by Niall Barr, Tempus (Stroud - Gloucestershire), 2001. 176pp, 80 illus. (25 colour), ISBN 0-7534-1792-4, PB £ 14.99.

Flodden is an interesting battle. It was the last great strike of the tried and tested English bill & bow yeomenry in what was to prove a great victory for English arms over the old foe. For Scotland it was nothing short of a disaster, losing a respected and reformist king as well as a major chunk of the nobility. Various explanations have been described to account for Scotland’s defeat - treachery (always a favourite for the losing side), the indiscipline of the Higlanders, the inherent advantage of bill and/or longbow over the pike etc. But these reasons usually opt for the simplistic and fail to analyse the political and tactical situation that lies behind the event. Barr’s book sets out to examine these in scholarly and readable detail.

Barr’s book is broken into five chapters and covers the web of political intrigue and jockeying for position of the kings of England, Scotland and France, the military systems of the two protagonists, James IV’s invasion of England, the battle of Flodden and the aftermath. The author produces a very interesting discussion of the build up to the event and puts the battle into its political context. James is placed on the stage as a monarch trying to gain prestige in Europe rather than remain on its fringes. James was treading a fine line between England and France, relying on ‘peace with England and support from France’ to help him develop and harness his resources. The development of his military capabilities was a part of this. James had resisted renewing the alliance with France to avoid antagonising Henry. James had resisted Louis’ requests for military aid in 1510 and 1511 but had his back put to the wall when Henry claimed the throne of France and overlordship of Scotland and began raising taxes to finance an army. James was forced off the fence, realising that if Henry defeated France, Scotland could not stand alone.

War became inevitable if James was not to break faith with Louis and if Henry remained committed to invading France. Thus, in July 1512, some 6 months after Henry’s declaration, James renewed the alliance with France. A part of this alliance was that France would pay for James’ navy whilst it operated in French waters and would provide other financial and military aid. This suited James as his new ships, the Margaret built in 1509 (6-700 tons, 4 falcons, 1 cannon) and the Michael built in 1511 (1000 tons, 24 cannon, 3 large “basilisks”) were expensive but necessarily prestigious items for the relatively small resources of Scotland.

The development of James’ army is also a focal point for the book. James put into the field for the campaign the largest and best equipped army Scotland had fielded to date (possibly as high as 40,000 men, reduced to approximately 30,000 by the time of the battle). It can’t have been lost on James that every military encounter between England and Scotland for the past 150 years had ended in defeat and humiliation. James had placed great store in developing an artillery train of modern guns that would rank alongside those of mainland Europe. It proved its worth by reducing Norham castle in 6 days, however its strength lay in its large siege pieces and this may have proved a drawback inn the field at Flodden.

The great change in the Scottish army was the rearming of the infantry with pikes and perhaps an increase in the use of armour, James establishing a ‘harness mill’ at Stirling in 1496 to produce it. The armour certainly proved its worth at Flodden, nullifying the previously devastating English longbow. The Swiss were at the height of their powers during this period and their victories were studied by all with an interest in the military. Perhaps James noted similarities between the Scots and Swiss military traditions in areas such as the mountainous terrain and the levying of men. By 1471 the Scottish Parliament had passed a law forbidding the import or selling of pikes of less than 18 feet in length, late amended in 1481 to 17 feet and 6 inches. In early 1513, English agents on the continent had reported that large shipments of pikes plus armour and artillery were being sent from the Low Countries to Scotland.

French military aid was also extensive, a letter detailing this being found in the purse of a Scottish nobleman killed at Flodden. It details one shipment of 25,000 gold crowns, 40 cartloads of powder, 2 cannon, another of 400 arquebuses and 600 hand culverins (which didn’t arrive in time for the battle) and another large shipment of pikes, spears and maces. Finally, there was the arrival of the French knight D’Aussi with 50 men-at-arms and 40 captains to train the Scottish soldiers. This assistance, as Barr points out, cannot be underestimated. However, Barr makes some astute tactical observations that although James was attempting to adopt the latest in European military techniques, there is a large gap between the theory and the reality. In comparison with the Swiss, the Scots at Flodden were poorly trained and inexperienced in battle but also vitally lacking in the high morale, confidence and ferocious military discipline (elan and self-belief?) that made the Swiss so devastating. (A similar observation can be made on with the use of ‘imitation legionaries’ by various kingdoms in the first century BC.)

