The Macedonian Empire: The Era of Warfare Under Philip II and Alexander the Great, 359-323 BC by James R Ashley

I was very eager to read this book after reading the first sentences of the preface. The author mentions his motivation was based on Major-General JFC Fuller’s “The Generalship of Alexander the Great” and the emphasis on political and cultural aspects in most other history books about these two leaders. The text does focus on the military forces and the military campaigns of the two Macedonian leaders. Considering the time between when Fuller’s book was published (1958) and Ashley’s book (1998), a second book is warranted given the increased knowledge available about the period. Most of Ashley’s sources were written after Fuller’s book was published.

I have read both books as well as many of Ashley’s sources. Because of this, I applaud Ashley for using many endnotes to identify the source of his information. Ashley rightly points out that many of the ancient sources (Curtius, Arrian and Diodorus) were written centuries after Alexander’s death. Most of our knowledge of Philip and Alexander is based upon these sources because the primary sources did not survive beyond the ancient period (post 500 AD). The endnotes do indicate the differences in the surviving sources and these can be considerable as numbers were often exaggerated to magnify the victories achieved by the numerically inferior Macedonian forces.

Ashley pares down many of the exaggerated sums to reflect that many of these superior forces consisted of a lot of poor quality troops that did not participate in the battles, but were casualties in the routs. The result is that the opposing forces were often relatively even in terms of the number of effective troops.

The book is divided into three appropriate parts; Ancient Warfare, the Reign of Philip and the Campaigns of Alexander. In the first, there are chapters on the contemporary armies, siege operations, logistics and naval operations. The latter two parts are divided into geographical rather than chronological sections. This can be confusing as Ashley covers all of the operations in a specific area and then moves to an adjacent area. In doing so, he often repeats chronological information because the events overlap. Ashley does provide a chronological summary (Appendix I) that helps to clarify some of the confusion.

The inclusion of the military campaigns of Philip and Alexander is one of the major things that distinguishes this book from that of Fuller. Ashley ties in the importance of Philip’s activities to the successes achieved by Alexander. Without Philip’s efforts to dominate Greece, Illyria and Thrace, and train a very professional army, the victories of Alexander may not have been so great. The Macedonian military and its commanders had experience in a variety of different types of warfare including what is now known as conventional and unconventional operations. Experience of this type was important because the conquest of the Persian Empire required the Macedonian army to combat armies in the more traditional large-scale open field battle, and nomadic forces relying on their manoeuvrability to defeat their foes.

Both Philip and Alexander needed to achieve clear-cut victories to subdue recalcitrant foes and awe potential enemies. Success in warfare often discouraged enemies from fighting commanders who seemed unbeatable. Father and son were good at doing the impossible. The success of the former contributed to the confidence of the latter, who knew what his men were capable of achieving even if they doubted themselves.

The comparison of the two leaders really emphasises the role played by both in the conquest of the Persian Empire. Most books focus on Alexander and leave his father much in the shadows. Ashley does state that information about Philip’s campaigns is limited; however, he does provide a lot more detail than I have read in other books.

Ashley includes a glossary in which he includes definitions of military terms, and geographical and biographical information. In addition to the one Appendix mentioned above, he has eight others covering diverse topics relevant to the period of study. There are also 51 maps to complement the text.

Of note, the author mentions that he played wargames in his youth and thus he writes about the battles and then some of the “what-ifs” that may have altered the historical outcome. This adds more depth to the battle analyses and may inspire wargamers to incorporate some of these alternatives in their own tabletop scenarios.

The author states in the preface “I made diligent efforts to locate every geographical reference discussed in the text on a map”. I found that there were some places omitted from the maps (which may be the ones that the author could not able to locate as he states in the preface) and places on the maps not discussed in the text. I would have also liked the inclusion of geographical features such as rivers and mountains that are important references to following the text. Often the maps are bland with only towns shown.

In the section covering the Battle of Gaugamela, Map 32 has Gaugamela east of Arbela while the text states that it was about 75 miles west of Arbela. On Map 34, the Macedonian right wing is not shown and the wrong symbols are used for parts of the opposing Persian left wing. This is obvious when compared to the dispositions shown in the preceding Map 33, which shows the deployment of the two armies.

The descriptive text about the various military organisations is often repeated twice or more throughout the book. Some may like this as it reminds the reader about certain aspects pertinent to the events then being discussed in the text. I found it annoying and consider it unnecessary padding.

Sometimes the author contradicts himself:

“The Thessalians fought in a diamond-shaped formation called the rhomboid. This was a highly maneuverable, star-shaped formation…” I think that this obvious error could have been eliminated before the book was published. It is not as if the editor or proof reader(s) needed to know anything abut the subject. It should be apparent that a formation cannot be both a diamond and a star simultaneously at least in terms of shape.

The editor could have done a better job with the proof reading, as there are many spelling errors. When these are names it can be confusing as to who or what is doing the action. On page 146, one of the commanders is named Phocion and one of the cities is Phocis (and its inhabitants are called Phocions); however, Phocis is used instead of Phocion to identify the commander. This suggests that the city (or its troops) made a camp on a ridge rather than the commander Phocion. In the section covering the siege of Tyre, the adjective Cypriot is used to identify one component of the Persian fleet, and then the word Cyprian is used to identify the same ships. The former is the correct word and the latter suggests that a separate contingent was present.

The author sometimes uses proper names to describe things and other times a generic name. For example, the Macedonian phalanx is armed with the sarissa not the pike, but Thracian peltasts have broadswords. Does the author mean rhomphaia or falx, or just sword?

In conclusion, I recommend this book to anyone who wants to know about the Macedonian Empire as created by Philip and Alexander. By itself, it is a good single source about the military campaigns and some of the related events. When read in conjunction with other books like those included in the bibliography, it summarises the military aspects of the period, which may not be as obvious in the many biographies of Alexander, and to a lesser extent Philip.

For the wargamer, the book offers good orders of battle upon which to base scenarios and many alternatives or “what-ifs” to try. The information on tactics is useful when deciding on personalised orders of battle for tabletop armies. Ashley descriptions provide lots of details about the employment of the various troop types A gamer can either try to emulate the historic generals or try to better them.