The articles and army lists published in this journal and by "other similar groups are usually derived from research based on a wide variety of sources. The most common written material falls into two categories; contemporary sources like Plutarch, Polybius, Herodotus and Ammianus Marcellinus, and later (or modern) works by Delbruck, Tarn, Lot, Oman, Gibbon, Connelly and Ferrill.

The writers of the first category could have based their writings on eyewitness accounts, personal experience and other written material (some of which is now lost to us). Generally these can be considered original works as they are possibly, if no actually, the only surviving contemporary reports. Thus they represent the only written records of what happened all those centuries ago.

The authors in the second category are more like ourselves in that they were inspired to study and then write about the results of their research. The research is based on reviewing the material of the first category, artwork, archaeological findings, architecture and, in some cases, deductions from personal experience.

Despite this wealth of written records of both categories, the student (either amateur or qualified) can still be frustrated when 'doing research on this period of history. The contemporary authors may have been biased by political or ethnic ties, or unfamiliar with the subject (in this case military affairs). Even an experienced soldier like Marcellinus can be infuriating in that he uses flowery prose and vague descriptions to report events (resulting in battle reports without unit names, numbers involved or personalities). Too often a writer assumes that the reader will be familiar with the events and/or understands the terminology and therefore elaboration is not necessary. The result can often be a less than complete account of history.

The writers of the second category usually attempt to substantiate or refute the first group. Their written material can often be plagued by problems arising from lack of knowledge, personal bias or putting too much faith in the first group. The results can often cause heated debate or perpetuate the errors in recording history.

The only safe course open to the student in to be cautious in accepting the written word. This may still not be wholly satisfactory, but does force the student to keep an open mind. To illustrate this approach, the following review in offered. It is not intended to be more than an example as it in very difficult to view past events and provide an absolutely accurate summary.

Recently, in articles and army lists published by ancient wargaming groups, it was indicated that the Huns used more infantry in their armies than is usually reported for armies of the reign of Attila. The inclusion of this as a major troop type in Hunnic armies appears to be based on a single source, which was quoted by an author of the second category (Ferrill)(1). This information is based on the theory that the Huns modified their fighting style after settling in what is now Hungary. The author of this theory, for those not familiar with Ferrill, is Rudi Paul Lindner (2), who wrote a well-researched essay, but one that does not fully appreciate the contemporary military factors of the fifth century A.D.

Mr. Lindner supports a Hunnic army with infantry outnumbering cavalry. Ironically, he begins his essay with two quotes by authors of the second category (Thompson p. 51 (3) and Maenchen Helfen p. 201 (4)), both of whom support more traditional views of the army's composition:

"There is no need to labour the point that the Huns all but lived on horseback, and in sheer horsemanship they far surpassed the best Roman and Gothic cavalry".

"In the seventy odd years between the first clash of the marauders with the Roman frontier troops and the battle at the locus Mauriacus, the warfare of the Huns remained essentially the same. Attila' a horsemen were still the same mounted archers who in the 380s had ridden down the Vardar valley and followed the standards of Theodosius."

In spite of this use of widely read authors as sources, Mr. Lindner would have his readers believe that the Hunnic army was altered significantly between the arrival of the Huns in Europe and the campaigns of Attila. The transition from a predominately cavalry to an infantry composition is certainly a radical concept given the relatively short period of time (about 75 years).

This is made even harder to accept because of the traditional view of nomadic warfare recorded by European historians over the centuries and the changing nature of warfare in the fourth and fifth centuries because of the impact of mounted German and Asian armies (at least from a Roman point of view). The importance of horsemen in Parthian, Sassanian, Gothic,, Vandalic, Moorish and Alanic forces indicates that regardless of total numbers, the cavalry were more important than infantry. The growth and importance of Roman cavalry forces as well as the Hunnic role in this process, also supports the traditional view that mounted troops were favoured over infantry.

The Arguments and Refutation

This theory can then be refuted with arguments drawn from the following list:

a. geography;
b. Hunnic culture;
c. related nomadic/barbarian cultures;
d. mathematical calculations;
e. contemporary sources and more current references;
f. military comparisons; and
g. scientific studies.

Geographically, the empire controlled by Attila covered an area encompassing Hungary, Romania and south-western Russia. The exact size of this domain is difficult to assess as the references, are unclear and Hunnic sources were either not kept or unknown to historians. what can be deduced is that the shear size of this empire permitted the Huns to raid Roman and Sassanian territories. simultaneously. The area was known then, as it is now, for the grazing of horses and other livestock. It was also the home of many other nomadic tribal groups before and after the Huns (all of whom are subject to Lindner's scrutiny). All of these peoples were recorded by Greek, Roman, and Byzantine historians (and of course later historians) as sharing similar roots an nomads. In addition, armies fielded by these groups were dominated by cavalry forces.

