Author: Victor Davis Hanson

There seems to be an increasing interest in the ancient period in the wargaming world (perhaps sparked by the publication of several new sets of rules or the release of several now lines of figures--I've never decided which comes first), so it seems appropriate to take a look at this book about what combat between hoplites armies was like.

The introduction is by John Keegan, one of my favorites. and hi's unreserved approbation of the book is enough to encourage out to got right into the text. The book is written In an engaging and comfortable style reminiscent of Keegan$'$ own and is most pleasant to read. Greek terms are always rendered with the Latin alphabet (thus saving typesetting expenses, I suppose) and invariably provided with an English translation (despite the author's counsel to learn Greek and read the primary sources rather than rely on translations).

In his Preface, Mr. Hanson commands not only Keegan but also Kendrick Pritchett and J. K. Anderson, without whose studies the present work could not have been written. I've not seen the studies of Pritchett referred to, but I certainly can commend the excellent and thought provoking work of Anderson.

The main body of Hanson's book is divided into five sections, each of three to five chapters: "The Greeks and Modern Battle", "The Ordeal of the Hoplites", "The Triumph of Will," "Battle!", and "Aftermath".

Of these I find the first the least convincing, not the part about the Greek strategy of ravaging fields not being as significant economically as it was in terms of morale and territorial instinct, but rather the suggestion that the Greeks are responsible for the Western tradition of seeking the "Decisive Battle". He makes an interesting case. but I an more inclined to blame the notion on the theorists of the post-Napoleonic era (see Keegan, pp.57-62).

Be that as it may, very likely it was this suggestion that provided not only the title of the work but helped secure its publication and provided an audience. Assuming this to be the case, I an extremely grateful, even if unconvinced.

"The Ordeal of the Hoplites" tells us something about the area and armor of the hoplite, which any be familiar but with implications which often have been overlooked. To learn that Corinthian helmets ware twice as heavy as medieval helmets, that students trying to maneuver wearing duplications of hoplite equipment are too exhausted to fight after a rapid advance of more than 200 yards or unable to hold up their shields after 30 minutes of mock battle tells us something about what the 'ordeal" was like. It also makes the individual attendants of each of the combatants (the equivalents of medieval squires) more understandable. Besides which, it is very interesting.

"The Triumph of Will" deals with the significance of having the general up front (which he compares with the "up-front" aggressive leadership typical of many Confederate generals in the Civil War). It is also interesting to compare Martin Van Crefeld's observation that generals like Alexander the Great 'were probably too busy fighting for their lives to pass along messages of any kind", (see Van Crefeld. pg. 39). This section also covers the question of unit cohesiveness and the use of alcohol.

"Battle" presents Hanson's opinion of what the clash of hoplite phalanxes must have been like. This in a fascinating section and has finally convinced me that the "rugby scrum" school of theorists is right and that the 'dualist' school may be right about the Romans but not for the Greeks. I've resisted this opinion for some time mostly because of the account of Agincourt in The Face of Battle (Keegan, pp. 100-101) but it does seen from Hanson's presentation of the sources that in the combat between opposing phalanxes the Greek hoplites actually crashed into one another at a closing speed of some ten miles per hour (as perhaps no other Infantry in the history of warfare besides the Swiss and their imitators). C

harles Oman's account of the clash between Swiss and landsknechts conveys some idea of what this must have been like (sea Oman, pp. 106-107). In his The Origins of War, Arthur Ferrill has argued that there is no form of combat which requires higher morale or demands more of troops psychologically than this headlong type of brutal melee (see Ferrill, pp. 143-144).

The final section is about the aftermath of battle-something wargamers prefer not to dwell on (other than a quick calculation of what percentage of losses are immediately restored for use). The sight of close packed carnage on the field is not something any of us hop* ever to see.

The author does not hesitate to criticize the detached analytical view of war typical of German historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He specifically rejects Hans Delbruck's position that the basic starting point of the study of battle should be the strengths of the opposing forces. He states that this view is wrong and misleading for Classical Greek warfare since, "the army was without reserves, coordination of specialized troops or Integration of cavalry, and at the mercy of rumor, superstition, misinformation, and panic to a degree unknown an the modern battlefield," (see pg. 23).

Hanson raises many issues in this compact work and suggests answers to a number of disputed questions. I confess that I don't always concur with his conclusions. For example, he seems skeptical about the extent of the general lightening of hoplite from the period shortly before the Persian Wars until the Theban Hegemony. On the contrary, I thought this process convincingly argued by Anderson (pp. 13-42), whose findings have also boon accepted by Sakunda. It to Sakunda who pudits increasing use of body armor In the period of the rise of Macedon under Philip (p. 47).

Hanson suggests that the decreasing use of body armor occurred In the Hellenistic Age, thus accounting for the increase in casualties in the big battles of that era. Obviously, If Sokunda is correct, this is not a viable solution. Hanson does not pursue other possible explanations such as the greater numbers of cavalry and the emphasis of pursuit of a defeated foe nor the possibility that our sources for this period are simply not reliable on the subject of casualties (all of which seen quite plausible to me-never trust a Greek who is telling you how many Persian@ there were).

Nevertheless, I think this an excellent book for those of us interested in how men function under the stress of combat. Anyone involved in gazing with ancient Greeks ought to obtain a copy and ponder what it has to say.

Although there are many sets of rules currently available for Ancients, I think none can convey the feel of what happened the way this book does. I's re-working sy own Ancients' rules now. Maybe some of you will went to do the same.

References

Hanson, Victor Davis. The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, Knopf, 1989.
Keegan, John. The Face of Battle, Viking, 1976.
Van Crefeld, Martin. Technology and War: from 2000 B.C. to the Present, Tree Press, 1989.
Oman, C.W.C, The Art of War In the Middle Ages, Cornell, 1953.
Ferrill, Arthur. The Origins of War- from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great, Thames and Hudson, 1985.
Anderson, J. K. Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, Berkeley, 1970.
Sekunda, Nick. The Ancient Greeks, Osprey, 1986.