A rather auspicious title, don't you think? Justifying the Army. How can one justify the existence of an army without a potential enemy? When the Soviet threat started to diminish in deeds rather than words, in capabilities rather than in intentions, the U.S. Government was surprised, to say the least. We, in the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, were not. Since the United States and its major NATO Alliance partners rely heavily on a threat-driven strategy to construct military budgets, the diminishing threat (perception) may logically lead to diminishing military budgets, which in turn lead to diminishing force structure, and the ever smaller budget spiral continues unabated as the threat continues to diminish. [1] That quotation was written in the spring of 1988 and published in the fall, prior to Mr. Gorbachev's United Nations speech of December 7, 1988. We followed this logical trend to boldly predict the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the abolishment of the Warsaw Pact and the expulsion of all foreign troops from Germany in Force Structures: The United States and Europe in the Coming Decade, dated June 12, 1989, clearly six months before the domino developments in Eastern Europe occurred. [2] Why am I telling you this? For a pat on the back? No, I want to demonstrate that logical progression, not surprise, has determined our future, that the long-range military strategy of our country which everyone is calling for is simply budget-driven and reactive (rather than proactive) support of our national interests and objectives. Simply stated by the Regional Conflict Working Group in its report, Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict, our U.S. national objective is: Survival as a free and independent nation with values and institutions, freedoms and security intact through healthy economic growth, a 'threat free' stable and secure world, continued growth of freedom, democratic institutions and free market economies (fair and open international trading system) and healthy and vigorous alliances. [3] National objectives are by their nature oversimplified and somewhat vague. We rely on national policies to articulate directions and rules of engagement for definitive actions, concepts and, ultimately, resources. Reliance on the national strategic objective "containment" proliferated hundreds of policies which required conceptualizing and resourcing. As the cold war terminates, we seem to accept that this strategic objective has been achieved, and logical rationale for its implementing concepts and resources, e.g., "deterrence," forward stationing, alliances and the military buildup, no longer exists. Now we are left with a relook at our national objective and acceptance of a new strategic objective which President Bush terms "Beyond Containment"; and severe resourcing constraints. [4] This same logical thinking process may be applied to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its political- military objective has been achieved; its concepts and resources may no longer be required. Now we must pursue a new security policy for Europe. Germany is reunified. Accept it. And also accept that in the very near future all soldiers in Central Europe will return to their country of origin. My prediction is that all U.S. Army forces will leave Europe by 1995; however, certain air and naval forces will remain in NATO's flank regions (in the United Kingdom, Turkey and Italy). These forecasts are surely assumptions, but they are logical assumptions, particularly given today's rapidity of events. All right, you say, even if I accept your assumptions, justify the Army! O.K. Since Mr. Bush has declared that our new enemies are instability and unpredictability, we need to consider these new threats, much as we did communism. After all, these new enemies directly infringe upon our declared inclusive national objective of "a 'threat-free,' stable and secure world." My thesis is that since there are 140 other militaries in the world; since those nations have structured their forces predominantly in land power as opposed to sea or air power; since very few nations have invested in power projection forces naval and air forces); the next war in which the United States is compelled to fight will be on land, and thus requires U.S. land forces. My rationale does exclude economic trade war, the most likely scenario, only if escalation of that war does not also include military support, an unlikely scenario. The framework for my arguments includes four simple models which will size the force, establish missions for the force (to include gains and losses), resource the force, and integrate and utilize the force. The models are designed to be interactive, rather than mutually exclusive, to develop a comprehensive, logical justification for the Army. In model development I will also discuss the U.S. Marine Corps versus U.S. Army controversy, the rising economic dominance of Japan, the strategic resourcing debate, and the conceptual integration of economic and military power. Back to Table of Contents Justifying the Army Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1990 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com