What would we do without helicopters? We would be fighting a different war, for a smaller area, at a greater cost, with less effectiveness. We might as well have asked, “What would General Patton have done with out his tanks?

--General Westmoreland

Many weapons systems have changed warfare, but few have increased the tempo of combat operations the way that the helicopter has. It has exponentially increased the mobility, flexibility, and enhanced the firepower of the maneuver commander.

The helicopter was first used by the U.S. Army in Korea, primarily for casualty evacuation and observation as the engines couldn’t produce enough lift for transport purposes. The development of the small turbine engine in the late 1950’s opened the way for helicopters powerful enough to carry troops and equipment.

The Army added a limited number of transport and observation helicopters to its divisions in the early 1960’s. Additionally, it provided and operated several early models of transport helicopters for the Army of Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN). But the helicopter didn’t came into its own as a military system until after 1962, when Defense Secretary McNamara directed a board to determine the feasibility of the tactical employment of rotary wing aircraft. The Howze Board recommended the development of the 11th Air Assault Division, with ground and aviation units integrated into task forces. This organization was envisioned for use in conventional warfare, where its firepower and mobility were thought useful for rapid advances, delay operations, and ambushing enemy forces.

While the 11th was never constituted, the 1st Cavalry Division (1 CD) was converted in 1965 and subsequently deployed to Viet Nam with almost 450 helicopters organized in 2 gunship companies and six transport companies.

Shortly after the 1 CD arrived in Viet Nam, it rapidly deployed a brigade to blunt, and then repel a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) offensive in the Ia Drang Valley meant to split South Vietnam. The speed in which the brigade deployed over 100 miles into an almost trackless jungle caught the North Viet Namese Army by surprise, allowing the 1 CD to gain and maintain the initiative for the rest of the campaign. A rapid series of airmobile operations, supported by gunships and reconnaissance helicopters kept the enemy off balance. By quickly shifting his infantry and artillery batteries, and a liberal use of close air support, the one brigade was able to savage an NVA division, causing over 4000 casualties and forcing the enemy to retreat back to Cambodia. The 1 CD sustained less than 1000 casualties. As an example of the mobility, in this 35 day period, the artillery batteries shifted 67 times.

The final engagement of the campaign occurred when the NVA unexpectantly ran into five battalions of ARVN paratroopers airlifted over 200 miles, in less than a day, to a blocking position just short of the Cambodian border. The NVA division was withdrawn to rebuild. The 1 CD was awarded the first Presidential Unit Citation in Viet Nam for this campaign.

Having proven the combat potential of the helicopter, its use in Vietnam expanded exponentially. The Army deployed six basic types of helicopter units: assault for airmobile operations, general support for moving supplies and administrative moves, aerial rocket artillery battalions for fire support, air cavalry for reconnaissance and economy of force operations, air ambulance and attack companies.

Airmobile operations became commonplace, allowing U.S. commanders to seize the initiative and force the NVA to dissipate its strength guarding areas previously thought secure. Gunships, originally converted observation or utility helicopters, became even more lethal with the introduction in 1967 of the AH-1 Cobra, the first purpose build gunship. Ground commanders favored gunships as their loiter time and multiple weapons systems enabled them to place large volumes of fire on the enemy. Additionally, they had the ability to place direct fires on enemy forces in contact with friendly forces where Air Force and Navy jets would decline for fear of creating friendly casualties. Air ambulances became the primary means of transporting casualties directly from the battlefield to level II and level III medical treatment facilities, which is credited with saving thousands of lives. Many medevac pilots received medals for their heroism in picking up the wounded under fire.

Post Viet Nam saw the development of the first true air assault division in 1975, the 101st Air Assault Division (101 AASLT). Building upon concepts from Vietnam and utilizing improved equipment, the air assault division was designed to “conduct rapid tempo operations over extended ranges.. fight by projecting significant combat power by transporting infantry, field artillery, other combat and combat service support units sing organic helicopter assets.. rapidly deploy, concentrate, disperse and redeploy its forces making it a highly responsive force.”

More so than just moving units, it is designed to insert them under hostile conditions.

The Howze Board’s vision of an air assault division use in conventional warfare came to fruition when the 101 AASLT deployed to southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Storm. During the air campaign, the division’s 72 AH-64s made hundreds of sorties against Iraqi air defense sites and armored vehicles. When the ground war began, the division made the largest air assault in history. In less than 24 hours, it had seized an airhead 100 miles inside Iraq, then moved 3,000 soldiers an additional 70 miles north to the Euphrates River Valley and cut one of the major Iraqi supply routes into Kuwait. Over the next day the number swelled to over 8,000. The 101 AASLT captured thousands of Iraqi prisoners who unknowingly blundered into their position. The division had moved so fast the Iraqi High Command was unaware of their location until the armistice talks.

Today aviation is indispensable to combat and other operations. All five Army division structures contain an aviation brigade with varying numbers and type of helicopters. These aircraft are used by the division commander as integral members of a combined arms team to fight the close battle.

Corps normally contains an independent aviation brigade with an attack helicopter regiment and an aviation group with medium lift and utility aircraft. The attack helicopter regiment is one of Corps Commander’s primary tools for fighting the deep battle. The other main tools are his multiple launch rocket systems and Air Force attack aircraft. Under the air-land battle doctrine, the corps fights the deep battle to shape the battlefield and to establish favorable conditions for the close fight. He does this by destroying the enemies’ command and control nodes, follow on armor and artillery units, and disrupting his timetables.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the helicopter is indispensable. Most platoon sized operations, and all company and above missions include at least an air weapons team of two AH-64s. Their night fighting capability, precision fire control and rapid response enable the ground commander to target Anti-Iraq Forces too close to Coalition Forces (CF) or Iraqi civilians for artillery or CAS. Additionally, airmobile operations enable CF to descend on an area before the AIF can respond or flee. Finally, transport helicopters allow the movement of personnel and high priority supplies without the ever present danger of improvised explosive devices.

As one can see, the helicopter has changed the tempo and lethality of operations. It began with the first tentative use of aircraft to transport troops the early 1960’s. The development and deployment of the 1 CD as an airmobile unit accelerated this process, allowing the U.S. Army to strike at will. The 101 AASLT’s historic deep attack into Iraq, so rapid that the Iraq Command was unaware of its extent completed the process. Today, the commander has a powerful tool to quickly deploy ground forces and bring devastating firepower to any point of his choosing on the battlefield.

Bibliography

Palmer, Dave A. Summons of the Trumpet. CA: Presidio Press, 1978.
Watson, Bruce W. Military Lessons of the Gulf War. CA: Presidio Press, 1991.
Tyler, Dave. The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Viet Nam, Military Review, Vol. LXXXIII-July-August 2003.
Cash, John A., The Fight at Ia Drang, www.Magweb.com, 2001.
FM 71-100, Division Operations, 28 August 1996.
FM 100-15, Corps Operations, 29 October 1996.