"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

One of the major discrepancies in buying troops has been the difference in cost between regular and irregular or barbarian troops. Regardless of rules, most regulars will cost more. Now several gamers have written to complain that this tends to make irregulars too powerful, as they are often almost as effective as regulars when fighting or shooting. Usually the regulars are given tactical advantages to compensate for the extra cost, but is this really as advantageous as it is suppose to be?

Some gamers would argue that the cost is not compensated by the advantages given to regulars as good generals can compensate for them when using barbarian armies. This debate will probably continue for years to come. I do not intend to enter in to it now, but I do want to consider some other reasons for redressing the point imbalance between the two troop classifications.

One thing that has mystified me for years is the frequent reference in history books to barbarian hordes. These usually outnumber the regular army that valiantly engage the horde and somehow win (well in most cases). Now there are some very good examples in which this is true, although some of the most believable examples are well after the cut off date for our period. Trying to find a reasonable example before this date is harder because historians sympathetic to the regular army wrote most of the available accounts. One good example is Caesar's Commentaries, which records his campaigns in Gaul.

This is a fine example of increasing the difficulties experienced by the regulars so that their victory is all that more stunning. Now accepting all these written accounts of battles leads one to accept that there was often a barbarian horde. To recreate this disparity in numbers, rule writers have to make the barbarians cheaper.

One other reason given for making barbarians cheaper is that they did not have to go through a regular training process. They usually worked for a lot less too (plunder or nothing in some cases). So there is lots of good rationale for making them cheap to buy.

I disagree with this point, as there are many examples of training programs for barbarians such as the majority of knights, Japanese warriors, Jomsvikings and household warriors. Some of this training was applied to fighting in groups, in addition to individual fighting skills. They also had to be paid or otherwise compensated for their service.

I think that rule writers overlook the more important reasons that influence cost.

One of the most important is the capability to mobilise an army. Most civilised states had a simple thing like a census or tax roll that indicated how many people were available. For example, Athens classified its citizens (the men who could vote) and non-citizens. From these groups, a military force could be raised. Once this figure had been calculated, then the administrators could determine how many would be used and start calculating what was required in state supplied support such as food, transport (particularly if using ships), weapons and other essentials.

Sure a barbarian leader could hold regular musters, possibly during events like festivals and fairs, so that a tally could be made of available manpower. There are some problems with this system. Unless ordered to attend (and assuming everyone obeyed the order), the turnout could be less than the full potential because of people's inability to attend for good and bad reasons. Without a reasonably accurate tally, how would the leader know how many were available for military service or what was needed to support a campaign?

Logistics is now considered a principle of war in most of the leading military doctrines. By being included in what is usually a very short list (up to 10-12 principles), logistics is recognised as an important part of the art of war. Unfortunately, it is not given the same status in our games. One reason is that logistics generally deals with strategic or operational aspects of warfare. These do not normally impact on a tactical situation such as the tabletop battles that we enjoy. Or so it would seem. I would suggest that logistics should play a major role in developing a system for buying an army. In order to appreciate the role of logistics, we have to consider how the troops get to the battlefield. Unless a leader can do this, he can not fight the battle.

A regular army could be defined as any organisation that provided sufficient support to ensure that a healthy and trained army was available to fight. This has to be modified somewhat as an incompetent general may forget to secure enough food, clothing or other basic requirements so that his men are less than fit to fight. So generally a regular army is one with a permanent logistical and administrative support system, which normally provides it with basic needs (as defined by the government). This might include pay, food, accommodation, medical services, pensions, transportation, clothing and weapons. In addition, there is a permanent or standing force retained regardless of whether it fights or not. This force can be reinforced in wartime by conscription, mobilisation of reserves (militia) or new conscripts/recruits and hiring of allies or mercenaries.

An irregular or barbarian military lacks such support or has a much more limited system or it is organised in a haphazard way. Some could be better than others, therefore it is important to evaluate what one considers as important to get to the battlefield. So what we have is one force that has an establishment from which an army can be drawn for a campaign.

It will be supported by various services so that it can conduct a campaign with all the resources it needs or is likely to need. The latter is calculated based on various factors such as duration of the campaign, weather conditions, requirements for special manpower and equipment (siege, bridging, building materials, transportation, etc.).

Then there is the other force, in which the men must satisfy their own needs. It may lack many of the essentials to fight a campaign that can not be easily supported from its own territory or by foraging from that of the enemy. Additionally, it may be limited in scope because of other pressing needs such as providing food for its dependants (wives, children and others).

After considering the above, which do you think would be easier to prepare for battle: a Roman army or a Gallic army?

The Romans are part of a paid professional organisation, which included various support services and trained its personnel to perform a variety of tasks in addition to fighting. A Roman army usually lived in conditions suited to minimise health problems (latrines, inspections of men, animals and equipment, and regular diet). It could move at a specified rate each day and could increase this rate if necessary. It was trained to deploy from march column to tactical formations in an orderly manner.

The Gallic army was often a collection from divers tribes, families or clans that were not trained to fight in large numbers. Equipment, weapons, armour and supplies varied between warriors. Eating depended on how well the men could forage and the availability of food. Health problems were often the main cause of casualties. Getting the majority of men to the battlefield was dependent on the distance to be covered and how well the force maintained itself. This process was complicated by the addition of families if the whole was a migrating tribe or similar.

There are many examples of armies that were defeated without the need for a battle. These usually could not sustain themselves or suffered such heavy casualties from non-combat causes. Sun T'zu even suggested that the most successful general is the one who wins without fighting a battle. Now following his advice would be of little benefit for us unless a preference for campaigns is the reason for gaming. Since this column is aimed at those gamers who prefer tabletop games, it is an interesting comment only.

I would encourage rules writers to read what he and other military advisors have written before publishing their rules.

The impact of logistics goes beyond what has already been stated. It has an influence on morale, which is also another important factor, although not always an obvious part of a rulebook. An army is more likely to be ready for battle after being fed, rested and paid. There is nothing quiet as demoralising as to be cold, wet, hungry and poor just before a battle.

Again using the two example armies, which is likely to be in good morale before a battle. There will be exceptions as the Gauls may be keen to fight and thus compensate for their discomforts. Napoleon stated that morale is to the physical as three is to one. So enthusiastic troops (or possibly desperate troops) would be capable of fighting well in spite of any negative conditions (hungry, wet, old, tired, etc.)

Caesar recorded that his troops were worried about facing the Germans for the first time. His men were able to overcome their fears and win. This may be another case for his magnifying the enemy and it is often true that soldiers are very concerned about fighting which can be detrimental to their overall morale. It is likely that many Germans were just as apprehensive.

No matter what one thinks of these observations, there are many factors that can be considered before defining a point system for buying an army. I for one think that it may be very difficult to raise a barbarian horde to oppose a regular army.