At the outbreak of the Second Punic War in 218 B.C. Publius Cornelius Scipio, the father, was consul with Titus Sempronius Longus. He was ordered to sail with his army from Pisa to Massilia on the Rhone to try to block Hannibal's advance to Italy. Missing Hannibal at the Rhone by a day or two, P. C. Scipio returned by sea to Cisalpine Gaul, but sent his army on to Spain under his brother Gnaeus. In Italy he advanced to met Hannibal as the latter emerged from the Alps. In a cavalry engagement on the Ticinus River Scipio was defeated and wounded. It was in this skirmish that the young P. C. Scipio (later Africanus) first met Hannibal, while rescuing his father. Again in December the elder Scipio and son saw the defeat of the Roman army on the Trebia River, when T. Sempronius Longus would not listen to advice. While Scipio (Africanus) remained in Italy, his father then went on to Spain.

Scipio (Africanus) in 216 was present at the Roman disaster at Cannae where his father-in-law, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the victor of the Second Illyrian War, chose to stand and die rather than be dishonored. Scipio rallied the survivors and sought to block Hannibal's route to Rome. During the next several years his father and uncle won several victories over the Carthagianians including the capture of Saguntum in 212. Also in 212, the 25-year-old Scipio (Africanus) won his first election, as Aedile, along with his brother, Lucius. However, in 211 both the elder Scipios were killed in battle in the Baetis River valley, being immediately replaced by C. Claudius Nero and Gaius Marcius.

The year after his father's death in Spain (210), despite being too young and politically ineligible, Scipio stood for the election as pro-consul for Spain. When no one else would stand for the office, he was elected to command the new army set to Spain. He sailed for Spain with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, disembarking at Emporaiae in 210 or 209 to find all Spain south of the Ebro River in Carthaginian hands. His first task was to win over the Celtiberian hill tribes as well as gain the loyalty of the veteran troops.

In 209 he was at Tarraco with 28,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. The three Carthaginian commanders, Hannibal Barca's brothers Hasdrubal and Mago and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, each had about as many troops as Scipio, but they were quarreling and would not cooperate. All three were at least 10 days march west of their main base at New Carthage, which was garrisoned by only 1,000 trained troops. Scipio suddenly conducted a rapid march south along the coast from the mouth of the Ebro to surprise the city. He invested the city and launched several assaults on the walls. On the third attempt, with the aid of his fleet he captured the city. This gave him immense booty, war stores, and an excellent harbor. His special treatment of the prisoners including a young princess greatly endeared him to the Celtiberians and brought him significant aid.

Scipio immediately set about improving his army. He discarded the Italian short sword and replaced it with the Spanish gladius. This weapon was especially suited for the cut and thrust tactics favored by the Romans. He may also have adopted the Spanish javelin as the pilum. He instituted a rigorous schedule of training designed to improve the ability of his men to operate as individuals and in small units. After strengthening the city's defenses and leaving a strong garrison, he retired to Tarraco. He spent the winter of 209-8 letting the meaning of his victory sink in on the Celtiberians.

In 208 Scipio with 35,000 - 40,000 troops defeated Hasdrubal Barca with 25,000 troops at Baecula on the upper Guadalquivir River. However Hasdrubal was actually trying to avoid a decisive battle in order to pass around the Romans and march on Italy. This Scipio failed to prevent. (For description of this battle, see separate essay.) The year 207 was spent in skirmishing as the Carthaginians remained on the defensive while awaiting the outcome of Hasdrubal Barca's march on Italy and Scipio did not consider more sieges worth while. The defeat of Hasdrubal Barca in Italy changed the strategic situation dramatically.

There was no longer any need for Hasdrubal Gisgo to try to protract things in Spain. Now he had to force the issue in order to help Hannibal. Scipio likewise could now afford to storm towns one at a time in order to gradually drive the Carthaginians out of Spain.

Therefore in 206 Hasdrubal left Gades and moved to Ilipa (near modern Corduba) with 50,000 infantry, 4-5,000 cavalry, and 32 elephants. After gaining help from more Celtiberian chiefs, Scipio also prepared for battle. He concentrated about 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, including the Celtiberian allies, at Baecula.

Not trusting his allies, Scipio executed an elaborate deception plan over three days in order to win a decisive victory, which resulted in the virtual loss of Spain by the Carthagianians. The ancient descriptions of this battle are disputed by military analysts, however, if the sources have any validity at all, it is clear that Scipio must have instituted a remarkable transformation of the tactical maneuver capability of his legions. (See separate essay.)

Scipio then visited the Numidian king, Syphax, in Africa to try to win him to Rome's side. Syphax appeared interested and was considering his options when Hasdrubal Gisgo played a trump in providing his extraordinarily beautiful daughter to be the Numidian queen. Scipio returned to Spain to quell a mutiny in his army and destroy as much Celtiberian resistance as possible, both with exemplary brutality. In the center piece of this operation he destroyed a 22,500 man force on the Ebro River.

