So, we start. Why the heavy cavalry first? Firstly, the heavy cavalry was the soul and heart of medieval military system. Secondly, the biggest part of popular misconceptions concerns it. Let's define our terms first. Who must be included in the "heavy cavalry" category?

Obviously, the mounted knight falls here. But by no means did the medieval heavy cavalry consist solely of knights. In fact, in any major muster the proportion of knights (in the strict social sense of this word) in the heavy cavalry was at best around 1/5 to 1/3. Who were the rest? Mostly, squires - the rank of the noblemen below the knight, usually serving as retainers of a knight.

Also, the heavy cavalry could consist of mercenaries (especially in the Italian armies), who not necessarily were nobles by birth at all.

There is also another often misunderstood term - "man-at-arms". It is a more general term, meaning a professional warrior, usually in heavy armour (in our period - the full plate). So, all the knights were men-at-arms, but not all of the men-at-arms were knights. To speak more widely, all the heavy cavalrymen were men-at-arms, but not all of the men-at-arms were cavalrymen at all.

So, in most precise definition, the heavy cavalryman of the second half of the 14th-15th century, is a professional warrior in the full plate armour (at the beginning of the period - a composite armour of both mail and plate) on a specially bred and trained horse (often also artly armoured), armed with a long lance, a sword and sometimes an assortment of other hand weapons.

What can we tell of the individual horseman of this sort? First, his armour. A lot of silly myths exists around the full plate. We are told that such an armour was cumbersome, to such an extent that an armoured knight moved with difficulty, couldn't mount his horse without help, and could not stand up once knocked from his feet. The stories are told about the knights who died inside their armour without receiving a blow, of heart attack - because of the sheer weight of the full plate.

It's simply not true. The fully developed plate armour weights about 25-30kg - like a backpack of modern NATO infantryman, and the weight is distributed evenly over the whole body, without exceptionally taxing any specific group of muscles.

Furthermore, the armour is cunningly articulated, and doesn't significantly restrict the natural movements. When the NASA specialists were designing the space suit, they looked to the suit of full plate armour and LEARNT from it. A man clad in such a suit could not only walk freely, but run, jump, mount a horse... indeed there are contemporary descriptions suggesting that a strong man could even perform a somersault in it! The heart failures happened sometimes, but not from the weight. The main cause was the heat. It could be really hot inside a full plate, especially on a sunny day in the middle of a melee.

The protection that this armour offered was excellent. The steel wasn't really thick, but it had a lot of smoothly rounded surfaces designed specifically to lead the blades away in glancing blows. On the other hand, it's very difficult to CUT through the armour, but it's quite possible to THRUST through it with right selection of weapons, and even without cutting through the knight could be beaten very seriously inside his armour by just banging on it with a blade. So the wearer of the full plate armour is well-protected, but by no means invulnerable. By the way, it's another popular myth that the gunpowder weapons made the full plate obsolete. In fact, they were no more effective than the longbow, and less effective than the contemporary steel crossbow, when it comes to armour penetration, but a handgun was easier in exploitation, and didn't demand much training to use it.

But let's return to the heavy cavalry. The main force of the medieval heavy cavalry is in its' charge. That's what the lances are for - for the first moment of impact upon the enemy. The armour is needed not only for protection, but for the weight it adds to the power of the impact as well.

To understand the proper tactical implementation of the charge, let's mark its strong and weak points. The first effect of a heavy cavalry charge is psychological. Imagine for a moment that you are standing in the infantry ranks, watching the thundering tide of steel coming on you at incredible speed, armour glistening, ground trembling, as a single mass.

The first natural inclination, no matter how personally brave you are, will be to turn and run. That's exactly one thing that the infantryman MUSTN'T do, if he wants to live. A footman cannot outrun a horseman. In medieval Germany the heavy cavalry was duly nicknamed "the Peasants' Death". The untrained rural militia often fled before the charge even before the actual impact. In this case they were ridden down mercilessly to the last man. The infantry which trembles as the charge is delivered, will be massacred.

