The editor has been soliciting ideas for his rules including specific tactical concepts. Most rules writers have taken similar approaches. Some allow a wide variety of formations and manoeuvres, while others tend to limit these options. While there are many variations, my contention is that there are few basic tactical manoeuvres. These are based on the essential troop types and their specific combat tasks. Development of variants occurred because of the diversity of weapons and mixing of troop types. The problem is to identify what will work well for a set of rules without creating a complex system. I suggest that it is not as important to develop concepts based on historical models as it is to identify what troops are entitled to perform certain actions or use certain formations. In both cases, there has to be a connection between what the troops did historically and how we use them on the tabletop. Once more the need to balance history and playability. Many rulebooks stress the importance of weapons and gamers tend to follow this trend. It is not necessarily the weapon that determines what a soldier can or can not do. Sometimes is the number of weapons; a few can cause problems and a lot can be a serious factor in combat. Other times, the troops had to improvise with what they had. Often the troops conducted the same tasks regardless of the weapon with which they were armed. I shall give one example of this. Skirmishing troops are one of the most obvious categories for which a variety of tactical formations and manoeuvres have developed. The majority of formations were loose reflecting the fluid actions of the troops and the manoeuvres required space so that the troops were not placed at a disadvantage and their aims stymied by their opponents. Generally, skirmishers attempt to harass their opponents with missile fire. A suitable range from the target would be sought so that the skirmishers could inflict casualties while minimising the risk of casualties to themselves. Obviously, javelin-armed skirmishers would need to be closer than bow or sling-armed skirmishers. The ideal target would be densely packed formations such as a phalanx of Greek hoplites, which could not fire back (as it usually lacked missile weapons) and would not break formation for fear of falling prey to some other enemy threat such as cavalry or close order infantry. Without their own skirmishing screens, the hoplite formations were vulnerable to harassing fire. One option was the development of groups of hoplites that could sally out from the phalanx to chase away or melee with the skirmishers. This seems to have had limited application and the preferred option was to employ a covering screen of skirmishers. Skirmishers developed several formations to conduct their harassment. The simplest was a linear formation, which advanced to the ideal range and commenced firing at the enemy. This worked for both mounted and foot skirmishers. One variant popular in the Renaissance period was the caracole in which successive lines of skirmishers, particularly cavalry, would fire at the target and then retire to reload. Early skirmishing chariots and later skirmishing horse formed circles with each skirmisher firing where the circle (Cantabrian Circle) was closest to the target. Other examples can be found in the various military manuals produced by the "civilised" military organisations. Whatever the formation preferred, the principle was the same. The skirmishers attempted to advance to effective range of their target and then fire to ensure maximum casualties to the target. They were formed in a loose formation or a formation relying on continuous movement to minimise the risk of suffering casualties. The number of casualties inflicted by the skirmishers was not always the main aim of the skirmishers. Sometimes the aim was to encourage the target to act rashly such as attempting to disperse the skirmishers and thus disrupt their own formation (making it vulnerable to attack by other enemy units). Other times, it was to neutralise the enemy's skirmishers. Whatever the intentions of the skirmishers, they normally were capable of evading quickly if an enemy force charged them. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that on the tabletop skirmishers have an evade move as an option in response to enemy advancing or charging. Skirmishers should therefore move in a loose formation with the options of being stationary or moving forward/backward in order to fire at their target. They should be able to evade if the enemy advances or charges. Going back to formations, there have been a number of rulebooks that permitted a number of different formations. Their inclusion in the rules has complicated the employment of skirmishers, although they do not always enhance the game. Some were general and permitted to all skirmishers, while others were more specific to one or more armies. What was not always apparent is the original purpose of the formation. For example, the Cantabrian Circle or Gallop was a Roman cavalry training formation. Its name is derived from a Spanish tribe, which presumably invented the manoeuvre or made it well known to the Romans. What is not clear is if the Romans actually used this in combat. It was certainly useful in preparing men and horses for combat and impressed the audiences watching the cavalry train. It may not have been practical on the battlefield. Modern military training also makes a distinction between formations and movements on the parade square, and those appropriate for the battlefield. The former are good for developing cohesion amongst the troops, but not suitable for combat conditions. So there are two reasons for scrutinising special formations before including them in the rules. First, one must consider what armies can use them. Second, each one has to be proven as a combat rather than a training action. The course that I am suggesting is to limit the options to two basic manoeuvres. The first allows all skirmishers to evade when charged and the second allows some skirmishers to attempt to draw their target into charging. The latter is permitted by those armies, which were known to employ such tactics. The same logic can be applied to other generic troop types such as shock cavalry and heavy infantry (both armed with melee only weapons). Other troop categories tend to be hybrids such as Greek peltasts and Roman auxiliaries; Byzantine, Turkish, Mongol, Mamluke, Ghulam and associated cavalry; and mixed melee and missile troops. All of these can have a broader range of options depending on whether they intend to melee or skirmish. It is not easy to emphasise commonality on the tabletop, when many players endeavour to introduce special tactics and manoeuvres. While these may be appropriate to historical match-ups, the majority of games (especially during tournaments) are not fought between historical opponents. We tend to allow numerous restraints in these fictional engagements because of the limits placed on the use of formations like wedges, squares and feigned flight. This philosophy can create an imbalance in a fictional game. Would it not be better to limit such historical formations and manoeuvres to games between known historical opponents? Alternatively, we can explore the various counters developed to negate or minimise the impact of the cunning formations and manoeuvres. How many rulebooks permit the use of the saw formation as a counter to the wedge? How many Greek army lists permit hoplite units to have a sub-unit or detachment of loose order troops to chase away skirmishers? If one does enough research, there is plenty of scope for adding to the number of special formations and manoeuvres currently permitted in our games. Is this really the direction that we should be taking? Already there are problems trying to cover sufficient topics in most rulebooks that span hundreds of years and most known armies. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deal with every nuance of ancient and medieval warfare. Every time a new innovation is suggested, players must consider the ramifications on the rules and games. In conclusion, there are a number of tactical innovations that may have had universal application. Much of our knowledge is limited to well-known information derived from historical accounts of battles and campaigns, and military manuals. These may or may not be the most reliable sources for information on actual battlefield tactics, formations and manoeuvres. It is my contention that most formations and manoeuvres can be used by the majority of armies with a minority being specific to a few armies and troop types. I further suggest that non-universal formations and manoeuvres be included as optional rules so that non-historical opponents are capable of playing a balanced game. The options can be introduced on the agreement of all players for fictional games and be made mandatory for historical games. Back to Saga #74 Table of Contents Back to Saga List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2000 by Terry Gore This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com