PETER HANSEN (251-LIFE-1987) spent time working for the ABWEHR (the German Secret Service) during WW II and he has information that is known to a mere handful of people. He gives this secret information especially to SHARKHUNTERS. Here he tells us:

NOTE - In case you wish to save this piece in its entirety on the capture of U-570 which ultimately became HMS GRAPH in the Royal Navy began in KTB #139. As you will recall in KTB #141, the sudden and unexpected attack of a Norwegian plane while Rahmlow was trying to surrender caused several bad leaks.

Woods doubted the veracity of this message and gained the firm impression from close observation of U-570 that she was unable to dive or to get her diesels going again, as otherwise U-570 would have escaped for sure during the dark night, Woods could not find any other explanation why the U-boat simply rolled in the seas without making emergency repairs and just getting away quietly. Woods requested more details of these alleged leaks, but did not receive any satisfactory reply from Ralmlow.

By now U-570 had been pitching about on the surface for over 24 hours already, but evidently had done nothing whatsoever to make emergency repairs to become operational again. Rahmlow now demanded immediate rescue of his crew, as U-570 was about to sink finally and could not be kept on the surface very much longer. Woods disbelieved this information too and instructed Rahmlow to order half his crew below deck again in order to blow all tanks and raise U-570 again much higher in the water so that she kept floating longer on the. surface, until weather conditions improved somewhat.

Woods also warned Rahmlow once more NOT to destroy any secret documents, files, papers or instruction books or to toss such material overboard as otherwise nobody would be picked up, rescued and taken prisoner of war. Thence Woods attempted to pass a towline to U-570 while WINDEMERE pumped oil into the rough sea to calm it somewhat more. Three times this maneuver was tried, but without success, because the seas were simply still much too rough at the time and further time was needed before repeating the attempt.

Watching through his binoculars what transpired, Woods felt that the German crew did nothing whatsoever to assist with the towing line and just watched and waited without trying to cooperate in fastening the towline. Woods became angry and ordered BURWELL to fire several rounds of machineguns and then also fired off his antiaircraft guns too.

While this was supposed to be only a warning threat, five members of U-570 were wounded thereby, probably because U-570 was moving considerably in the seas. But this action did catch the attention of the German crew and most decided to re-enter the U- boat and go underdeck to blow the various tanks, raising U-570 gradually higher up again in the water. They also accepted a hemp messenger line but when a heavier steel cable was attached to it, the hemp line parted and Woods suspected that this was due to sabotage by the Germans.

Once more he ordered that BURWELL's machineguns open fire towards U-570 and this seemingly increased cooperation and achieved the type of cooperation the British wanted. Now again a white surrender sheet or board was shown on U-570 and held up high. Additional oil was pumped into the ocean and U-570 floated after a while higher up and better trimmed on the surface.

Now Rahmlow requested that the five wounded crew members be taken off right away for medical treatment. Woods agreed to this demand and tried twice to get close enough to U-570 to take them off, but somehow things did not work out. Then Woods ordered the captain of the KINGSTON AGATE, Lieutenant H. O. L'Estrange, to make a towing attempt, as this trawler was equipped with special machinery and heavy towing equipment. A four-man boarding party was organized, headed by Sublieutenant H. B. Campbell that remained tethered to the trawler and carried a heavy hawser to be fastened firmly to U-570.

The boarding party landed successfully on U-570, with assistance by the German crew who informed Campbell that the battery rooms had flooded and filled U-570 with chlorine gas and that they expected U-570 to sink momentarily. Campbell was doubtful that this was really the case and decided to get below deck himself quickly, to search for the Enigma machine and related coding material, but found actually nothing anymore of any real value At 1600 hours (4pm) the towline was finally fastened and the float pulled over to the trawler but instead of the authorized five wounded crewmembers, Ralmlow himself, the Directing Engineer Erich -Menzel and the First Watch Officer Bernhard Berndt were the first three men to leave U-570 and arrive at the trawler, to the surprise and disgust of her captain.

Only on the second trip of the raft did the wounded arrive and were taken aboard KINGSTON AGATE, thereafter a third load arrived so that there were now 12 men from U-570 on the trawler and no further suitable space for more men on the small ship. Then the rescue plan came fully apart during this waiting period and after the officers had left U570 first instead of last.

