by Terry Gore
[This is an excerpt from an upcoming article on the Battle of Lewes that will appear in the February issue of Military Heritage magazine.] Mail-armored cavalry, armed with lance and shield and riding war-horses were considered the epitome of military evolution in the 11th century. They had ridden down the armies of the Lombards at Civitate (1053), the Byzantine Empire at Durazzo (1081) and had proven their worth against the Saracens in the Levant at Arsuf (1191). Yet for a time, the mounted knight was used as a dismounted foot soldier to bolster the ranks of unarmored foot, notably at Northallerton (1138). As the 13th century dawned, however, the experiences from the Crusades as well as battles on the continent made the mounted knights less inclined to dismount and fight on foot. By the time of the Battle of Lewes in 1264, the knights would again fight as mounted warriors.
The mounted knight became an essential part of most Western European armies of the 13th century and English armies were no exception. The knight provided a powerful presence, with high-pommeled saddle and stirrups converting an incredible amount of kinetic energy into their charge. Reports from Moslem sources in Sicily and the Levant as well as Byzantine documents make note of how the Western knights could ride right through their opponents.
By the 13th century, Western knights were quite heavily armored. They wore mail from head to toe, with many now using a covered helm to protect their faces from enemy weapons. Some knights continued to prefer the open-face helmets right up through the next century, as this allowed a much greater visual and aural acuity, but sacrificed the added protection of the full-covering helm. Solid body armor had also begun to appear in use, as either boiled leather or plate, worn under the knight's tunic and over his mail as chest and back protection. Armed with a lance and sword, as well as axes, maces or clubs, the knight was a tough enemy to face and increasingly more difficult to wound or kill.
Tactics of the 13th century usually included forming an army into three divisions or 'battles' as they were called. Each division was usually commanded by a senior noble, by the King or one his sons (if a Royalist army), brothers or other trusted relatives. It was not unusual to find entire armies under command of a single family, as evidenced by the de Hauteville's in Italy, Sicily in the latter part of the 11th century. This was one way to ensure loyalty and firmness in battle, as nobles were sometimes not averse to changing sides if the situation warranted.
Each division would be autonomous to a certain degree, and act independently of the others. This allowed for an amount of tactical versatility insofar as launching attacks, defending against enemy charges or making advantageous advances. Though command control could be a major problem with audio and visual signals hard to discern over the tumult and din of battle, commanders did sometimes manage to exercise an amazing adaptability and ability to shift units and even entire divisions if necessary. At Lewes, the Royalists formed up in the traditional three divisions while Simon de Montfort used four divisions, his own being held in reserve.
Most open field battles of the time were fought out hand-to-hand, although missile fire could and did at times have an affect on the outcome of the battle. Armies could and did blunder into each other, but by and large, charges were launched against enemy divisions in order to force them to run or crack under the pressure of the assaults. Cavalry charges were not a given for victory when launched at similarly armed and armored enemies. It became more difficult to coordinate an all-out mounted attack as the knightly armor became heavier and the helmets covered the entire head, cutting off sight and sound. Besides, that, if the enemy division also contained knights, they would launch their own attack as soon as they could, causing the two cavalry lines to crash into each and rapidly dissolve into a series of individual contests. When the cavalry attack was directed at enemy foot units, the result was usually much different.
Once launched, a cavalry charge was almost impossible to arrest, a notable exception being a French cavalry charge at Muret in 1213. At Lewes, for example, the charge of Edward's knights routed the London infantry militia, but effectively put the knights out of the rest of the battle as they pursued their defeated enemies, only returning to the battlefield after the battle had been lost.
Foot could and did at times manage to stand up to the mounted knights. At Civitate, 700 Swabian heavy infantry held off repeated charges by Norman knights until they were finally overwhelmed and killed to the last man. At Courtrai (1302) the Flemish foot defeated the French knights who had crossed a ditch and been disordered by this, and could no effectively make their charges. These were exceptions, however. Most foot of this period had no armor and at best had a helmet, so had little chance of standing up to a knight charge in the open. This was certainly the case at Lewes, where the Londoners broke on contact.
The use of archery is little noted in chronicles of the time. Perhaps this is because archers were looked upon as little more than a nuisance, or minor auxiliaries in support of the noble knights. Archers were present at Lewes and most armies of the period contained numbers of missile men who would harass the enemy ranks before hand-to-hand combat. Charles Oman made note that Simon de Montfort used Welsh archers, while other reports, notably John Ricall (The Pastime of People, circa 1529) record that archery actually forced back the London militia. Archers were not used in large numbers at Lewes, however. This would certainly change in the next century as English armies began to employ huge numbers of archers, allowing the developing power of the famed longbow to become a major determinant of battlefield victory.
In addition to missile troops, large numbers of militia would often accompany armies. They provided numbers and could be used to anchor a section of the line, if properly supported. At Lewes, Simon de Montfort assigned them to a flank position. In retrospect, this was a good move, as when they broke and routed they did not carry any other units away with them. Welsh were used primarily as auxiliaries in English armies, contributing numbers of spearmen and archers. Though of dubious quality morale-wise (often they were not that eager to serve their English 'oppressors'), the Welsh did manage to make themselves more and more a contingent part of later English armies both in France and in Scotland.
As with most battles of this period, once the missile fire and knightly charges had been made, at some point one side or the other suffered a major loss of morale and that army broke. This could take all day or be immediate. The Baronial army at Lewes suffered an immediate reverse at the start of the battle when the Londoners fled from the field, but this also took a good portion of part of the Royalist army out of the conflict as well. The seemingly bad result of the London militia routing actually worked out for the better for the baronial army.
When the battle finally ended with the Royalists losing, there were few actual knights killed. Casualties among knights during this time were usually extremely low, especially at Lewes, where capturing the enemy was an enriching experience. Such was not always the case, as embittered enemies such as the Scots would show and be shown less mercy. It should be noted as well that the foot soldiers were not shown much in the way of leniency, as they would be cut down in large numbers as they fled, unable to outrun their mounted enemies.
Battles in the 13th century were still determined largely on the charge of knights. This would gradually begin to change with the advent and use of high velocity missile weapons such as the longbow and crossbow over the next three centuries. Once again, knights would begin to dismount and fight on foot as they had earlier in the 12th century, but this time is would not be to stiffen the foot, but to avoid the devastating arrow storms of longbowmen.
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