization to direct Western European engagement in out-of-area operations, a major problem becomes apparent in regard to what roles the United States and NATO are to play. In addition, it is necessary to define what types of cooperation and planning are politically acceptable and militarily sufficient. In terms of institutional structure, it would appear to be reasonable that, at a very minimum, a formal liaison relationship and joint military body need to be created between NATO and the WEU. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it would enable the Western Alliance to benefit from an enormous amount of military expertise that exists in NATO, without necessitating replication. To be sure, power projection and sustainment over potentially vast distances are not areas with which NATO has overly concerned itself, and would require substantial doctrinal and conceptual assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and France. [40] Nonetheless, the basis for cooperation and coordination between defense forces exists within NATO and should be utilized. Second, a joint institutional arrangement would not limit either of these two bodies from engaging in reorganization and reform, at the moment or in the future. Both organizations play important roles in their respective principal areas of responsibility and should not be hindered in any way from reforming themselves to meet changing security and political conditions. The basic purpose of achieving a liaison between these two organizations would be to allow for the WEU to provide the necessary political framework for its members to engage in out-of-area operations, while largely employing existing NATO expertise. It is interesting to note that in spite of the WEU's strong interest in out-of-area contingencies however, its membership does not include NATO members outside of the Central Region, i.e., Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey. This would not present any major legal or political impediments since one of the purposes of creating a joint liaison body betweed NATO and the WEU would be to enable participation by NATO members who are not part of the WEU. Such a proposal, therefore, could have the character of serving as a catalyst for further defense integration among Western European nations, thereby lending support to two of Bonn's long-term objectives: furthering European integration, while maintaining the trans-Atlantic link. Since a wartime command and control structure would not have to be predetermined prior to an agreement by the participants to deploy forces, this structure would not have the same political baggage that alienated France from military integration in the Western Alliance in the past. Finally, in view of Paris' interest in out-of-area threats to its security, a strong case could be made to encourage France to take a leading role in the establishment and development of this liaison body. Indeed, to ensure a definite WEU "flavor" to this combined structure (which may be essential for its acceptance), it would be wise to limit the planning headquarters' staff to seconded field grade officers from WEU members. In time of crisis, the staff would be complemented by personnel seconded from participating states and these officers would take the lead in planning and operations specific to the contingency. The small permanent staff would act as custodians of alliance interoperability with the task of simply maintaining and testing it through periodic exercises, and, in crisis, providing a basis for expansion. This cadre staff could also prepare force tailored packages to operate in various conditions, e.g., desert, jungle, over-the- beach, airmobile, airborne, etc. It may also be wise to have this body serve as the planning headquarters above a rapid reaction corps, made up of WEU members, whose creation has been suggested by that organization's Secretary General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen.. [41] It could also thwart French efforts in particular to create an out-of-area military formation, exclusive of U.S. participation. [42] As regards the actual type of military planning that would facilitate future joint responses to out-of-area contingencies, very little would be required. As long as the NATO military structure continues in existence and allied forces conduct regular field training, command post, and logistics exercises, the actual military requirements of this joint NATO-WEU body would be very modest. What could be required, and this could be easily carried out within existing NATO structures and programs, would be to hold more air-transportable/airmobile and amphibious maneuvers, as well as logistics projection and sustainment exercises among countries possessing these capabilities. Wherever possible, existing NATO procedures, standards and methods would be employed to avoid duplicating efforts within the alliance and adding a needless new layer of procedures to be employed by allied defense forces. It needs to be clearly understood, and would have to be carefully explained to the publics of alliance members, that participation in developing this type of planning methodology would not by any means imply a nation's precommitment to support a specific out-of-area campaign. Rather, it would enable the alliance members' armed forces to have an existing military capability to conduct joint operations in instances where the political leadership of each country felt its national interests so dictated. One would think that these projection and sustainment capabilities would complement current thinking in NAT043 which is attempting to direct more attention to the security requirements of the flank countries which have not seen any diminution in the Soviet military threat. With few, if any, exceptions, the requirements for campaigns on the flanks would be very similar to out-of-area requirements, as recently suggested by Admiral Dieter Wellershoff. [44] Back to Table of Contents Franco-German Relationship in the TransAtlantic Security Framework Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com