There is evidence of the use of baggage carts in defense as early 58 BC, when Julius Caesar describ­ed the barbarian Helvetii attempting to save them­selves from a defeat in the field, though some authorities question whether that was a deliberate tactic or merely desperate opportunism.

It was not until the 4th century AD the idea of wagon-forts attained real distinction. At the Battle of Adrianople (378), the Goths provided a protec­tive enclosure for their infantry with a wagon square intended to maintain them until the cavalry could administer the coup de grace to the Romans. But Adrianople also marked the eclipse of infantry by the cavalry arm, and it was cavalry action that determined the shape of the next decisive clash at Chalons in 451, when a Roman-Visigoth alliance drove down Attila's Huns, forcing them to take refuge behind a wagon laager.

The great migration of the Dark Ages, the Volker­wanderurigen (Migrations of the Peoples) was re­markable for the opportunistic use of wagon-forts against the ravages of the predatory roving barbar­ians. Some time later, we find records of regular armed forces utilizing this tactic in a systematic way (a supply wagon wall fronted by a defensive ditch), such as described in the Byzantine Emperor Leo Vi’s (886-911) military treatise, Tactica.

The deployment of specially equipped infantry formations to thwart ponderous heavy cavalry charges had also been used by Henry V’s longbow­men at Agincourt, just a few years before the rise of the Hussites. The English archers made use of portable shield walls as well as baggage carts placed in a protective arc and backed by heavy foot-men. The Swiss pike hedgehogs likewise had begun to dampen the preeminence of heavy cavalry.

But all these episodes were unrelated to the spe­cial conditions affecting the use of wheeled vehicles in Hussite warfare.

The Hussite Wagon—Fort System

The Hussite commanders recognized their first task would be to steady their untutored peasant levies against masses of charging knights. No only did the Bohemian provincials lack familiarity with battle, they were not used to participating in any well-ordered group activities. The only armaments immediately available to them, and with which they were familiar, were weapons based on agricultural implements: axes, the halberd (an adaptation of the scythe fixed to a long pole), spiked clubs (later evolving into the infamous “morning star”), bill-hooks (pruning tools), spears and the threshing flail. The last became particularly effective in the hands of Bohemian farmers, who learned how to work the device at high speed with devastating force, once it was weighted with an iron core and had iron spikes affixed.

But the Hussite rustic infantry lacked the cohe­sion of English bowmen or Swiss pikemen. Thus, in the open field, such handy contraptions would have been to no avail against heavy cavalry, who would simply mow down the infantry by weight of horseflesh and metal. Hence Ziska adapted another com­mon farm implement, the wagon cart, to war, and the wagon-fort (Wagenburg) tactical system was born.

An army of 6,000 would typically comprise 300 wagons moving in four columns, the outer columns consisting of 90 wagons each, the interior rows of 60. With 40-foot intervals between wagons, a marching army was about 3,600 feet (about one kilometer) long. The estimated march rate was about two to three miles per hour, which was slow­er than a forced march by unencumbered infantry alone.

The four-column formation could be converted into a rectangular fortress in an hour or two. This was more than enough time, as on average an approaching Imperial force would be detected at least several hours from the point at which it could form up for an attack. The relative speed with which these cumbersome forces could redeploy from the march stemmed from their constant drill­ing and use of prearranged flag and horn signals. The deployment from march to defensive pattern was well practiced. Their precision of execution might be best likened to that of a college marching band at a halftime exhibition at a football game.

The exact outline of the wagon-fort could be adapted to suit the terrain. Time permitting, a defensive ditch would be dug along the perimeter, \\Ith the dug up dirt being packed against the wagon wheels to furnish additional protection. For his purpose, each wagon was equipped with two axes, two spades, two pickaxes, two hoes, two shov­els, two lances with hooks, all of these doubling as weapons. There was inevitably a broad exit left in the front and rear of the wagon—fort formation, intended as sally ports. During the enemy assault, these openings were blocked with posts, chains and shields.

The estimated length of each wagon was 10 feet, with 180 of them forming the outer edge of the complex, giving the encampment, including its two sally ports, a circumference of about 2,000 square feet and an area of about 250,000 square feet. (Some authorities claim this estimate doesn’t include the baggage carts, which might have increased the circumference by as much as half.)

It’s also reckoned there was usually an inner for­mation of wagons to back up those of the perime­ter. This secondary citadel was likely formed by the baggage carts as an added buffer for the reserve foot and cavaIry.

The battle wagons were at first normal baggage carts, but Ziska discovered a cavalry assault could find or create gaps in such formations, then pene­trate to its vulnerable center. This led to several modifications. Each cart’s four-horse team was rigged for rapid unhitching after taking up battle formation. The poles were then raised or removed and the wagons pulled close together with chains, forming a seamless wall. The carts themselves were adapted by fixing hinged planks or vertical covers on the fighting side of each one, while the inner sides were fitted with pivoting panels or vertical covers that could be quickly dropped to form a ramp for speedy crew replenishment or rearming. A long board with firing loopholes was suspended be­tween the wheels to close that avenue to attackers.