Culturally, the horse played an important role in the nomadic lifestyle. The horses raised by the Huns (and others) were noted for their hardiness despite their diminutive stature. These animals were the descendants of horses raised and bred for centuries on the plains and steppes of Asia. These eastern lands may not have been as an good for grazing as the lands eventually settled by the Huns in the fourth and fifth centuries. Thus the nomads, horses were accustomed to a much more diverse and probably lose appetizing diet than that of Roman and Greek horses. Both types of horses would have advantages and both were highly prized as a form of wealth (as evident by the status of the mounted warrior in barbarian and civilized cultures). The advantage of greater mobility when horse-mounted facilitated the migratory lifestyle of the nomad and was important to the various forms of warfare practised by these peoples. To the North Americans of today, it in easier to understand the role of the horse to a nomadic culture because of the similarity between Plains Indian cultures and Asiatic groups (and the Indians are easier to study because the horse was a relatively recent acquisition).

It is difficult to accept that the Huns altered their culture based on hundreds of years in a period of only 75 years. There are many examples of cultural shock abounding today to illustrate that such a change would have had a significant impact, which would probably be identified in contemporary sources. The problems associated with certain social groups (impact on American native groups, in Africa and Asia) adapting to modern Western cultural ideas tend to be noticeable and sources of comment in our media so why are the Ancients so quiet on a similar process as Lindner would have us believe occurred among the Huns?

Upon entering Europe, the Huns came into contact with two major cultural groups; the Germans and the Romans. The exposure to these two groups also resulted in the Huns encountering the horses of the Roman world. The various breeds preferred by the Romans and Germans were becoming more common on the battlefields, and. therefore more accessible to the military forces. The Germans, specifically the Ostrogoths, of eastern Europe had begun to dramatically increase their use of mounted forces. These people were to be the vassals and foes of the Huns, and probably did cause changes in the lifestyle of the Huns. This would include military activities.

The Romans began to accept the Huns as auxiliaries into their armies and the Germans (either willing or otherwise) became troops in Roman and Hunnic armies. These forces were increasingly dominated by cavalry an reported by historians. In fact the Battle of Hadrianople is often cited as the starting point for the rise of the mounted warrior (knight), who was to dominate European warfare over the next 11 centuries. Why then would the Huns sacrifice mobility when all around them were gaining the same?

As well, why would the Romans (in particular Aetius) recruiting Huns as soldiers when their were plenty of Germanic tribes with longer histories as ferocious infantrymen? How could a short Hun stand up to the physically bigger German, when the Romans were hiring Germans to take advantage of their stature (or so Caesar would have us believe from his experiences in Gaul during his conquests)? It would be more logical from a military point to hire from the barbarians specialists, who would not require the same amount of weapons handling to become proficient as would a ignorant city dweller or uncouth farmer? The Roman and Greek armies were filled with auxiliaries hired to take advantage of their particular skills (Cretan archers, Balearic slingers, Numidian light cavalry, etc.) and this was a practice established many centuries before the arrival of the Huns.

Why then would the Romans suddenly change? They may have been short of recruits, but there are no clear examples of accepting poor quality mercenaries when the empire abounded with similar quality citizens. A commander in more likely, wherever possible, to recruit the best an a way to ensure success. This is supported by the actions taken by Aetius to replace his Hunnic troops prior to Attila's campaign of 450 A.D. (due to Attila's edict prohibiting Huns from joining the Roman armies). Therefore, it appears unlikely when considering other cultures that the Huns would reduce their dependence on horses in an era of increasing reliance on cavalry.

It is quite possible that the Huns began to acquire Roman and German horses after making contact with these peoples. These other breeds of horses may then have been raised with the Asiatic breeds and possibly resulted in cross- breeding. Despite the limited size of the Hungarian plain (Alfold), the Huns could still probably rely on their Asian holdings, tribute from vassals and payments from the Romans to support the vast herds of horses to maintain a mounted military organization. Horses and fodder could be gained by raiding, which remained a part of Hunnic warfare to supplement tribute (or just to keep the warriors in shape) or the Huns may have been able to use the Roman payments to purchase horses or fodder as required prior to a campaign.