The second effect of the charge is the actual impact. You may have read somewhere that the armour of men and horses was so heavy, that the charge was delivered at a low speed, like a trot. The mistake becomes obvious as soon as you understand that the full plate armour actually weighted LESS than the equipment of a heavy cavalryman of the second half of 19th century. Yes, we should add the weight of the armour for the horse itself, but it couldn't be very heavy, and besides, the destrier - knightly warhorse - was an exceptional animal, specially bred and trained just for such conditions. The ideas of the exceptional weight of the armour originated in the 19th century, when romanticist collectioners often confused the tournament armours (which indeed were much heavier) and the actual ones worn in battle. So, the charge could be delivered at full gallop.

The shock must have been formidable. The cavalry wouldn't cut through the infantry, as it's often depicted, because it's not the same as a knife and a piece of butter, but two groups of men who will naturally lose any formation upon impact. It wouldn't cut through, but it would smash, and push and roll back the enemy in disarray, and even the troops who didn't run before the impact, are likely to do so after it.

The heavy cavalry never actually attacked in "wedges", or "lance formations". If they did, it would be a suicide for those in the front line (as they would be easily surrounded), and a failure for the overall plan, because the casualties would be too great in the first moment to continue the pressure. The idea of a deep formation to "cut the enemy in two" makes sense for the infantry, it's impossible to implement effectively on horseback. Such formations may have been used in confined spaces, but certainly never intentionally against infantry. [Editor: Yet records indicate that wedges were used to achieve the 'scherpunkt' or point of attack on a concentrated front to break through the foot…or enemy horse. Russian chroniclers noted the Teutonic wedge at Lake Piepus in 1242, for example.]

The natural formation for the charge is the wave. It allows to use all of the lances in the first moment (after which they are useless and often even broken).

But the "wedge" (or indeed the deep column) formation can be useful. Not for attack - but for approach and positioning before the charge. The armour is light enough to enable the horse to gallop, but it's heavy enough to prevent it to gallop for a long time. The strengths of the horses must be saved before the charge to achieve maximum speed possible. It means that prior to the charge the heavy cavalry must move as close to the enemy as possible (to 200-250 metres at least) slowly. During this time they are a nice target for anything that shoots.

The deep column formation minimizes the space presented as a target. On reaching the appropriate position the cavalry must reform into the wave. Sometimes the infantry would be concealed in the middle of the column (which again demonstrates that the column moved slowly), and would form up behind the cavalry wave in order to follow the charge and prevent the scattered enemy from reassembling (the Teutonic knights did this in the battle on the frozen lake Peipus in 1242, which is commonly known in Russia as "the Ice Slaughter").

The distance between the starting position for the charge and its' object must not be great for one more reason: during the prolonged charge the wave formation inevitably breaks (because one horse naturally runs more quickly than another); if it happens, the horsemen reach their destination not as a single mass, but in ones and twos and small groups one after another. It greatly reduces the effectiveness of a charge. So the distance must be long enough to allow the horses to achieve high speed, but not long enough to allow the wave to scatter.

As early as the Crusades, the heavy cavalry on the battlefield was organised into small tactical detachments called conrois in French; a conrois consisted usually of about 20 to 30 mounted men-at-arms, who attacked in closely-packed (stirrup to stirrup) linear formation, two or three ranks deep, arranged in a checkerboard pattern. These conrois would form side to side with each other, resulting in a more or less dense wave.

Such a formation would be very difficult to maintain in full gallop, that's why sometimes in order to make a more coherent impact on the enemy, the horsemen moved in canter instead of gallop, which is slightly slower (about 25 km/h), but still fast enough for a strong

charge. By the way, there is a curious bit of information I've encountered recently, which I can't prove or disprove yet, but which generally makes sense: that the heavy cavalry couldn't maintain a trot for any prolonged time, because it was extremely uncomfortable for an armoured man on a horseback. Thus a "trotting charge" is completely out of question; canter and gallop are the only possible variations for a charge, one resulting in a weaker, but more organised impact, and another - vice versa.

But even the correctly delivered charge may be stopped by the disciplined infantry in deep ranks, particularly armed with spears or pikes and well-trained in their usage. No sane horse would charge the hedgehog of pikes, and no sane horseman would make it do so. But the infantry must be numerous and disciplined enough not to waver in face of the coming charge, or else the determined mass of cavalry willing to take some casualties can break through the wall.