Each wagon crew consisted of about 16 men (later up to 20). Half of them fought with close quarter weapons, the remainder with crossbows or handguns. The missile men were usually stationed in the wagons, while the others dismounted to take up positions in small groups between the wagons or to form larger groups near the sally ports.

Aussig, 1426 — The Essence of Wagon—Fort Warfare

The largest pitched battle the Imperialists lost to the Hussites was the Battle of Aussig, or Usti nad Labem, on 16 June 1426.

The Imperialists had moved to rescue the loyal Bo­hemian town of Aussig-on-Elbe, under siege by the Hussites. By this time the Hungarians tended to domi­nate the Imperialist forces sent against the Hussites, since the German aristocracy had already lost patience with the incessant campaigning and wanted to look to their own affairs. But because the town belonged to Frederick of Saxony, the Germans had a renewed inter­est in this project. Thus the combined Imperialist Ger­man force here, mustered from Meissen, Thuringia and Lausitz, numbered around 20,000.

The Hussites massed both taborite field armies and the Prague levy to get a total of about 25,000, one of the largest assemblies of Bohemian manpower ever gath­ered. Knowing numbers were against them, the Germans went into battle determined not to let that consideration intimidate them.

Upon hearing of the approach of the relief force, the Hussites abandoned their siege and drew up their wagon-fort laager on nearby Behani Hill. The battle opened with the customary cavalry attack on the Hus­site wagon bulwark, which was here particularly fool­hardy given the unfavorable balance of defenders to attackers and the fact the taborites had gathered an especially heavy concentration of field guns (about 180) for the siege. Still, their opening thrust was able to break through the outer ring at one point. But upon penetrating into the laager, they suffered heavy cross­bow and firearms salvos from secondary positions, and were unable to grapple with the foot soldiers who mounted a furious close-quarters counterattack with billhook, flail and morning star. The smoke from the gunfire and kicked up dust was especially thick and helped undermine German cohesion. One account also claims elementary wheeled howitzers were employed inside the perimeter by the defenders.

At any rate, the Hussites timed their counterattack perfectly and caught the knights at their breaking point. The reserve infantry pressed the faltering Germans back as the Hussite cavalry enveloped them. The Hussites pressed their pursuit vigorously and trapped some of the fleeing enemy cavalry in the nearby village of Hrvo­vice (Herwitz) and another group at Predlice (Prodlitz).

The Germans trapped in those towns attempted to surrender, but the Hussites learned the invaders had earlier been ordered to take no prisoners, and in turn slaughtered all their captives. Other German remnants staggered back to the north Bohemian border, many col­lapsing from the intense heat.

Because of the sustained Hussite pursuit, this became one of the bloodiest battles of the war. German chroni­clers put their dead at 10,000 to 15,000, but modern authorities say the number was probably closer to 4,000. The triumphant and pitiless Hussites continued on to capture Aussig itself, slaughtering the entire garri­son as it attempted to escape and burning the town so thoroughly it remained uninhabited for three years.

Hussite Tactics

The Hussite system centered around selecting a topographic feature the enemy had to attack or pass close by to attain his strategic objective. In this they were aided by their knowledge of the pri­mary objectives in each part of Bohemia.

They were also greatly aided by the inability of their enemies to come to terms with Hussite tactics. In the early fighting, up to the Battle of Aussig in 1426, the knights never failed to throw themselves repeatedly upon the deadly Hussite bastions. Had they chosen not to do so, simply holding back in a siege or redirecting their movement to a different objective, the guns and crossbow’s, let alone the flails and pikes, of the Hussites could never have been brought to bear. It should be kept in mind most of the attackers would never before have been exposed to volley fire. Such encounters with guns as the knights might have experienced prior to combating wagon-forts would most likely have been a few desultory rounds from siege cannon or handguns placed spottily along castle battlements.

Whenever the Imperialists seemed to hold back the Bohemians sent out raiding parties to goad the encamped German and Hungarian expeditionary forces to react And react they did. The knights were imbued with the spirit of the offensive. They accordingly refused to acknowledge they could not overwhelm the rough peasants cowering behind their portable castles. It seems incredible today that such absurdly reckless mulishness could so long endure among an ostensible “elite.” But one has only to examine the behavior of the British at Ypres, Passchendaele and the Somme, the French at Verdun and in the Nivelle Offensives or Burnside at Fredericksburg to understand this mentality.

Once the likely battle area was determined, the terrain would be examined for the best possible site. The ground was then thoroughly prepared to channel the advancing enemy into a prepared killing ground.