These two options would indicate that actual grazing territory was the sole method of determining the size of the Hunnic herds. Thus it would be difficult to assess the size or potential size of an army of cavalry deployed by Attila based on the acreage of grazing land (and of course the number of animals that could be fed by this land).

In military terms, the mobility of the nomads was probably essential to remaining dominant in Europe. The use of cavalry could ensure control over vast empires, which stretched from Asia well into Europe (of course with poorly defined boundaries).

Cavalry was ideally suited to the guerrilla warfare prosecuted by the Huns prior to the campaigns of Attila in 450 and 451 A.D. (these were similar to the raids conducted throughout the American civil war by several commanders on both sides between 1861 and 1865). In fact the speed of these mounted raiders was the cause of the exaggeration of nomadic numbers. A few warriors with sufficient mounts could easily control large areas because they could patrol quickly and on a regular basis. Being more visible to the inhabitants as well as reacting to any crisis situation would ensure better control over reluctant vassals.

The advantages of a mobile force to react quickly was the rationale used by the Romans to increase their own cavalry forces in the second and third centuries (well before the Huns arrived). If the civilized armies understood the benefits of cavalry to travel long distances quickly, then why would the Huns sacrifice the advantage in the face of mounted foes?

The size of the armies quoted in various sources is used as a criterion to determine the troop types fielded by the Huns. The very dubious figures used by historians tends to weaken the accuracy of any assessments. Armies quoted in the hundreds of thousands are likely sheer fantasy, while armies of tons of thousands are more believable. However, the use of hyperbole in describing military strength does indicate that these were impressive forces and worthy of note.

Whatever the actual size of a barbarian army, the commander would be hard pressed to maintain his troops in the field for long periods of time with only a rudimentary supply system. This tends to make a force of 15,000 Huns, as described by Lindner, a formidable army if it was all cavalry and used in a single campaign. By contrast, the Roman armies were measured by historians to about equal to their barbarian opponents (Julian's army at Argentorum in 357 was roughly 13,000, Stilicho had about 30 units to oppose Radagainue in 406 (20,000?) and Valens may have had 60,000 at Adrianople in 378).

Given that some troops would have to be left to garrison the empire (as much of the Roman strength was tied up in static defences), the army of Attila of 15,000 and additional German vassals would be a major threat to the Romans. This is supported by the efforts of Astius to gather allies to augment the troops under his command in Gaul (especially as he had lost his main source of recruits-the Huns).

The absence of Attila and his army on campaign would also support the need for a mounted military structure to provide the garrisons. While the main army fought in the west, a garrison force would have to contend with the Eastern Roman armies, Asiatic threats and the German vassals and neighbours. The lack of permanent Hunnic communities, fortifications or similar developments combined with the benefits of a mounted garrison indicate that the Huns did not rely on infantry to safeguard their territory. The absence of settlements established on permanent basis may be a reason for the quick demise of the Hunnic empire following the Battle of the Nedao River. The lack of urban communities like those of the Greeks and Romans (as well as the fact that the Huns did not occupy these communities) supports the idea of a semi-nomadic culture residing next to a settled urbanized culture.

The lack of fortifications and settlements weakens the existence of an infantry dominated military organization. There are also other indicators that the Huns did not change. Following his defeat at Chalons, Attila is reported piling saddles into a funeral bier. Why would a predominately infantry army carry saddles instead of more food or something more useful (shoes?).

The weapons used by the Huns remained the same from the arrival until after the demise of their empire, namely the bow as well as javelins, the lasso and sidearms. Thus the type of weapons, possession of saddles and movement of the Hunnic armies point to the Huns retaining a predominately mounted military.

In support of a Hunnic army with a majority of infantry, then it would be possible to state that the Germanic vassals could have been forced to supply auxiliary forces of infantry. These could have outnumbered the Huns and been useful in the same way that infantry were used in Sassanian armies (in siege situations). However, this seems less likely given that the German vassals included Ostrogoths, Heruls and Gepids. All of these tribes used cavalry forces to some extent. The advantage of taking these troops on campaign appear reasonable.

The typical German noble (or for that matter most barbarian nobles) rods to battle. The Huns may have taken nobles in the time honoured tradition an hostages to ensure loyalty among the vassals. The mounted Germans would also be able to keep pace with the Huns. Mobility is an important factor to consider given that Attila campaigned extensively in Gaul and Italy in 451 and 452. Could he have been so mobile if the army was predominately infantry?

