This interview with ERICH TOPP (photo) was conducted in 2000 by MIKE MATHIS (6063-2000) for the production by ROB LIHANI (59892000) and Digital Ranch. All these interviews are available on videotape from SHARKHUNTERS. Check your KTB #156 Magalog or log onto our website at www.sharkhunters.com for full details.

The interview with ERICH TOPP

SHARKHUNTERS: What is your name?

ERICH TOPP: Erich Topp. I am born 1914, am a rear admiral.

SHARKHUNTERS: How did you come to be in the U-boats?

ERICH TOPP: I was serving on board of the German cruiser KARLSROHE after having finished my training at the navy school and the cruiser was participating in the training of submarines.

They were shooting torpedoes and we were the target; the cruiser was the target. On board of the cruiser was at that time Captain Donitz. And I met him there and I gave him my cabin because on board of a cruiser there is a lack of rooms, and so I handed over my room to him to stay there and so we came into a conversation and he asked me if I would be interested to join the submarine force.

I said of course I am interested. It has always been my wish. I wanted to be in the submarines. I've read a lot of submarine books from the First World War, and the big names and so I said to him 1, I would like to join the submarine force.

Half a year later I got the command of a submarine and not a command, but I was watch officer on board of U-46. And we were operating during the war in the first year of the war in the Atlantic.

But then we came to Narvik because Germany intended to invade Norway and so ten destroyers went up to Narvik to protect the Gibergsjager, the mountaineers there and we had to protect the destroyers. We were in the fury of the Narvik Nord and waiting for the enemy at that time.

SHARKHUNTERS: When did you become a captain of a U-boat?

ERICH TOPP: I became commanding officer of U-57. It was a small boat and we were operating round about the isles off Great Britain and well, it was the normal operation. We came to Lorient in France because at that time already France was occupied by German troops and we had to take torpedoes there and small repair and then we went out again.

And on the isle of Ireland, I was attacked by a British bomber and my boat was suffering a lot by these bombs and one diesel engine was destroyed by this attack. So I had to ask my engineer and the watch officer what to do now. We have only half our speed and the other engine can break down too.

So we decided not to give up, but to go into the narrows at Liverpool and well, it was a risk of course, but we did it and a convoy came out, we were attacking and with success, but then we the destroyer was following us and we had to dive and we got a lot of depth charges at that time. At the depth of fifty meters only. That is not much for security.

SHARKHUNTERS: Describe a depth charge attack at fifty meters.

ERICH TOPP: Well, at fifty meters when you, when the escort has located the submarine and it is at fifty meters is not much. Not only finding the submarine, but locating it exactly is comparatively easy and so the danger of being destroyed is very great.

And so, I think we were lucky in so far as we were lying in moulder as we called it, moulder, and the depth charges were exploding around us. But everything was hit and we had no light, we had nothing. All the engmes were practically out of action and we were lying there 36 hours and the oxygen of the air became bad. We had not much to breathe.

And so I put all the people on their beds so that we were able to breathe and we had special apparatus for breathing and anyhow, after 36 hours I tried to surface again, but I was pressing all the air out of the tanks and, but the boats didn't move.

So I thought perhaps we had to stay fifty meters below the surface of the sea but finally I said let's try to move a little bit the boat and I moved it and then it was indeed marching again and was coming up to the surface and the destroyer was 1,000 meters away and nothing was okay, not even the compass and everything was dead. But we, but we were marching out of the narrows and so we survived.

SHARKHUNTERS: What goes through your mind during those 36 hours?

ERICH TOPP: Well, when I say I never have had fear, it might be exaggerating, but it was the fact that I never have had fear on board of a submarine even in very dangerous situations. And of course that had an effect on my crew and they were relying on me and you know when I met the wife of one of my men and we were talking together and she said to me - my husband says when it is very dangerous then I go into the pocket of my captain.

You see, they were relying on me and that is very important because at that time with the U-57, that was a small boat, we were 20 or 27 on board, but nevertheless, it is a crew and everybody is looking at everybody. And so, the main goal is the captain, of course. What is he doing?

SHARKHUNTERS: Why do you think you weren't afraid?

ERICH TOPP: That's my nature. I can't say why. I never have had fear. I always was relying on myself

SHARKHUNTERS: Describe attacking that convoy.

ERICH TOPP: Well, we were in the narrows we had passed two fires on the right side and on the left side. We were going into this narrow part of the Irish Sea and it was dark, it was during the night and it happened that, at that time, a convoy was leaving the narrow and so I was attacking and with my torpedoes and three of the torpedoes hit, but then of course they followed me.

SHARKHUNTERS: What do you actually see inside a submarine?

ERICH TOPP: I was on the surface and we had the possibility to launch the torpedoes and so there is no problem at nighttime.

SHARKHUNTERS: Do you see the ship sink?

ERICH TOPP: No, well, it was around about 800 to 1,000 meters and to take some time from the moment when the torpedo is launched to hitting, the torpedo takes some time and during this time we were turning and trying to escape of course because the destroyer was following us.

And then came the situation that we had to dive and I think there were more than 100 depth charges we had to suffer from.

SHARKHUNTERS: Is warfare in a submarine impersonal or is it personal?

ERICH TOPP: I see the target and I want to sink the ship and I don't think of the people living at that time on the target. I know that there are perhaps people hit and not hit, but are hurt and that maybe that one ship is sinking, but there are rescue actions and so I never have had much, I've never been thinking about, about what might happen there. Well, of course, it is different.

