Recently, a friend of mine asked as about wedges and how they were used in games. While in the process of responding, I came across the article by Terry on additional wedges for the WRG army lists (and others). This prompted me to dig into the books to f ind out more about wedges and for that matter, other formations and their representation.

The emphasis placed on formations has varied over the years an the rules change (WRG that is) and understanding of military techniques increased. With the advent of WRG 7th Edition, the number of permitted formations has decreased. Gone are the Skythian, Byzantine *African", Cantabrian circle and odd numbered. units. Unfortunately the wedge remains and so does the poor comprehension of what it could have been.

The wedge has been defined an both a unit formation and army formation (used by the Teutonic Knights during the "Ice Slaughter" in 1242 against Alexander Nevsky). However its precise form has not been clearly defined. There are some people who define it as similar to the tool used to split wood, that is to say triangular in shape with point designed to pierce an enemy's line or formation. others consider it to be an analogy in that the sheer energy of the troops massed at a specific point, regardless of formation, will drive into the enemy like a wedge.

There are cases for both recorded in history, if one is keen enough to take the time to search f or them. What should be emphasized in not the actual formation, but rather the ability of troops to apply pressure which results in pushing an opponent back or breaks into the opponent's formation. The aim being to grant a benefit to any formation considered a wedge so that it can perform historically (or at least as gamers understand it).

To illustrate this concept, a few examples are supplied below. The actual wedge-shaped formation like that used by Macedonian or Norman/German cavalry and Roman infantry have been given such a bonus by counting extra figures. Other formations like the deeper Theban and Macedonian phalanxes do not as yet have any such bonus. There is a case for giving deeper formations something to indicate their historical performance. This logic has been put forward by various gamers; however, this has not been recognized by all rules writers.

The other formations mentioned above have been cutback for a number of reasons including an attempt to simplify rules. Would it not also be appropriate to dispense with the wedge- shaped formation in favour of a generic wedge-like formation that permits certain units to fight more historically? The generic skirmish formation covers the Cantabrian circle, Skythian formation and other formations which formally distinguished between the various methods of skirmishing. The process could have been logically extended to cover all unique formations. Apart from visual accuracy, there is really no need to represent each type of formation that was or could have been used.

A simplified list of permitted formations would certainly curtail the debate over what armies can use this or that formation is a Swiss kiel the same as a Viking svynfylking (which was described by Saxon Grammaticus an an army formation). And does the latter have any relevance to the Roman term for a wedge? Is there any distinction between a cavalry rhomboid and a wedge? Why is a wedge disordered by melee (WRG interpretation) but not a testudo or phulcum/foulkon? Why if wedges are allowed, then why can not Romans use the counter (which resembles a saw blade) to it as described by Vegetius?

It seems that writers can be short sighted in their aims. The goal of some rules in to represent armies in battle and yet the gamers still squabble over individual units and their role in a game. If it is the army that is being controlled then the general is not going to be terribly concerned by precise formations as if standing on the parade square like some sgt.-major. The general is more likely to be concerned about deployment of his men in the battle with emphasis on reserves, shoring-up weak points and exploiting enemy mistakes.

I would suggest that the tabletop general, like his historical counterpart, is going to be busy trying to keep a table battleline and try to maintain his plan in the face of the enemy. He is not suddenly going to revert to being a subordinate in charge of a single unit and start fancy manoeuvres. Even if laying at this lower level, it is probable that the main concern would be to keep pace with flanking units or carry out orders to he best of his abilities. This last point may be enhanced by shifting into a new formation, but how much is this likely to influence the battle?

Possibly an army wedge as used by the Teutonic Knights may have a dramatic effect, but then so is the counter as employed by the Russians. If this is true, then the Romans formed a similar wedge at Cannae which was effectively opposed by the double envelopment of Hannibal. It is unlikely that the success of a single component of an army will influence a battle unless it is a planned concept (Alexander's use of cavalry at a specific point to shatter a battleline).

So mark me down as a supporter of simple concepts. I have studied warfare both as a pastime and as a profession. The tactics and basic concepts discussed by Sun Tzu and other ancients are as valid today as they were thousands of years ago. I see only three basic options open to an army commander; advance the centre, flank attack or a combination (hammer and anvil or double envelopment). This is a very simple approach but then anything else may just be too much as I try to digest intelligence on the enemy, push my troops and update my basic battle plan from a strategic vantage point.

It is unlikely that Scipio Africanus went rushing from unit to unit at Zama to ensure that the lanes were created to allow Hannibal's elephants to pass relatively harmlessly through the Roman army. It is more likely he left this work to the centurions and other subordinates whose job it was to maintain discipline so that a battle plan was followed.

Therefore the formations permitted to a tabletop general should reflect equal simplicity of intent. Allow troops to either engage in hand-to-hand or fire missiles. This can still allow for some flexibility in representation but not to the extent that we are reduced to endless debate over how this is to be done and by whom.