Lindner's arguments are weakened by references that are open to broader interpretation. He provides an analogy to the Pony Express; however, he fails to consider that speed was the key factor for transmitting news until the advent of the telegraph (this idea is also an old one as the Achaemenid persians, Chinese and Romans used similar mail/courier services, and even the Incas used runners in this capacity and Marathon races are based on a feat by a Greek runner in 490 B.C.). He also quotes Marco Polo noting the horses were a symbol of wealth among nomads, but this is quite common among nomads of Asia and Plains Indiana.

It is unlikely that all of a nomad's horses were taken on a campaign or a raid. Some of the horses were needed as breeding stock, cargo carriers and a reserve force to replace battle losses. A better comparison for his argument would have been a review of accounts from the campaigns from 1866 to 1890 of the American west. This would represent a more up to date study of nomadic warfare and somewhat more accurate in terms of numbers (less likely to be corrupted by time and historian interpretation).

The other weakness in his article is the lack of similarity between the Huns and other nomadic groups. The Skythians, Sarmatians, Alans, Avars, Bulgars, Magyars, Seljuk and ottoman Turks, Khazars, Pechenegs, Cumans and Mongols came into contact with the same geographical areas (Russia and eastern Europe). There is no clear evidence that any of these groups gave up mounted warfare. There in however evidence that they did incorporate subject/allied tribes as infantry. The sedentary peoples like the Slavs, Bastarnae and Dacians did fight with these Asiatic hordes.

From the first eruption of Asiatic nomads into Europe, the dominant arm was the cavalry. Even an late as the ottoman expansion into Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries, the mounted warrior was supreme in eastern armies. His opponent from these times like Poles, Lithuanians, Russians, Wallachians, Albanians and Hungarians also used cavalry and gave It the dominant role in any army. The Romans and Byzantines were also quick to realize the advantages of cavalry forces, such that horsemen remained the essential element of the army until the fall of Constantinople.

It is for the above reasons that it appears more likely that the Huns remained a cavalry dominated military organization despite their settling next to the Roman lands in the fourth and fifth centuries. Thus an Maenchen-Heflen states.

"Attila's horsemen were the same mounted archers who in the 390's had ridden down the Vardar Valley and followed the standard of Theodosius. Their tactics were determined by the weapons they carried, and as these did not change, the Huns fought at Metz and Orleans as they had fought at Pollentia. It in true that in Attila's army there were men who could build and serve siege engines, clearly not Huns but Roman prisoners or deserters. Unlike Alaric, who boasted that Thrace forged him "are, swords and helmets, Attila had no Roman fabricae work for him." (6) (pg 201).

For those that wish to field a Hunnic army on the wargames table, there are plenty of Germans to use as auxiliaries. The need to substantiate Hunnic infantry holds no appeal given that a gamer can use the historically better infantry of the Germans.

Whatever the reader wishes to accept, it is wise to carefully weigh the words of the authors bef ore accepting a version of history.

Footnotess

1. Ferrill, Arthur, The fall of the Roman Empire, London 1986.

2. Lindner, R.P., Nomadism, Horses and Huns, Past and Present No. 923 (1981), 1-19.

3. Thompson, E.A., A History of Attila and the Huns, Oxford 1948.

4. Maenchen-Heflen, O.J., The World of the Huns, Berkley 1975.

5. Ibid.

Bibliography

Ammianus Marcellinus, 3 Vols., Cambidge MA (Loeb Classial Library) 1935.
Bachrach, B.S., A History of Alans in the West, Minneapolis 1973.
Bury, J.B., History of the Later Roman Empire, 2 Vols., London and New York 1957.
Connolly, Peter, Greece and Rome at War, London 1981.
Delbruck, Hans, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, Vol II: The Germans, Westport CT 1980.
Grant, Michael, The Fall of the Roman Empire--A Reappraisal, London 1976.
Grousset, Rene, The Empire of the Steppes, New Brunswick NJ 1970.
Haywood, R.M., The Myth of Rome's Fall, Westport CT 1958.
Jones, A.H.M., The Later Roman Empire 284-602, 2 Vols., Norman OK 1975
Maenchen-Heflen, O.J., The World of the Huns, Berkley 1975.
Randres-Pherson, J.D., Barbarians and Romans, Norman O
Thompson, E.A.,A History of Attila and the Huns, Oxford 1948. Romans and Barbarians, Madison 1982.
Warry, John, Warfare in the Classical World, London and New York 1980.

Other Sources:
Slingshot (Journal of the Society of Ancients): various issues