Before addressing possible solutions to present difficulties in Franco-German ties, it is appropriate to assess briefly the conditions which have produced the current situation. It is not the purpose of this essay to present an explanation of the evolution of bilateral relations subsequent to the signing of the Elysee Treaty, since this has already been articulated elsewhere. [5] Rather, these issues are presented here solely to place the current state of affairs in their proper context. In respect to the current nadir, three events and issues identified above warrant explanation. At the heart of the upheaval in Franco-German relations lies the nettlesome issue in that the unification of Germany on October 3,1990, produced the largest non-Russian continental power (with an economic potential that will likely dwarf its neighbors in short order), which is now a sovereign country, albeit tightly entwined in Western international economic, political and security institutions. The mere existence of a united Germany has had the effect of altering fundamentally the political balance not only in Europe as a whole, but within the EC as well. The previous "balance of imbalances" among the four key countries with comparable populations (i.e., France, the Federal Republic, Britain, and Italy), no longer exists. [6] Yet probably most significant from the perspective of French policy is that the mere act of unification killed once and for all the perception (greatly encouraged by Paris and tacitly accepted by Bonn) that France was the senior partner in the bilateral relationship. The act of unification showed this image to be but a mere myth. Just as Bonn must come to terms with the fact that it has all but become an incomplete superpower, so must Paris accept its new status in Europe and refocus its political aspirations. [7] Yet, well prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall, strains were becoming evident in bilateral ties. During the period of 1982 to approximately 1987, relations between the two countries were probably at their height. Fifteen years after the Elysee Treaty was signed, a protocol was effected implementing the accord's security provisions, thereby establishing, belatedly, a bilateral defense council, a secretariat and subordinate bodies to manage cooperation. [8] However, it is often forgotten that it was Paris which began the process of reining in cooperative initiatives in the area of defense. From hindsight it is evident that conventional defense cooperation had reached its limits since Bonn was unwilling to enter into bilateral arrangements which were supplementary to NATO, no matter how disillusioned Bonn was becoming with U.S. policy. One of the principal reasons behind Bonn's desire to effect closer bilateral security ties with France in the early 1980s was due to what German officials saw as a wavering in Washington's nuclear commitment to the security of their country. The Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, the Intermediate- and Shorter-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and especially, the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, where President Reagan seriously considered President Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate their countries' respective intercontinental ballistic missile forces, left many in the frontline NATO state anxious of U.S. intentions. [9] The French nuclear force, notwithstanding its relatively small size, [10] did present the advantage of being controlled from the continent, while not being as susceptible to arms control limitations or reductions as U.S. weapons. [11] Despite President Mitterrand's February 1986 public statement promising to consult where appropriate with German officials prior to the use of French nuclear forces on German soil," [12] Bonn apparently has wanted additional assurances. This has led to what Francois de Rose characterized as the of nuclear obstacle" to closer cooperation between the two countries in defense, since to meet Bonn's wishes would compromise long-standing Gaullist security policy tenets. [13] This was apparently not a battle President Mitterrand had been willing to undertake until very recently, and will be dealt with below. Suffice it to say that prior to the fall of the Berlin War, his comments made before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense nationale in October 1988, typified French attitudes. In this speech, the president made reference to limits in bilateral Franco- German defense cooperation, and stressed the need for further economic integration. Only then, he stated, would Europe realize that it "cannot exist without the ability to defend itself." [14] Lastly, the lack of visible purpose in Franco-German relations is directly related to the still unanswered question of the EC's future. Notwithstanding the likely success of achieving a single market through the implementation of EC 92, Western Europe is quickly approaching a crossroads of historical proportion. While President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl have strongly endorsed the concept of political union [15] (a process which incidently was reinvigorated in April 1990 as a means to mend the Paris-Bonn relationship), [16] and Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis has tirelessly pressed for the EC to assume a greater role in diplomatic and defense issues through its amalgamation of the Western European Union (WEU), [17] the fact remains that there is far from being a consensus within the EC as to its ultimate goals. The decision upon the application of neutral Austria for membership in the Community in 1993 will force that body, possibly once and for all, to decide upon whether it aspires to become a true political body, or as in the words of Chancellor Kohl, merely a Zollverein. [18] At such an important moment in European history, the value of an intimate Paris-Bonn axis becomes indisputably crucial. Back to Table of Contents Franco-German Relationship in the TransAtlantic Security Framework Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com