In 206 Scipio captured Gades to complete the Roman conquest of Carthaginian Spain and returned to Rome for the election of 205. Hannibal's other brother, Mago, meanwhile recruited another relief army in the Baleric Islands and sailed to Genoa.

Scipio won the election along with P. Licinius Crassus, and was assigned to Sicily. With Hannibal blockaded in southern Italy by Crassus, Scipio wanted to carry the war into Africa. He was strongly opposed by the Roman senate led by Fabius Maximus. After a political struggle, he was allowed to sail to Utica where he landed in 205.

Syphax allied to Carthage in support of Hasdrubal Gisco and brought an army against Scipio, forcing him to raise the siege and fortify his own camp on the shore between Utica and Carthage. In 203 by launching simultaneous night attacks and setting fire to their two adjacent camps, Scipio destroyed both the Numidian and Carthaginian armies. The Carthaginians raised two more armies, which were likewise destroyed in battle by Scipio and Syphax was captured, deposed, and replaced by a Roman ally, Masinissa.

At this the Carthaginian government ordered Hannibal and Mago back to Africa to defend the city. Mago died enroute from wounds, but much of his army joined with Hannibal's remaining Italians in the fall of 203.

Battle of Zama

Scipio was in a difficult position on the coast awaiting his new Numidian allies, while Hannibal was in position to block their junction. In a brilliant strategic gamble Scipio began a campaign of destruction in the interior and moved southwest to meet Numidian reinforcements under Masinissa, forcing Hannibal to come out for battle before his army was fully ready, on the plain west of Zama. Accounts of the battle are very confused. (Modern authors build on the confusion by picking and choosing between parts of classical sources. I find Delbruch's reconstruction more convincing than that of Dupuy, who mostly follows Theodore Dodge.)

Apparently Hannibal deployed his forces in two main echelons behind a skirmish line consisting of 12,000 Ligurians, Celts, Baleric islanders, and Moorish mercenaries mostly from Mago's army - and his elephants. His tactical concept was for the skirmish line to hold off the Roman legions until the greatly superior Roman - Numidian cavalry could be lured away by the weak Carthaginian cavalry, which was ordered to entice them away. Then the Carthaginian main forces would attempt a double encirclement, as at Cannae. In the main position the first echelon (line of battle) was 12,000 native Libyans, Carthaginians, and a contingent of Macedonian mercenaries. The second echelon (battle line) was 12,000 of Hannibal's own veterans from Italy.

The Roman army, consisting of about 25,000 Roman and Italian legionaries and 10,000 Numidians, also formed its usual three lines of infantry but with the principes and triarii held back together as a second echelon. Scipio placed his Italian cavalry on the left and Numidian cavalry on the right. While Scipio's cavalry drove off the Carthaginian cavalry, his first line infantry drove back the opposing skirmish line and mercenaries. These troops believing themselves betrayed, then fought the Carthaginian first line phalanx, which nevertheless also managed to disorder the Roman hastatii. Carthaginian elephants proved worthless during this struggle. Scipio then brought up his principes and triarii to extend his line to each flank. (He was not about to be surrounded as the Romans were at Cannae.) Hannibal did likewise by merging his second and third lines. Hannibal's infantry were gaining a slight edge in furious fighting, when they were attacked in rear by the returning Roman cavalry. This destroyed the Carthaginians who lost 20,000 killed and 20,000 captured to the Roman losses of 1,500 to 2,500 total.

Scipio again pressed successfully for moderate or lenient peace terms against the wishes of the Senate. He was given a triumph and the surname Africanus, but refused may other honors. Then he lived in private life until 194, when he was elected consul to fight the Ligurian Gauls in northern Italy. He was then one of the commissioners sent to Africa to settle a dispute between Masinissa and the Carthaginians.

In 190 Scipio was sent as legate to his brother Lucius, who was consul in command of the Roman army in the war against Antiochus III of Syria. Actually, Scipio had engineered the election of both Lucius and Gaius Laelius in order to ensure for himself the effective command. The first project for the Romans was to secure naval supremacy. This they did, with the considerable help of the Rhodians and Pergamenians, and some aid from Carthage. The Syrian fleets were defeated in three battles. In one of these, Eudamus, Hannibal had fought and lost his first and last naval engagement.

Antiochus now blundered into withdrawing his garrisons from Lysimachia and gave up the defense of the Hellespont. Scipio, meanwhile, had marched through Greece with an army composed of Glabrio's old army plus two legions from Italy. In addition, 5,000 veterans had volunteered to serve under their beloved leader. If Antiochus had chosen to contest the passage of the Hellespont, he, no doubt, could have forced Scipio into winter quarters in a very disadvantageous position. Having crossed his army, Scipio remained behind due to his religious duties as high priest. Antiochus spent his time (as before Thermopoly) in sensual pleasure at his court. When it was too late, he sent envoys to ask for peace. Scipio replied that he might have accepted the king's terms while still in Europe, but now that the Romans were in Asia, Antiochus would have to surrender all Asia Minor.

The King returned Scipio's son, whom he had captured, and tried to bribe the general, but to no avail. Even now, the King might have had some success by refusing battle and withdrawing into the interior. Instead, he hastened to met the trained Roman legions with his ill-organized mass of Asiatic levies.