The Scots also had one other major problem and this was that nearly all their infantry were armed with the pike - the army lacked the supporting missile troops and halberdiers to support the pikemen. The Highlanders may have been potentially able to fulfil a similar role but lacked the discipline and probably even the cultural homogeneity with the rest of the army. This comparison of the army, coupled with the tactical discussion of the Scots performance in the battle are for me the most interesting aspects of Barr’s book and provides some interesting points on the development of infantry from the late medieval to the early 16th century.

These points Barr contrasts with the English army at Flodden which was outmoded by the standards of the day with King Henry also having the best equipped English forces with him in France. Henry had taken the precaution of taking few, if any troops from the northern counties to France so there was a full muster available to tackle the Scots should they invade. Outmoded it may have been, but there was no doubting the experience, tenacity and organisational skill of its general, the 70 year old Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey. Henry’s Commissions of Array was at least an efficient system that gave a good indication of how much man power was available, where it was and what it cost. Surrey was reputedly bitterly disappointed not to be accompanying the King to France and would make James ‘sorry for the affront’.

Barr does a good job in assessing the successes and failures of the armies on the day of the battle. Surrey’s urgency to fight due to a lack of provisions and the niceties (and insults) exchanged between the knightly leaders is well explained. Surrey’s wily side-step of the Scottish army receives its due attention but Barr also highlights that this was far from an immediate master stroke as James still had sufficient time to about face his army and entrenched artillery James’ prepared position on Flodden edge had been well chosen to cover any deficiencies with his soldiers but the position on Branxton edge was also a strong defensive position. The loss was in the cover provided by the unprepared positions for his heavy guns. The resulting artillery dual found the Scots’ guns silenced by the lighter English field pieces. The suggestion is that some of the Scottish gunners were killed causing the rest to flee. This contrasts with the greater experience of operating in the field of the English crews. The ineffectiveness of his artillery caused James to advance from the hill.

Barr’s analysis of the battle is well detailed. He has the Scots in 4 battles, not 5 as is mentioned once in the “Articules of the Battaille”. He dismisses this suggestion as deriving from a romantic and chivalric Italian poem, which lists the Earl of Bothwell as commanding a fifth battle. The strengths and weaknesses of the Scots’ pike formations are well contrasted. The leftmost phalanx of Home and Huntly smashes unimpeded into the troops of Edmund Howard, Surrey’s youngest son, whose formation promptly disintegrates. Again, Barr highlights the effect of elan on fighting formations, pointing out that Edmund’s formation was composed of a mixture of troop, many of which were not serving under their usual leaders. Unfortunately for the Scots, the centre battle of Errol, Crawford and Montrose plus that of the King are both played upon by the English artillery and then run into a small and unspotted stream at the bottom of the hill. This brings them to a halt and disorders their formation as they attempt to cross. As they straggle across the stream they are confronted by the other two English battles standing uphill on Piper’s Hill.

Disordered and lacking momentum, the Scots are cut to pieces in an encounter where their pikes become useless. Barr makes the point that criticism of the successful Home and Huntly not coming to the rescue is unfounded. Not only did Dacre’s horsemen (who had rescued Edmund Howard in the midst of the melee) block them but also they probably couldn’t see what was going on elsewhere. The lack of manoeuvrability of the pikemen shouldn’t surprise us when it is understood that they were in a large body (possibly 8000 in the charge), inexperienced, were operating under battlefield conditions (fog of war) and could see unbroken enemy troops before them. They had been victorious; there was no reason to suppose that the other Scottish battles had been any less successful than they had. Barr summarises that militarily, the Scots’ campaign was good but unfortunately Flodden was an unparalleled disaster!

I enjoyed this book. It is informative and well researched and has a good grasp of the military tactics it is trying to examine. It’s not often that we get such a readable account that goes into such detail and that chooses to go beyond the “what” to examine “why?”. Any tactical analysis and comparisons are to be welcomed and Barr’s account of Flodden is not only useful for examining a single battle, but also in highlighting the changeover from a late medieval to an early renaissance military system. A recommended read.