I think it best to repeat and renew this subject for publication soonest. I do this especially because I understand that you intend to repeat the Russian GRU reactions and actions once more in the KTB that were previously printed, the same as the Spanish matters around URSULA etc. Perhaps you figure most of the new Members since this was first run, have no knowledge of it but one can’t fail to see that the older Members would say - what about this repetition despite the fact that the subject is of course, of considerable interest and few people really know anything about it.

Regarding the inquiry by TOM MARKER (472-1991) - it is both a challenge what concerns the political as well connected strategical and tactical connections, as these are so intertwined they can’t be separated and must all be taken into consideration in order to halfway understand the ‘background’ and certain reactions as well as actions. But without such background, some are almost impossible to follow, much less understand.

First of all, one must NEVER forget that Germany was primarily a mainly Continental power and country, contrary to the British who are islanders first and foremost, and for whom the Royal Navy consequently was the ‘Senior’ service, that also had a higher prestige than the Army, as the RAF was only started up and separated from the Army in the early Twenties after World War One. Consequently, virtually all German policies, decisions and the general strategic and planning thinking was dominated by such type of Army General Staff views, while overseas was of little interest and there was only a very small minority interest that concerned itself with Africa, Asia, the Middle East, South America or North America. Individuals and special interest type of small groups that involved themselves in these before Television ‘far-away’ areas were generally considered as somewhat peculiar, if not even loony not only by the general population, but also in the influential military and political circles thus they were seen as strange birds, like butterfly collectors for example and unimportant by and large. This crowd did include a few retired and even active naval officers too, but even within the Navy they were considered as odd-balls usually and had no influence on planning or were included in strategic sessions.

Naturally, more naval officers had traveled internationally and visited different foreign countries, some of them in the line of duty, others for curiosity reasons. However, 95% of the people ‘thought German’ and viewed almost everything foreign as suspicious, disorderly and strangely confusing. Those rare exceptions amongst officers tended therefore towards assignments in the international liaison fields or connected intelligence and covert as well as open information areas and assignments. The Nazis viewed such types of people as not conformist enough, as cosmopolitan and unreliable because they did not share the ‘dictated’ official policies and views in most cases and had many reservations about the mostly low class Nazi types, at best mediocre fellows, who had been unsuccessful in the professions or commercial endeavours or had been fired for incompetency, rudeness, underhanded dealings. Their parole being ‘If you don’t want to be my brother, I shall bash your head in.’

Hitler himself, of course, was a typical ‘land animal’ as he himself frequently stated, he feared the seas and tended to get seasick even before any ship transporting him left the pier, though he only utilized seatransport when there was no other choice, mostly in the Baltic though he did like airtravel and used chartered aircraft for political campaigns before almost anybody else did so. This is also one of the principal reasons why Hitler left the Navy pretty much alone and for many years acting in accordance with its own devices and according to the OKM Navy views, no matter how outdated!

Admiral Erich Raeder was of course, a typical representative of these type of ‘imperial’ if not reactionary navy circles, that still dreamt of big battleship navies and of course building fleets of big ships to offer positions for admirals regardless if German industry and shipyards had the capability to produce them, apart from the shortage of many materials and knowledgeable craftsmen to construct them. In this connection, one must also recall that in 1933 the German Navy had barely 1,000 officers of all grades, even though the ‘Versailles Contract’ had permitted the Reischmarine to have a maximum of 1,500 officers, this quota was never approached much less filled. Hitler had repeatedly assured Erich Raeder that there would be no war until 1947/1948 at the earliest and that consequently no substantial fleet needed to be available for political and military pressure, actions etc before that year.

With other words, the Nazis miscalculated the actions, reactions and determination of the British Government grossly. They were quite painfully surprised in 1939, when the British stood firm and ‘Total Germany’ was decided upon. Hitler had relied upon the totally incompetent champagne salesman von Ribbentrop on foreign policy matters and promoted this jackass to Foreign Minister, as he was also a good ‘Yes man’ in most ways. When his information and planning proved a total failure, Hitler pushed in July/August of 1939 towards a ‘reconciliation’ with Stalin and Sowjet Russia, that had been negotiating with the British and French for several months without reaching agreement. Hitler felt apparently this would force the British back and would allow him another ‘diplomatic’ victory ‘a la Munich 1938’ and thereby postpone, if not avoid, war again. But this turned out to be a total misconception and false reckoning in every respect.