The Hussite guns were generally discharged into pre-selected fields of fire when the attacking caval­ry got within 100 yards of the wagon-fort periph­ery. The noise, flash, smoke and shock of the fusil­lade, combined with the deadly silent hail of cross­bow bolts, was often enough to unnerve advancing horsemen. At close range, the shot from the guns could pierce double layers of chainmail and plate, whereas crossbow bolts might glance off unless they struck a seam or joint.

Once an attacking force had been exhausted and was on the verge of disengaging to regroup, the impediments at both the front and rear sally ports were withdrawn and a compact body of heavily Each wagon fought under its own commander. The next higher unit was a contingent of 10 wag­ons, forming the basic maneuver element in the laager perimeter. Each wagon column was led by a “linesman.” The infantry serving outside the wagon teams, the staff-weapons bearers and counterat­tack reserve, were arranged in 100 man companies.

The wagon guns were adaptations of the wea­pons customarily mounted on castle walls, and were capable of throwing iron or stone shot out to an effective range of only 100 feet or less. The “hand guns” were not actually hand-held, but were individually, rather than crew, served. There was no real aiming, since the guns were not hoisted to the shoulder but bolt-mounted on the wagon planking. At first guns accounted for one quarter of each wagon’s missile weapons, increasing later to one-third of the total.

In addition to the wagons, each army had small contingents of cavalry and field guns. The guns were mounted on their own carts spliced into the troop carrying wagons at intervals. Written descrip­tions of the actual firing of these heavier pieces are lacking, but from contemporary woodcuts it appears they were mounted in such a way their recoil would be absorbed by the wheel hub at the axle. It’s assumed the recoil of these primitive can­non was not severe; however, if they were fired from the wagons instead of from the ground, some special cross-bracing would have been required to reinforce the wheel mountings.

The cannon were of two principal types: palisade guns (Tarasnice) and howitzers (Houfnice). The first type were more of a close-in weapon, while the howitzers were particularly effective against massed bodies of advancing troops. Both had been in general use since the 1380s, and it should be noted Ziska didn’t make any innovations in gun­powder weaponry as has sometimes been averred. It was his tactical exploitation of the devices from mobile bases that created the stir.

The number of field guns was not impressive though as more and more Bohemian towns and cities joined the Hussite movement, their gun works — then, along with those in Moravia, the finest in Europe — were opened to the rebels. As best we can judge today, it’s estimated a 5,000- to 6,000-man Hussite army at the zenith of the move­ment’s power around 1426 might have maintained 36 palisade field guns, 10 howitzers or siege mor­tars, and 360 or more hand guns.

Cavalry formed the smallest part of the army. Cavalry horses were at a premium, as were men who could ride them. The massive dray horses that towed the wagons had no hope of pursuing the rel­atively fleet crusader cavalry (not merely because they were ponderous, but because they were tired from pulling the wagons). So the Hussites searched for men-at-arms who had served in some knight’s entourage for cavalry duty. Later, enough Czech aristocracy crossed over to the rebels to consider­ably leaven their cavalry force. Ziska also set great store in capturing excellent Hungarian light cavalry mounts, or failing that, the German knights’ horses, which he used in 1420 to train villagers armed with crossbows in scouting techniques. armed footman would rush out from the front to rout the already reeling foe. Hooked bills or hal­berds would be used to drag the knights from their horses, whereupon those wielding flails, daggers, etc., would finish off the immobilized noble.

At the same time, Hussite cavalry would emerge from the rear port to move out and encircle the enemy, completing their destruction. Sometimes the cavalry complement was large enough to allow them to be held in an open area far to the rear and outside the wagon laager.

It was up to the highest commander on the spot, often Ziska himself, to determine the exact moment the enemy onslaught was on the verge of breaking. If the Hussite counterattack was launched prema­turely, the still potent knights could wheel about and not only wreak havoc on the sortie, but might enter the unprotected sally ports and devastate the laager from the inside. On at least two occasions (Nachod in 1427 and Waldhofen, Austria, in 1431), the Hussites were lured out precipitously by a feigned enemy flight and ambushed.

Sources

Delbruck, Hans. History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, vol. III “The _ Middle Ages.” Trans. by Walter Renfroe, Jr.-­Westport, CT, 1982.
Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy. Harper's Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 BC to the Present, 3rd rev. ed. New York, 1993.
Heymann, Frederick G. John Ziska and the Hussite Revolution. Princeton, 1955.
Kammby, Lt. Col. The Battlewagon: A Historical Study with Observation on the Unique Features and the Employment of the Battlewagon Berlin 1864.
Oman, Charles. A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 378 to 1485 AD. New York, 1924.

Used with permission from Command Magazine

15th Century Armored Wagon Warfare

Hussites Part 2 (Saga 92)