The Canadian destroyer NIAGRA now took suddenly over, without orders from Woods and moved to center stage. Ryan came up very close astern from U-570 and shot over connecting lines, which permitted the pulling over of another raft to take off more crew members from U-570. Then Ryan signaled that the remaining Germans should evacuate the boat without further delay, but they were hesitant to follow his orders as previously Commander Woods had instructed them to remain on board U-570 as Woods only intended to take off the five wounded men.

Woods was furious that her officers had been getting off to start with, as he felt they should have stayed aboard U-570 in order to keep her floating and seaworthy. A German speaking petty officer of the NI4GRA told the remaining Germans to get off immediately on that float and to come right away aboard the NIAGRA - or else!

So the raft shuttled back and forth and the remaining 31 men were made P.O.W.'s of the Canadians, including the Second Watch Officer, Walter Christiansen. The Canadians searched the Germans thoroughly, cleaned them up and provided them with dry clothing followed by hot beverages and a full evening meal before they were placed under guard into a stokehold.

By this time, the boarding party of the KINGSTON A CATE had managed to attach a heavy towline firmly, closed the conning tower hatch of U-570 and returned to their trawler to start towing U-570 towards Iceland at slow speed. Campbell and his men did not believe that it would be feasible to actually get U-570 to Iceland but that she would sink somewhere along the route instead while under tow. Woods released the trawlers WASTEWATER and HIINDERMERE to return to their regular duties and proceeded with the rest of the ships very slowly towards Iceland under heavy air cover for antisubmarine protection while the BURRELL, the NIAGRA, the KINGSTON AGATE and the NORTHERN CHIEF circled the towed U-boat continuously in order to keep her covered at all -times. After several hours, Woods ordered that the towing speed should be increased, but the towline broke quickly after that was the case.

Now the NORTHERN CHIEF took over the towing job and managed to replace the broken cable with an even heavier one. Woods then decided that the other ships should take off towards Iceland, due to fuel problems and Woods signaled the NORTHERN CHIEF new instructions: 'If the towline breaks again during the night, sink U-570 with depth charges!'

However, the weather finally improved and the seas calmed down considerably while visibility increased substantially, so that a towing speed of 6 knots could be maintained and before taking his ships to their base in Iceland and leaving NORTHERN CHIEF behind, Woods ordered that NORTHERN CHIEF should head with U-570 in tow, to the nearest port on the Icelandic shoreline, Thorlakshaven near the tiny town of Eyerbakki where U-570 was to be beached temporarily as she was already way down again in the water and Woods considered it too much of a gamble to proceed all the way to Reykjavik, his destination for refueling.

Consequently, U-570 was beached gently at 1900 hours (7pm) on 29 August 1941 with the assistance of two local tugboats.

As is so after the case in these types of situations, plans and. intentions do not work out as contemplated because matters beyond control interfere and the reactions as well as the actions of people involved are seldom fully predictable. Furthermore, machinery and equipment have a tendency to malfunction rather than to perform when most needed and least expected. More so when an operation almost without precedent suddenly has to be dealt with.

On 30 Aug. 1941, a party of four British submariners and technical specialists were flown to Iceland for an initial inspection of U-570. it was found that the pressurized high grade steel body was undamaged and did not leak anywhere; that the batteries were quite low but still provided enough electrical current to illuminate the interior of U-570 sufficiently. Both diesel as well as electric engines worked, though not giving much smooth or full performance. Pumps, compressors and other auxiliary machinery likewise were still in operating order. But the interior of U-570 was a terrible mess and had been left in a chaotic state of disorder. All sorts of things were floating around from bread to fruit and from flour sacks to vegetables and all sorts, of cooking items, many of them already rotten and smelly, combined with bilge water into a sticky, revolting compound that was knee-deep over the floorplates.

One of the two toilets had been converted into a food storage room. Though this was actually customary on Type J/7I U-boats due to lack of storage space, the British submariners were amazed about it no end.

Working in three around-the-clock shifts, U-570 was cleaned up entirely. On 5 September 1941 she was declared ready for towing to the Royal Navy base of Hvalfjord on Iceland after several small cracks were filled, all tanks were blown and emptied and the bilges pumped.