The so-called advantages of the ‘Hitler-Stalin’ pact were temporary at best and also limited geographically in importance, influence and effect. Now the summer of 1940 forced sudden and entirely new decisions to the surface that needed to be made and clear thinking was required - but not forthcoming. After the Lightning Defeat of France, Germany suddenly held the European coastline from the Spanish border at San Sebastian to the North Cape, facing a confused England that had managed to bring back its beaten Army from the Continent to Southeastern Britain, but largely without arms and equipment. No plans existed for such a development and situation anywhere at the German Army Commands (OKH and OKW) or for that matter the Navy Command in Berlin (OKM).

The SEALöWE (SeaLion) Operational plan thrown together in a hurry was faulty in so many respects, nobody really liked it. The German Navy lacked the ships to transport a sufficiently large Army Group to England. Erich Raeder feared, with good reason, the overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy. Despite requisitioning anything that floated, from river barges to coastal steamers, there simply was not enough shipping obtainable to properly operate such a landing operation crossing the Channel to England. The Army planning and command staffs largely thought of it as a somewhat similar operation that a crossing of a broad river would require. How hostile the sea conditions and storm as well as bad weather conditions would become, they had no real notion at all.

So the Bigmouth Fatman Göring jumped into the ring and told everybody the Luftwaffe would singlehandedly defeat Great Britain and knock it out of the war with bombings so that the landing would probably not even be required, except to bring an Army of Occupation after the Luftwaffe Victory; to administer and police England. Nobody else really believed the bragging assurances of Göring, but Hitler seemingly did and agreed to give him his chance and way.

However, because Chief Air Marshall Hugh Dowding had fought the politicians tooth and nail, particularly Winston Churchill after he became Prime Minister after May 10th, 1940 and intended in his peculiar way of strategic meddling based upon cavalry tactics from even before World War One, to push strongly for a gradual ferrying of more British fighters to France, after France was already obviously defeated, which would have only been bled to death and could not really change anything except possibly delay slightly the end of the French Campaign for political and public relations reasons.

But Dowding stood firm, his nickname being ‘Snuffy’ turned out prophetic, as his RAF Fighter Command literally snuffed out the Luftwaffe during the Battle for Britain, but this was only possible because he refused to release further fighter groups from those required for the very defense of England, regardless how loud and much Churchill yelled and hollered for them, demanding that France must be strengthened and helped by them, even though this could not influence the final outcome in any decisive way anymore. Churchill never forgave him and forgot his unbendable defiance of his attack at any cost policies, and the Victor of the Battle for Britain was promptly retired and canned at its end. Knowledgeable insiders stated - Dowding kicked out even though he was near retirement age, like some cleaning woman fired for doing a lousy job! Because Dowding was not a very articulate man, unlike Churchill, he suffered in silence while Churchill grabbed the publicity and achieved the status of victor in this Battle for Britain, which would unquestionably have become a great defeat if Dowding had not managed to get his way and to overcome Churchill’s decisions and determination to grind up the Royal Air Force fighters for no real purpose in France.

Hitler himself was turning negative on occupying Great Britain after his serious defeat of the Luftwaffe, where the peacetime trained crop of pilots was lost and could never be properly replaced by newly trained people with considerably less experience, thus steadily lowering the capability and efficiency of the Luftwaffe thereafter.

Result: Hitler decided to ‘defeat’ England in Russia. Another fallacy, that put the very kiss of death on the German Army and in many ways, also the rest of the Luftwaffe. The fateful Plan ‘BARBAROSSA’ to attack and occupy European Russia was put into gear and plan ‘SEALöWE’ was quietly canceled and deadfiled.

This is the time when the proponents of the ‘Mediterranean’ strategy entered the picture. Most of these admirals and overage captains at Navy Command (OKM) in Berlin and a few converts and friends they had at the Army Command. Plan FELIX was born and created by this small flock of desk warriors in Berlin. Hitler ordered ’feverish’ diplomatic activity, a lot of it for mainly public relations reasons, to confuse and convince the ‘innocent’ fools that could not properly analyze facts, and were unable to understand international factors, compared to merely making boastful speeches.