Later on for instance, I had attacked in the western part of the Atlantic, I have attacked an American ship, the REUBEN JAMES, and at that time the Americans had not declared war to Germany.

It was end of October, 1941. And so I was attacking this REUBEN JAMES and I saw the explosion and then I saw, well, they had prepared already the depth charges for attacking submarines aboard the REUBEN JAMES and well of course then when the boat was sinking, oh the depth charges were blowing up like a volcano.

Of course I knew that it would cost hundred lives, a hundred lives would be destroyed and I must really say that was horrible and to me I never forget that.

But may I add something here because we are always attacked by propaganda that we don't care for shipwrecked people. I did not attack the NIBLAC. She tried to rescue the 150 people of the REUBEN JAMES. I did not attack because I didn't want to interfere into the rescue action.

EDITOR NOTE - The father of KARL JEPPESON (4547-1995) was aboard NIBLAC during this rescue. If U-552 had attacked and sank NIBLAC, he probably would have been killed and KARL never would have been born. He personally thanked ERICH TOPP for this act of decency when they met at a SHARKHUNTERS function in San Francisco in 1999.

As you see there are different situations and, um, in this case the, I was thinking of the people who were suffering there.

SHARKHUNTERS: Prior to May of '43, how successful were the U-boats?

ERICH TOPP: Well, you know that I left my boat in May, 1942 and so I have no personal experience after that time. But if you ask me about the situation, then I must say of course, there was a big change and what was the change .........

SHARKHUNTERS: What was the change in '43?

ERICH TOPP: Well, there had been many things. First I want to say that the Allies had concentrated, there were measurements against the submarines in an excellent combination of scientists, experienced operators and navy men in Bletchley Park. So they were able and they had examined the whole situation and the result was first that they had, they were examining our possibilities to be decoding the messages, They were decoding our messages and we didn't know that at that time. The other thing was they had developed a radar, first a nine centimeter, later on a threecentimeter radar.

And at that time in the middle of 1943, they were covering with their planes, very long-range planes, and the planes that were coming from the ships, they were covering the whole Atlantic.

When you realize that from one plane they had the possibility to detect surfaced submarines at 90 miles, when you can find out how many planes you need to cover the whole Atlantic.

But it was our fortune that there was a misunderstanding of what shall I call that, between the Allies. The Americans, they wanted to put their weight, their effort, the main part of their airplanes, in the Pacific and the British wanted to have it in the Atlantic. So they were struggling there for one year before they decided what to do. And in this one year we had the possibility to attack in the so called Iceland gap, but that was then finished and so now, they had a lot of successes and there was a change insofar as there was the HuffDuff, the direction finder, there was a day light system and well.

So there was many things on the other side to their advantage. What did we do against it? That is of course the question. Well, firstly we had developed the so-called snorkel. The snorkel was an air tube it did give us the possibility to be submerged during the whole trip, only showing the snorkel, a small part of the snorkel, but that was not easy to detect.

And, well we had the so-called homing torpedo. Inaccuracies in the, in the detection for instance were compensated by the homing torpedo who was running directly to the targets. So we had some things that were an answer to the activity of the Allies, but it was not enough, especially we had the high frequency direction finder.

You know, our tactic of operation idea was the so called wolf pack tactic that means that boats had put into a reconnaissance line waiting for convoys and when one boat had contact with the convoy, then it was calling all the other boats of the line to attack the convoy. But when the boats came in the distance of 25 miles, then they were detected by this high frequency direction finder and were of course attacked and so the boats didn't come into an attack position. So the whole, the wolf pack tactic was obsolete now and you must realize that at that time already from three boats, only one came back, two were destroyed. So the destruction rate was very high already at that time.

SHARKHUNTERS: Talk about Donitz. What kind of a man was he?

ERICH TOPP: Well, Donitz was at that time, when I first met him I told you already, he was captain- But when he became responsible for all at the beginning of the war we had 57 submarines and only 20 were operational in, in the Atlantic. Donitz was asking for 300 boats, but at that time the philosophy of the navy was the so-called balanced fleet and we were constructing battleships, cruisers and surface ships and not enough submarines.

So we always had a lack of submarines. Only later on in end of '41 beginning in '42, we were producing more submarines. So at that time, Donitz was admiral and he was our leader and I must say he was a charismatic leader. When he was talking to his U-boat people, everybody was saying that is our man. And so he was doing what he was able to do and he was activating scientists and so on and so on to, to meet the requirements.

But as I said already, the rate of losses was multiplying and well, of course it is easy to know after the time in the historical dimension, is to criticize. It is certainly very easy but, you know, I was at that time in command of the tactical flotilla and we heard of this accumulation of losses and we had our own idea how to give an answer to that.

But if I may say so in my critique, Donitz was a 100% follower of Hitler and what Hitler said he was giving an answer to that. In other questions too, not only in the submarine question, well, from my personal point of view I would say he should have reduced the number of submarines running, going into, into the Atlantic and into the other oceans.

He should have reduced that and what he did was, he was creating a new type of submarine, the real submarine, the Type XXI and the Type XXIII, but that was too late because only one Type XV boat had the opportunity to, to operate against the enemy.

Interview with Topp Continued (KTB 161)