At Hva1fjord U-570 was very closely examined and then prepared for safe towing to Scotland, 21 of the 62 battery cells in the forward storage area had been smashed or cracked and 26 of the 62 cells in the rear battery area likewise. 7 minor kinds of damage were repaired, caused by depth charging. The Germans had partially destroyed the radioroom equipment and also the electrical recording boards, most valves and some connectors. Several instruments in the control room had been damaged by hammer blows, but everything could be fixed up easily.

Part of the navigational equipment was damaged, but could repairable. The attack periscope had its oculars removed. These were tossed overboard. The gliding sections had been opened and seawater as well as oil had entered and corroded same. An experienced English submarine captain, Commander George R. Colvin, was flown to Iceland with an operating submarine crew to take over U-570 and bring her to Vickers Yard at Barrow-in-Furness on the Scottish west coast, under escort.

Because so many servicemen had by now seen U-570, including many Americans posted to Iceland to replace the British occupation troops, it was considered impossible to keep the capture a secret for long. The Admiralty therefore recommended to exploit the surrender and capture of a brand new German U-boat to the hilt by making it public. The information was widely distributed to the British and neutral press, making headlines in all papers.

Reuters news agency spread the details worldwide and the various, BBC radio services, including all foreign broadcasts, featured the case as an extraordinary news item. This was unprecedented and had never before happened.

In Germany everything connected with U-boats was wrapped into a tight cover of secrecy. The British had always refused to publicize anything at all about their anti-submarine operations and remained silent even about successes, in order not to feed valuable information to the German navy and Abwehr counterintelligence services. Naturally, the information released was limited and restricted to keep the Germans in the dark about some of the technical and factual specifics. Some of the publicized details were slanted to disguise certain things the British preferred to keep under wraps and cammouflaged and twisted a bit to suit the purposes of the Admiralty to only hand out the facts they felt could no longer be held secret anyway.

U-570 became the Number One news item for quite some time and the first extensive operational event released to the press and radio, both British as well as neutral. The capture was also made public as a morale booster for the English civilian s, to balance some of the bad news from military operations elsewhere and particularly to strike a blow against the U-boal operations of Admiral Donitz and to shake his self-confidence somewhat.

Because the German Abwehr and other German intelligence organizations tuned in and listened to both British broadcasts as well as neutral ones and perused English papers arriving in neutral countries avidly and thoroughly, the capture of U-570 swiftly became known both to Vice Admiral Donitz,. in charge of U-boat operations at his command post in Kerneval near Lorient, France as well as at all the various U-boat bases and related commands.

It is interesting that the initial reaction of Donitz has been recorded and reported by the senior staff officer at U-boat headquarters, Commander Victor Oehrn -who was also close to Donitz personally. Oehm was considered by U-boat commanders and officers serving at the Atlantic Front, as the offficer with the - highest I. Q. in U-boat command, apart from Donitz himself and Oehrn was also seen as a tireless, tenacious, fair and reasonable officer by all who had dealings with him. Oehrn did not pull rank or play at being some kind of big shot, but was understanding of the various captains and their problems and tried hard to help them overcome same instead of just spouting orders and telling them off as others did, to emphasize their importance.

The recorded radio programs were delivered together with copies of various British newspapers to Donitz and discussed amongst the BdU (U-boat Command) staff. According to Oehrn, Donitz just listened and finally remarked:

'We know too tittle about the circumstances of this loss. Without more detailed information, we realty cannot judge the commander of U-570!'

It was a rather surprising statement for those who were acquainted with Donitz and rather unlike his usual reaction to bad news reports in general. Oehrn also stated that Donitz had not appointed Rahmlow to U-570. Furthermore that Donitz had never met Ralmlow in the past and did not know him or anything about him. This could have been actually the case at that period of time.

I believe that Rahmlow is still living in Germany, although he's not in contact with any of the U-boat groups (for obvious reasons). This story continues in KTB #143 next month - and when it is finished, I will repeat what OTTO KRETSCHMER (122-+-1985) told me about his meeting with Rahmlow before the war began. It surprised me - you will find it interesting.