PETER HANSEN (251-LIFE-1987) spent time working for the ABWEHR (the German Secret Service) during World War II and he has information that is known to a mere handful of people. He gives this secret information exclusively to SHARKHUNTERS. Here he tells us:

Plan ‘FELIX’ was born and created by the small flock of ‘Desk Warriors’ in Berlin. Hitler ordered feverish diplomatic activity, a lot of it for mainly public relations reasons, to confuse and convince the ‘innocent’ fools that could not properly analyze facts and were unable to understand international factors, compared to merely making boastful speeches or threats to scare the frightful ones. However, Generalisimo Francisco Franco did not belong in that bunch of suckers, as he was a very realistic man, contrary for example to Mussolini who likewise thrived on noisy show type of demonstrations and hour-long speeches of senseless baloney that bore little relation to actuality and prevailing facts. This in turn appealed again to Hitler, being down his alley and his own way of handling matters with fanatic talk and hot air promises.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was ordered to fly to Spain in order to test Franco’s state or preparedness and willingness to participate either actively, but at least as silent assistant. Canaris was instructed he could, if required, promise Spain parts of French North Africa, particularly Morocco, if this would induce Franco to join the operations contemplated. But Franco demurred and cited the poor state of his economy after the long Spanish Civil War and the extremely large needs for supplies of all sorts from coal to grain and anything else, not to mention fuel which was already too short for German needs to start with. Admiral Canaris was personally opposed to bring or rather, forcing or dragging Spain into the war as he felt that as a cooperative neutral, Spain could be more helpful than as a participant in the war. Canaris felt Spain would even turn into a bigger burden than Italy already was for Germany economically and strategically, and eventually militarily. But the paper-shufflers in Berlin continued to promote their decisive ‘Mediterranean First’ strategy, even after they became aware that Hitler and his camarilla had already thrown the dice and decided to attack Russia instead, to grab all the economic needs of Germany for the next three hundred years!

Canaris also pointed out that the essential economic and military support requirements for both Spain and Italy would far exceed German possibilities, apart from the fact that German industrial power was already very insufficient to merely supply the essential German needs apart from raw material and financial requirements even.

Canaris also brought the Army High Command into the picture and pointed out to them that Plan ‘FELIX’ might well turn into Plan ‘FENIX’ and get everybody burned badly unless Franco’s Spain was both able as well as willing to fully participate without needing German military and economic/financial support to do so. Naturally, Canaris was quite clear in his mind that this simply could not ever become the case, as he was intimately familiar with the actual internal situation within Spain in every respect. The Army planned and OKH (Army High Command) agreed that there could not be any hope for grabbing the Rock of Gibraltar swiftly and successfully without such Spanish support. the Spanish roads were in terrible shape, likewise the Spanish railroad system was totally worn out and not in shape to support fast troop movements with heavy equipment for the three or even four divisions considered the minimum necessary to attack Gibraltar and conquer the Rock even if it would be possible to preserve an element of surprise, which appeared very doubtful indeed with the prevailing geography and the impossibility to keep such large type of military movements under cover or camouflaged as something else.

Historians pointed out what had happened to Napoleon and how the Spanish ‘guerrillas’ had defeated his every attempt to occupy Spain and bring it into his domain by force of arms, as his navy had of course, been defeated and the remnants were insufficient to accomplish something of that order. The most daring of these historians also pointed out the experiences of Napoleon in Russia; but this was almost suicidal and bring such men into the Nazi court system to get shortened by a head. The masses of the Spanish population that had somehow survived the bloody Civil War was basically anti-foreign in their ideas and opinions and would become extremely determined ‘partisans’ if foreign troops would occupy Spain or parts of Spain, without active cooperation of the Spanish authorities, no matter how they might personally dislike same.

Hitler ordered therefore ‘Diplomatic’ activities be stepped up even more. Hitler decided to meet with General Franco and his HighStaff at the French/Spanish bordertown of Hendaye, traveling there in his personal train. The meeting was a total flop, despite official announcements to the contrary. The front money demands of Franco and his group of ministers were tremendous and could not be fulfilled by Germany except by promises of the political kind that never get taken serious. There was a lot of speech making, of back slapping, of toasts to all and yonder - but all those cocktail party type of activities could not hide the fact that the meeting was an absolute failure.

Finally, Franco and his Foreign Minister Serrano Suner promised in a ‘secret’ bulletin, that they would offer the required logistical support to put Plan ‘FELIX’ in action and permit the taking away of Gibraltar - AFTER ENGLAND WAS DEFEATED AND OUT OF THE WAR! A shrewd tactic indeed, as the Spanish had begun by then to have grave doubts this would ever be the case. Serrano Suner had given his final speech with a smile, but through steel teeth of inflexibility as the Germans realized that ‘Yes but’ usually means ‘No!’.

Hitler’s train departed onward for Montoine France where Hitler was to meet Marshall Petain, the new ruler of ‘Vichy’ France. During the journey Hitler told his intimates that he would rather visit a dentist and have all his molars pulled, than to have to talk again with these Spanish ‘Robbers and Holdup Men’!’. Canaris had predicted and coached the Spaniards attending that a big smile and friendly confusion combined with steely determination would be able to overcome the usual threats and bigshot tactics that Hitler and von Ribbentropp were so fond of utilizing. Hitler stated one could not nail these oily Spaniards on a barn, because they were like Jello and just could not be made to accept anything not to their liking.

The meeting with Petain was likewise a total flop and except for the usual press releases and cloudy ‘diplomatic’ speeches and bulletins, producing nothing of consequence. Petain grew even more remote, retiring to Vichy and was even more carefully determined to stay away from anything that would benefit German affairs in Unoccupied France, where Petain’s rule became even more tightly controlled than up to that date. Even the later-on shot, Pierre Laval, really pursued only matters of French interest mainly circumventing almost anything that could be sidetracked if it was not for the needs and benefits of the French. Petain ordered secretly to retain the greatest possible flexibility for France and her colonial possessions and not to commit to anything that did not offer at least specific advantages to the French, including French Prisoners of War. Speeches to the contrary notwithstanding!

Therefore the great diplomatic offensive was a complete flop. Plan ‘FELIX’ was put into storage for the time being; ‘SEALION’ was shut down except for press relation purposes and political speeches. Nothing had passed the pure planning stages at all. Regardless, if some people considered now the Western Mediterranean as the key to defeat Britain without landing in England herself as yet. Hitler immediately firmed up his intentions to attack Sowjet Russia and dropped any plans to conquer the Rock of Gibraltar, the linchpin to the Southern Mediterranean strategy to win over Great Britain.

But the tonnage sea war was stepped up, though largely on paper because THERE WERE STILL FEWER U-BOATS AVAILABLE IN THE FALL OF 1940 THAN HAD BEEN READY AT THE START OF THE WAR IN 1939!