We'll discuss the infantry tactics in another article; for now it's sufficient to say that it's not wise for the heavy cavalry to charge the formed-up pikemen.

So, the ideal heavy cavalry charge must be delivered as follows:

1) on the appropriate enemy (another force of cavalry, untrained and/or confused infantry from any side, any force from flank or rear, particularly if it's already engaged from the front, pikemen ONLY in the last case, and even then - with great caution);

2) in the appropriate place (obviously, the wide plain is the best for the cavalry, not the forest or a place crossed with bogs and pits);

3) from the appropriate distance;

4) at the appropriate speed (canter would be more suitable against better organised and formed-up enemy, gallop - accordingly, against a more disorganised or wavering one);

5) as a single coherent mass (so it must be well-led);

6) and finally, at the appropriate moment of time (at the tactically crucial point in battle). A good cavalry charge is capable of turning the tide of battle, but it demands a good deal of preparation to deliver it properly; so the most difficult task of the commander is to judge the place and moment correctly.

The well-known battles of the 14th century are often said to prove the ineffectiveness of heavy cavalry charge. They say, the arrival of good missile weapons and good infantry on the battlefield doomed the medieval heavy cavalry.

I definitely don't agree with it. Yes, there were several catastrophic defeats of the armies based around the mounted knight. But there were victories as well, and all the defeats of the cavalry were due to the mistakes of its' commanders, not to some distinct advantages of the other troops.

At Courtrai the Flemish infantry militia defeated and massacred the French knights. BUT the knights, due to the failure of their high command, launched the charge from extra-long distance over the terrain crossed by channels(!). Eighty years later the French made the Flemings pay the bloody price at Roosebek. There a skillfully delivered flanking cavalry charge resulted in the rout and massacre of essentially the same foot militia. The Scots beat the English at Stirling Bridge, because the English charged piecemeal into the prepared ranks of pikemen. At Falkirk the English first perforated the Scots with the longbows, and then charged into the confused and decimated ranks of their pikemen... the result is well-known. At Crecy in 1346 the French again failed to organize the charge properly - and only because of that were defeated by the massive longbow fire. Had there been no confusion in the French ranks, had they rested and prepared properly, had their King led them more wisely than he did, they would be perfectly capable of winning that day. The same is true for Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), which were actually very closely-fought battles.

At Agincourt the French had a very sound plan of outflanking the English and riding down their archers before they could do much damage. They would surely win if the plan was performed smoothly. But they had no capable King to command them again, and all ended once more in terrible confusion. At Nikopolis in 1396 the Western (mostly French and Burgundian, with some Germans and Poles) heavy cavalry rode down the Turkish irregular infantry without even noticing it, scattered the regular troops and even broke through a line of field fortifications(!) - all in one prolonged charge, but then fell in the Turkish trap because of the (again) incompetence of their inexperienced command (represented by young Comte de Nevers, future Duke of Burgundy Jean the Fearless, and several bickering barons), who failed to make the reconnaissance ahead, and rejected the wise plan of the Hungarian King (future German Emperor) Sigismund to send forward the infantry and then charge, when the enemy discloses his disposition...

What is truly astonishing about all of these battles is sheer discipline and fighting spirit demonstrated by the heavy cavalry on almost all occasions. These men were not quick to fly and not easily broken, even when used in such a way that they had little chances of success. At Crecy the French knights charged the English lines 16(!) times, thrown back again and again with heavy losses.

At Agincourt they regrouped and attacked again, with such an "elan", to use the French word, that almost broke the English when they were already celebrating victory. Almost... but we shall speak yet of the English side of these events, when we'll speak about infantry. But it's obvious that discipline wasn't usually the thing the heavy cavalry lacked, contrary to the popular belief. At least it was certainly valued and sought, even if not always actually obtained.

The weakest point of a medieval army, the most prone to failure, was usually its high command. The heavy cavalry remains what it is - a very powerful instrument, but difficult to wield properly and demanding a tactical skill in application.