INTRODUCTION

Over the past couple of years a heated debate has gone on in the Russian press about the role, problems and composition of the future Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF). On one hand essentially everyone agreed that while there exists another nuclear power, Russia also must possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, in conditions of deep economic crisis and a decreasing level of combat readiness in the army, the Strategic Nuclear Forces remain the sole hope for defense against any external threat from which Russia is not able to withstand with adequate means.

Practically all of the participants in the discussion recognize the role of strategic deterrence. However, this brief formulation allows for different interpretations and are therefore one of the causes of existing debates and conflicting answers to the following questions:

• What requirements must Russia’s SNF meet?
• What are the specific problems they must resolve?
• What should their structure and numbers be?

An attempt is made here to categorize the problems which arise in the course of this discussion. We attempt to show that a number of arguments which are being promoted by advocates of prioritizing the development of ground-based missiles, to a small extent, do not have a strong enough basis to support themselves.

At present (when this paper was finished) the state Duma of the Russian Federation had still not ratified the START-2 Treaty. Moreover, in our view, the political leadership of the country has still not completely defined the future of the strategic nuclear forces. This discussion, about what kind of SNF Russia needs, is continuing.