LADINO TACTICS The nature of fighting in Yucatan was largely determined by the heavily forested terrain of the frontier area which greatly favored the Maya's "guerilla" style tactics. To fight in the jungle the Ladinos used ad hoc field columns known as guerrillas. A typical guerilla task force could consist of anything from a couple of platoons or a company to larger battalion sized formations. The latter were more common after the crisis while company sized guerrillas were typical in the earlier days. Their size was largely determined by available forces, their mission, and the amount of opposition expected. Ladino guerilla operations were usually confined to narrow (often divergent) jungle trails that made lateral communications and mutual support between separate units impossible. Such "search and destroy" operations were largely "hit or miss" affairs. Once committed down a jungle trail a guerilla was on its own - hopefully strong enough to defeat any enemy it might encounter. A standard Ladino tactic, when possible, was to send two or more guerrillas against an objective along separate converging trails. As often as not one such column might be ambushed and defeated (or even wiped out) while the other column would reach the objective unopposed. In time the Ladinos improved theirjungle fighting skills, becoming less trail bound and learning to utilize the terrain much as the indians did. They also learned to strike where the Maya were most vulnerable; by destroying the cornfields they needed for sustenance and by campaigning into the wet season hoping to disrupt the Mayan corn planting. One method when operating in enemy territory during the planting season was to have lookouts scan the treeline horizon for smoke. The smoke revealed the location of Mayan farmers clearing a forested plot for planting (ie. slash and burn agriculture). The spot would be noted and later a guerilla would move in and destroy that field. INDIAN TACTICS The limestone geology of Yucatan left lots of flat limestone loose and scattered on the surface. This flat sheet rock was readily available for building walls and barricades -- a hallmark of Mayan tactics. In the bush the Maya used barricades to block trails and to set up ambushes. Typically such an ambush would consist of a blocking barricade across the trail and flanking barricades parallel to the trail behind which they would deliver a quick volley and then close in with the Machete the preferred weapon. These barricades were sometimes fronted by hidden and staked pit falls. Limited ammunition supplies influenced Maya tactics. Unless absolutely necessary or it was advantageous The Maya seldom put up a determined defence of barricades. They prefer to deliver aclose range musket volley and fall back to the next line of barricades or further into the bush. They hoped to the draw the enemy into the bush where their musketry was nullified; try to string out their columns and then attack with the Machete. If a pursuing column was small enough and vulnerable the Maya would attack and chop it up, if it was too large to deal with the Maya could easily avoid it and often times safely ignore it. In the early days these tactics were successful and countless militia companies and even battalion sized formations were decimated in this fashion. SIEGE TACTICS The Maya, as Commodore Perry noted possessed neither a siege train, the heavy weapons, nor the staying power to conduct formal siege operations against permanent fortifications. Fortunately for them the only such fortifications they would have had to deal with were the fort of San Filipe at Bacalar, the fortress of San Benito in Merida, and of course the formidable walls of Campeche. Of the three, San Felipe was surrendered on terms after repulsing desperate Mayan assaults and the other two were never reached by large Mayan forces. Other Ladino towns were defended only by fieldworks, barricades or fortified buildings. When the Maya encountered a fortified camp or town they would usually try to take the place by direct assault - often overcoming the defenses with sheer numbers or by the ferocity of their attack. If this failed the place was encircled (often screened and bypassed) and the enemy garrison pinned in place by sniping, skirmishing, and even rushes. Meanwhile the Maya would rapidly surround the enemy fortifications with matching barricades (lines of circumvallation) and later one or more supporting lines (contravallation) would be built. Afterwards these siege lines would be reinforced with small redoubts called plazuelos. These strongpoints served as ammo dumps or assembly areas and were often the object of sorties and counterattacks. Once built Maya siege works had the unnerving habit of creeping closer to the defenders lines literally overnight. Ladino defenses were similar though usually based on houses and the plazuelos were usually occupied by cannon. In the center a prominent fortified building or the customarily walled churchyard served as a final defensive strongpoint. When defending fortified positions the Ladinos relied heavily on their artillery a weapon the Maya did not possess. Against massed Mayan charges the close range fire of canister or grapeshot often saved the day and prevented a massacre. Even in the face of artillery fire the Maya were often able to advance their fieldworks by lying on their backs behind rocks or boulders and pushing them forward into place with their feet. In practice the Maya tended to loosely man their siege lines such that determined Ladino relief forces and supply convoys could often fight their way in. Beleaguered Ladino garrisons were usually able to break out of the siege lines but the trick was pulling off the evacuation and retreat afterwards. Thus in practice a Mayan siege usually succeeded by breaking the defendcrs morale and compelling a evacuation, not by starving them out or direct assault. Conspicuous torture and mutilation of prisoners helped accomplish this. Back to Table of Contents -- Savage and Soldier Vol. XXIII No. 2 Back to Savage and Soldier List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by Milton Soong. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com