The Royal Navy Convoys to Malta Part 1

There were near-misses by the dozen, but only the cruiser HMS GLOUCESTER received a direct hit on her bridge, a bomb’s full penetrating and high-lifting blast. The Captain was killed as were six other officers and eleven ratings while a number of others were wounded. HMS GLOUCESTER had been designed for more of the old fashioned actions at sea involving bursting shells. She did not burn disastrously but remained in action. Within a short space of time, she was brought under control, being steered from her after position. Although her speed was greatly reduced, she resumed her place in line. Admiral Cunningham had by now confirmed the information that he had earlier in the day received from the submarine HMS PHOENIX.

HMS PHOENIX, commanded by LCDR G. H. Nowell, first spotted the Italian fleet in the early hours of the 8th July but was too far away for a torpedo attack, and impossible to get into a firing position due to the speed of the Italian fleet. This completely frustrated LCDR Nowell. All he could do was to follow the Italian fleet and report their position, speed and course to the British fleet. The Italian fleet was at sea two hundred miles east of Malta heading south. This was also confirmed by a flying boat out of Malta, which sent a report that escorting the convoys there were two battleships, six cruisers and seven destroyers. Clearly they must be escorting an important convoy and the reason for the heavy bombing of the British fleet became apparent - it was to deny the British fleet the use of the Central Mediterranean.

It was more important then to strike at the enemy’s fleet and attempt to cut off the Italians from their base. the action, in which both battle fleets were covering important convoys of merchantmen were out of sight and unharmed in both cases but the conclusions that were to be drawn were correct on the Italian side; wrong on the British. The engagement was to reinforce the opinion of the Italian High Command that their fleet should be kept as a threat, while the British conclusion that air attack could be considered acceptable was to be proved false in later phases of the war.

After the German Luftwaffe had arrived in the Mediterranean, the ensuing Battle of Calabria as it came to be called, was to bolster British morale, somewhat shaken by the first day’s attacks and to confirm a wise decision on the part of the Italian High Command but the fact remained that if the Italians had risked a stand-up fight, they might have gained the Mediterranean forever.

As the two fleets drew together, one anxious to provoke an action, the other to avoid it. Admiral Inigo Campioni, having covered his convoy to a position northwest on Benghazi, had turned north. The Italian High Command having ordered him to steer west so as not to risk an engagement until noon the following day by which time the British fleet would be in easy range of bombers from Sicily and the Italian fleet would have air cover from the Italian mainland.

Early the next morning, the Italian fleet was located by a flying boat from Malta, some 145 miles to the westward of Admiral Cunningham’s flagship HMS WARSPITE (pictured below). Soon after, reconnaissance SWORDFISH from the carrier HMS EAGLE made contact and remained to shadow and report their movements.

Not until noon, when the two fleets were some 80 miles apart, did Admiral Campioni (badly let down by his Air Force) locate his opponent by means of an aircraft catapulted from his flagship, the GIULIO CESARE. He was only about 50 miles from Cape Spartivento on the toe of Italy, close to the Straits of Messina. He had every reason to expect that his opponents would now have come under heavy attack from shore based aircraft of the Regia Aeronautic and reduce Adm Cunningham’s strength. They did not.

Nevertheless, he pressed on, accepting action as he could well afford to do, for his two recently modernized battleships could outrun all of Admiral Cunningham’s, and could outrange all in firepower except HMS WARSPITE. His six heavy and ten light cruisers were opposed to five British light cruisers, one of which had been damaged (HMS GLOUCESTER) and was held back in support of the aircraft carrier HMS EAGLE.

At 1145 hours and again four hours later, a small striking force of SWORDFISH armed with torpedoes, was flown off HMS EAGLE. As was to be shown so often in the future, such a number was too small to ensure success, but it was all there was and on this first occasion of going into action, it was not surprising, even if disappointing, that they failed to score any hits.

Meanwhile, soon after 1500 hours in the clear blue Mediterranean with a light breeze from the northwest flecking the water, the two fleets had come in sight of one another. A few minutes later, the action opened when a squadron of Italian 8 inch cruisers opened fire on the four British cruisers, led by VADM John Tovey in HMS ORION at a range of 13 miles. As soon as the range of his 6 inch guns permitted, VADM Tovey replied; but the odds were too great and to reduce the balance, HMS WARSPITE, now far ahead of her two consorts, sent a few salvos from her 15 inch guns at the Italian cruisers. They at once turned away under smoke.

A lull ensued, during which HMS WARSPITE circled to allow HMS MALAYA, held up by the slow-steaming HMS ROYAL SOVEREIGN, to catch up. Then at 1553 hours, the opposing battleship columns came in sight of one another. HMS WARSPITE, her great guns elevated to maximum range, opened fire at 26,000 yards. Both sides shot well and straddled their targets almost at once. At 1600 hours they saw a great orange coulored flash of a heavy explosion at the base of the Italian Flagship’s funnels. The hit had caused fires to break out below decks in the CESARE as well as causing other damage.

The Italian fleet at once turned away under a heavy smoke screen. A confused action followed with destroyers and cruisers appearing momentarily from the smoke, the latter to make long-range but unsuccessful torpedo attacks to cover the withdrawl. Meanwhile, behind his smoke screen, Admiral Campioni was heading away south-westward for the safety of his own protected waters in the Straits of Messina.

Admiral Cunningham was unwilling to plunge blindly through the barrier of smoke. He chose therefore to work his way round to the north and windward of the smoke. By the time his first ships had drawn clear of it, the Italian fleet had vanished over the horizon. The superior speed of the Italian ships would have made a chase unrealistic.