Blitzkrieg, a term universally recognized and associated with the Second World War, did not just materialize in 1939. It was the product of years of thought and trial by many great military minds going back to World War I (WWI). [1] The originator was German General Oskar Hutier. He developed the original tactics that combined overwhelming firepower with the attack of highly trained infantry to break the stalemate of trench warfare. This returned mobility to warfare, handing ascendancy back to the attacker where it has been ever since. In the interwar years, other forward thinkers such as Lutz and Guderian combined improved tanks and airplanes with the Hutier tactics to fully develop the blitzkrieg doctrine. [2]

The Great War began in July 1914. In the opening phases of the Western Front, the German Army began its great right hook through Belgium. The long lines of infantry, cavalry and horse drawn artillery would have been familiar to their antecedents who fought in the Franco-Prussian years before. What was unfamiliar were the machineguns and quick-firing artillery. These combined to stymie each side’s attacks. Unable to win head to head, the "race to the sea" began as each side tried to outflank the other to their open, northern flank. Soon a continuous 450 mile front developed from Switzerland to the English Channel in Belgium. Both antagonists soon entrenched behind yards thick tangles of barbed wire, protected by thousands of artillery pieces and machine guns. Both the Central Powers and the Allies tried, but were unable, to break the enemy’s lines to the "green fields beyond".

These attacks were generally characterized by long bombardments, often up to a week, to soften the defenders. These were followed by infantry assaults across a broad front. While these occasionally would capture some ground, the defender had days to bring up reinforcements and prepare. Generally, the attacker would suffer horrendous losses for small gains. For example, in 1916 the British lost 58,000 casualties on the first day of the Somme Offensive and gained only six miles.

Between 1915 and 1917, both sides tried various technologies and innovations to achieve a breakthrough. At Passchendale, the British exploded a huge mine with obliterated a long stretch of the German trenches. At Ypres, the Germans used poison gas for the first time, at Verdun the flamethrower. At Cambrai, the British fired a short barrage followed by the first large scale use of tanks. The Germans even tried a battle of attrition at Verdun, hoping to wear the French down. None of these proved successful. Both sides continued to suffer numerous casualties and look for a way to break the stalemate. The allies looked to the tank, the Germans to the Hutier tactics and the sturmtruppen.

In 1917 on the Eastern Front an Army commander named Hutier hit upon an innovative doctrine to penetrate the enemy line. The Allies called it Hutier tactics. The Germans didn’t have a name for it, but when published as a doctrinal manual on 1 January 1918, it was entitled "The Attack in Positional Warfare".

The heart of the Hutier tactics was the storm squad. It was organized with highly motivated soldiers and experienced NCOs, trained to act independently. Their weapons included: MP-18 submachine guns, grenades, explosives, light machineguns and rifles. These squads were organized into platoons and storm companies. Storm battalions consisted of several storm companies, a battery of light artillery, a machinegun company and flamethrower and trench mortar sections. Battalions went through an intensive four week course on mobile warfare upon conversion. The exact equipment of each battalion varied depending on the availability of weapons. [3] Finally, the storm battalions were organized into storm divisions. Not all of the battalions in these divisions were converted. Unconverted units were referred to as trench units.

The Hutier tactics were a radical departure from traditional attacks. Surprise was key. Troops and artillery batteries moved into position at night. Artillery units did not register, that is fire a round at a known point to complete their ballistic calculations. This indicated an impending attack to the enemy. German artillerymen developed a method of calculating a firing solution for the first round, maintaining surprise and accuracy.

The attack was preceded by a short, sharp artillery barrage with poison gas and high explosives shells. It targeted in descending priority: enemy artillery batteries, command posts, supply depots, forward trenches, especially machinegun posts, and the main defensive positions. Artillery was also used to seal the attack area from enemy reinforcements. These tactics placed heavy emphasis on the use of gas. Persistent agents were used on the flanks while non-persistent agents were used on areas the Germans planned to occupy. [4] Unlike with earlier artillery support, the storm troopers used a system of signal flares to control the shifting of fires.

The storm squads attacked behind the artillery. Squads had no set objective. Using masking terrain they bypassed strongpoints, marking them for the following trench infantry. The squads searched out and attacked command posts, artillery batteries and supply depots, depriving the enemy infantry leadership, fire support and spreading panic.

The first use of these tactics was at the siege of Riga in March of 1917. Gen. Hutier was able to penetrate, in a day, the Russian defenses which had resisted conventional attacks for months. The German High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung – OHL) saw great potential in this new method, but wanted a better demonstration before exporting it to the Western Front. The chance came in Italy where the German’s allies, the Austrian-Hungarian (A-H) Empire was on the verge of collapse.

The OHL transferred seven Hutier trained divisions to Italy, and in conjunction with eight A-H divisions began the Battle of Caporetto on 24 October, 1917. While the Italians expected an attack, the form was a complete shock to them. In less than 24 hours an entire Italian army was shattered and two others were forced to retreat. By the time the German attack stalled due to logistics problems, the Italians had lost over 40,000 dead, 280,000 prisoners, an entire province, and two-thirds of their field artillery. Their army was reduced from 65 divisions to 33, and was incapable of offensive action for over a year. [5] Validated, the OHL approved the transfer of this doctrine to the Western Front.

The German Army knew time was running out. Between the blockade and the growing American presence, they had to win in early 1918. Operation Michael was planned for 21 March 1918 to penetrate the British lines and push to the English Channel, surrounding the British and forcing their withdrawal from the war.

Because of a lack of experienced NCOs and weapons [6], only 56 of the 208 German divisions were converted. These divisions, plus 10 trench divisions, struck the British Fifth Army in the Somme Valley. By the afternoon, the British lines were breached in several locations. Entire battalions had been surrounded or destroyed. The next day the entire British Fifth Army collapsed and retreated. The Allies reacted quickly. The French rapidly sent forces north to contain the breakthrough. General Pershing even released two American divisions to French control to stem the Germans at the Marne River and Belleau Wood. The Allies also finally appointed an overall commander, General Foch. By early April the crisis had passed. Allied reinforcements, rallied British units, logistical problems and exhaustion ended the attack. The Germans had torn the front open, but lack of motor transport prevented them from exploiting it. [7] However, it must be noted that the Germans captured over ten times the amount of territory in a month than the Allies had captured in all of 1917. [8]

Over the next few months the Germans attacked several more times but never seriously threatened the Allies. By August, the Allies had recovered and began a series of offensives that ended with the armistice on 11 November 1918.

As shown above, Hutier tactics were a response to the stalemate of WWI trench warfare. It combined intense artillery barrages and the infiltration of highly motivated and trained soldiers. These sought out command posts and artillery positions, paralyzing the enemy and leaving his units surrounded and leaderless for follow on forces to destroy. These tactics proved able to breach the enemy’s defenses, but due to lack of mechanization, exploitation was not possible. Forward military thinkers such as Lutz and Guderian saw the potential for Hutier tactics to restore mobility to warfare. They combined these tactics with improved technology, developing them into the blitzkrieg of 1939. Warfare has never been the same.

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