In some ways, we have precious few data points to go on. Here's a very quick summary:

401 BC

Cyrus the Younger wins at Cunaxa. Xenophon implies that scythed chariots were there but no account is given regarding their specific use if in fact they were used. What sounds like *the* public relations account of scythed chariots is from a teeny tiny tactical engagement 6 years later, a Persian Satrap Pharnabazus used 2 scythed chariots against a 700 man hoplite block. The chariots performed as designed, broke up the unit and the Pharnabazus mopped it up with LI and cavalry. But this engagement is too small to have any real meaning to us (or other ancient battlefield commanders) as to be nothing more than an almost "demonstration". Nonetheless, this little "demonstration" obviously colored the opinions of generals for the next 300 years or so.

331 BC

Darius looses the chariots on Alexander at Guagamela (Arbela). He deploys them what we've come to expect, across the center section of his army but we don't really have any detail if they were strewn across they way they did with elephants or if he had three groupings of chariots, one center, one left, and one right, and that these charged in sort of three "massive blocks".

Most (but not all) modern commentators feel the "massive block" charge is correct and that Darius was trying to open up three "lanes" for his cavalry/infantry to follow up. When Alexander shifted his army to the Macedonian right, Darius perceived this as a move to the rough ground to Alex's right in order to void the scythed chariot effect. He then ordered a cavalry charge and then turned loose the chariots (too early). Needless to say, Alex beat them up with LI and then the pike blocks dropped into columns after the chariots (probably crewless by that time) were trundling merrily along so that they passed thru harmlessly. This is an easy thing to reproduce in Warrior [and in AW. Ed.]. I feel that Darius' actions here are telling in our current debate about how to treat scythed chariots. His actions strongly imply that he "knew" the chariots weren't going to work in the rough ground to his left so made sure they were let go on the carefully plowed and scraped ground. This tells me that he knew that if troops were in the rough ground, it would be pointless (at that point) to charge the chariots, hence his precipitous action. This event colors my judgement on allowing expendables [or Fanatics in AW/MW. Fanatics cannot ignore charging into delaying terrain in AW/MW as can other frenzied troops-Ed.] to more or less "ignore" troops entirely in terrain they (the expendable) can't enter.

301

Seleucus apparently had some "leftover" Persian chariots with him when the allies ganged up and beat poor ole Antigonus One Eye at Ipsus. This is an infuriating battle to analyze because the accounts are so sketchy. All we know is that Antigonus' son Demetrius, leads the cav off chasing down the enemy cav, leaving the infantry behind. Seleucus, one of the enemy, then screened off Demetrius with 200+ elephants. Antigonus' pike formations then stood facing Lysimachus' pike formations while Seleucus ran around the flanks with LI and cav, effectively surrounding Antigonus. It wasn't until many of his men surrendered and switched sides, did things fall apart and the bad guys charged in to mop up and kill the old general. Nowhere do we see any hint of the chariots being used. In fact, since it appears that Antigonus' infantry position(s) were more or less pinned, it would have been an ideal time to roll in the chariots. But apparently that didn't happen despite the fact Seleucus had 100 of them. So, no help here. Or perhaps the terrain wasn't useful. We simply don't know.

273 BC

The Galatians, using captured chariots, turn them loose against the Seleucids who somehow managed to "hide" their elephants behind the infantry. As the chariots charged in, the Seleucid infantry drop into columns (ala Alexander's pike maneuver at Guagamela), the elephants move forward, the chariots slam into the elephants, the chariots rout back into the massed Galatian foot, victory for the civilized Hellenes, a minor setback for the fanatical Celts. We don't specifically know how the Galatians deployed the chariots but it appeared they were either in massive blocks ala Darius or across the army's frontage ala Charonea (see below). This battle is called the "Elephant Victory".

190 BC

At Magnesia, the Seleucid king Antiochus lost most of his chariots to a Roman allied force under Eumenes II of Pergamon before the battle evenstarted. He had deployed them on his left flank, apparently in an effort to use them in an enveloping manuever. Eumenes never gave him a chance, instead doing what everybody did to thwart scythed chariots back then: send up the LI to harass them to death. Yes the chariots did charge but again, that was done earlier than desired and all they fought were the LI. This is another battle that heavily colors my judgement on scythed chariots. I mean it appears that Antiochus deployed them in such a way as to avoid rough terrain (that was on the other flank) AND that he massed them to as to punch a big hole (or roll up) one flank. It also infers that the general *did* have some control over the things up until the point they charged, then all bets were off.

86 BC

The Pontic general (begins with an A) lines up his chariots in "classic" across the front fashion. However, Roman general Sulla never gives him a chance to even turn them loose since he comes up to the Pontic line so fast, the chariots are only barely given the order to charge and hence, don't get to build up a head of steam. Plutarch's description here is quite detailed. In fact, he recounts how the Roman infantrymen, after routing some chariots, would cat call out to the Pontics to send more of them in so they could bash them up in turn. Now you know where the "must charge 80p in order to get the scythe bonus" rule comes from.

There's always been a dichotomy with scythed chariots. With one exception, scythed chariots performance in combat wasn't great. But, there is no denying the effect their presence had on an enemy force in that said enemy force had to plan accordingly and fight accordingly in order to negate what was obviously perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be a very lethal theoretical threat on the battlefield. Therein lies the apparent contradiction on scythed chariots. Yeah, we say their performance sucked but I wonder if it didn't have more to do with the countermeasures used against them AND the inherent limitations (crewmen not fanatically committed to dieing so jump off) of the platform. Undoubtedly everyone "believed" the theoretical damage these things could cause which is why I still think an Irr A designation accurately characterizes them. At the same time, commanders would appear to have been somewhat aware of the grosser limitations of the platform (not going into rough terrain for example) and the drivers were still onboard until a) killed by some Agranian Javelinman, or b) jumped out after the charge, and as such, had a modicum of leeway as to how they were aimed.

Gaming Points

Yes, after they've charged, the rules are very clear and if the chariot plows into brush, so be it. Remember, it's now an unguided ancient missile with a limited target acquisition capability. However, prior to that, it's still guided by orders but their usage at Guagamela and Magnesia at least implies the generals knew about what the chariots *couldn't* do and there is no indication that a chariot would have moved up to some brush with a LI unit in it and *sat* there waiting for something else to develop.

And if someone wants to be "gamey" by putting a LI unit in some brush and waiting for the chariot to trundle by, then pop out and potentially "freeze" the chariot in it's tracks, great. To me, that's not "gamey", that's good tactics by the LI player, poor tactics by the chariot player in not potentially realizing what could go on vis a vis the terrain and planning accordingly.