Antiochus' force was about 80,000 strong, of whom 12,000 were cavalry. The Roman army including Greek and Macedonian allies was less than half that figure.

Scipio fell sick and returned to the sea coast. The army was now commanded by Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus.

Antiochus had difficulty squeezing his forces into the restricted space available in the Hermus River valley, near Magnesia. In the first division he placed his light troops, bowmen, mounted archers, Arabs, and scythed chariots.

In the second were the heavy cavalry (cataphractae), the Gallic (Celtic) and Cappadocian infantry, and the 16,000 man phalanx, which was his elite unit. His 54 elephants were located in the spaces between the phalanx and cavalry.

The Roman army formed with a small cavalry force on its left flank resting on a river. In the center stood the legions. On the right were all the light infantry and most of cavalry under command of Eumenes of Pergamum. Eumenes opened the battle by using his bowmen and slingers to dispose of the scythe chariots and Arab camel corps. This attack was so effective the left wing heavy cavalry in the enemy second division was also disrupted. He then launched all his Roman cavalry against the Gallic and Cappodocian infantry of the second division and routed these also.

Meanwhile, Antiochus had led his right wing cavalry against the Roman left flank and defeated it. However, he had not stopped there, but had continued on to an attack on the Roman Camp, which was successfully defended. Thus the main body of Syrian infantry, the phalanx, was deprived of cavalry support from either right or left. It was now attacked by Eumenes' cavalry and forced to halt and form front on both sides, as well as in front. In this position it was assailed by the archers and slingers, who couldn't miss such as easy target. The phalanx thereupon retired in good order until the elephants in its gaps became frightened and disrupted the formation. At this, the whole army broke up and was duly slaughtered. Antiochus escaped, but he left 50,000 men behind.

The legions had not even entered the battle. Total Roman losses in this conquest of a sub-continent were 24 cavalrymen and 300 infantry.

Antiochus again sued for peace, and this time accepted the Roman terms, which were the same as before. Gnaeus Manlius Valso replaced Lucius Scipio as commander to carry out mop-up operations. Lucius returned to Rome, where he conducted an even more elaborate and ostentatious triumph that his brother had after Zama. Publius received the thanks of the Senate and the title "principes Senatus". Lucius took the surname Asiaticus.

But all was not well for the Scipios. Party rivalries and jealousies stirred up the opposition. Cato persuaded two tribunes to charge Lucius with misappropriation of 500 talents of tribute from Antiochus. Publius was so angry he tore up their account books on the floor of the Senate, although the records would have shown them innocent. Thereupon, Lucius was found guilty, fined, and almost sentenced to prison; but for the interposition of his tribune's power by T. Sempronius Grachus.

Two years later, Publius was also prosecuted at Cato's instigation on charges of leniency toward Antiochus after being bribed. Publius delayed the trial until the anniversary of Zama and then broke up the proceedings by announcing he was going to the Capitol to give thanks for the victory. The crowd followed him leaving the prosecutors alone. The case was subsequently dropped, much to Cato's disgust. He complained that the state was in danger when any man, no matter how notable, could violate the laws and escape punishment by his hold on the popular imagination. (How prophetic this turned out to be!!!)

This skirmish in the party struggles was enough for Scipio, however. He retired to his estate at Liternum and died in 183 BC at age 53.

The same year Hannibal, who had fled after Magnesia, first to Crete and then to Bithynia, committed suicide at the age of 67. The Roman Senate had felt it beneath their dignity to harass an old man, no matter how implacable a foe, but Flaminius, ever seeking personal glory, had arranged for assassins to accomplish what numerous Roman armies had failed in. Hannibal chose to prevent this last triumph for Roman arms.

The close relationships of the several Cornelii and Aemilii is typical of the Roman aristocratic order. There were 30 consuls in the Cornelii gens over a 200 year period. Scipio's father, uncle, and father-in-law have been mentioned. His wife was Aemilia, daughter of Aemilius Paullus. One of his daughters, Cornelia, married Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who was with him in Asia in 190 B.C., and thus was mother to the two famous Gracchi brothers. This T. S. Gracchus was the son of the T. S. Gracchus who was master of the horse after Cannae, victor over Hanno in 214, and proconsul killed at Lucania in 212. Scipio's other daughter, also Cornelia, married Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, who was son of our Scipio's first cousin (Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica) the man declared by the Senate to be "the best man in Rome", in 204 to fulfill the requirement of the oracle at Delphi that "the best man" be the one to welcome the sacred image of Cybele, which the Romans in their desperation had obtained from King Attalus of Pergamum.

His eldest son, Publicus Cornelius Scipio, adopted the younger of the first two sons of his mother's brother, Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus (victor at Pynda), the conqueror of Macedon, and this Scipio - Aemilianus, Publius Cornelius, the Younger (185 - 129) was the final destroyer of Carthage in the Third Punic War, gaining the surname Africanus as well. He married Sempronia, sister of the Gracchi.

Character of Scipio and References