April 9, 1241 saw a Mongol army outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight a larger Polish/German feudal army on a plain outside of the town of Liegnitz. Liegnitz, now known as Legnica, is in western Poland within one day's march (for the Mongols) of the borders of both the Czech Republic and Germany. Almost the entire Polish army was destroyed and an even larger relieving/reinforcing army under King Wenceslas of Bohemia turned away and essentially took itself out of the fighting for the remainder of the season. The entire Mongol campaign that spring left the Poles stunned and bewildered. Where did they come from? How many were there? Why did they come? Why did they then leave? When the Mongols ultimately rode off shortly after the culminating battle the Poles somehow deduced that they had, despite terrible losses, done enough damage to the invaders to repulse them and the battle became widely known in Polish circles, and by some others, as a Pyrrhic victory.

THE CAMPAIGN

In fact, Liegnitz and its aftermath was a highly successful subsidiary operation intended as what would now be called an economy of force effort. The main objective for the Mongols' operations in 1241 was the destruction and subjugation of the largest power in Eastern Europe – King Bela IV's realm in Hungary. The Mongols were the only army operating in Europe at that time with the ability and resources to plan and mount an operation on the scale and of the complexity shown that year. Batu, the Khan of all Mongol possessions in Europe, was the head of the armies while his brilliant general Subadai conceived of and planned most of the operation himself.

Mongol intelligence (the most efficient and thorough of the period) correctly noted that even the tremendous power and flexibility of the Mongol army would have difficulty overcoming Hungary should the surrounding nations of Europe be able to come freely to her aid and concentrate forces. Thus the subsidiary operation into Poland was launched with 20,000 fighting men or 2 Tumens. These troops, under the command of Baidar and Kadan, were sent to raze the countryside, loot and destroy cities and towns and generally bring down upon themselves as much of the power of Poland, the Teutonic Knights, Germany, and Bohemia and Moravia as possible.

While doing this they needed to remain intact and not allow the power of the Europeans to shift to the decisive theater of Hungary, where Batu and Subadai were taking the cream of the army – 50,000 men or 5 Tumens.

Far from being considered the elite of the Mongol army, many of the troops used in the Polish campaign were not even true Mongols. Throughout the course of the campaign against Russia begun in 1236 the Mongols assimilated numerous nomad and semi-nomad tribes as well as most of the various Russian principalities. Many of the surviving nomad warriors, principally Kipchaks or Cumans, were pressed into service and trained in the Mongol ways of warfare. The victors of Liegnitz may well have been an army fielding a minority of true Mongol troops. Still, the rigorous discipline and training of the Mongol system turned defeated outsiders into outstanding warriors who became extremely effective cogs in the finely tuned Mongol war machine.

The Mongols struck into Poland in early March 1241 fighting two small pitched battles against ducal armies and retainers and carving a huge swath of destruction throughout southern and central Poland including the sack of Cracow, then the capital and most important city in Poland. The speed and efficiency of their operations and the great success of the preliminary battles even allowed the Mongol commanders Baidar and Kadan to split their forces, thus creating even more chaos and uncertainty about the size and intentions of the invaders.

When the two tumens reunited at the designated spot in western Poland resistance had coalesced around King Wenceslas of Bohemia, who was gathering an army estimated at 50,000 men, and King Henry the Pious of Silesia, foremost of the feudal leaders in divided Poland. Henry's army contained 25-30,000 men of all varieties and had gathered in and around Liegnitz, a short distance from the Mongol rendezvous. Estimates of the size of the invaders' forces ranged as high as 100,000 or more due to the speed and breadth of their advance. Faced with this belief and not knowing how far away Wenceslas' army was, Henry set out April 9 south towards the town of Jawor to try to find and link up with his ally.

The Mongols, knowing full well that Wenceslas was no more than 2 days march from Henry met the Poles in an area that became known as the Wahlstadt, or chosen place. As with most Medieval battles, there are conflicting reports and details -- and omissions -- that require educated guesses and deductions to help sort through the material and provide a clean, accurate narrative. I will give my best estimate of how things occurred while attempting to point out areas subject to other reasonable interpretation.

THE DEPLOYMENT

The battlefield was largely open rolling plain surrounded by hills, particularly to the west where the mountainous Czech border was nearly visible. The exact site is unknown, but based on sketchy descriptions of the battle site it was probably about 6 miles south of Legnica along the road to Jawor, and east of what today is a dammed lake but was then most likely the marsh of reeds referred to in battle reports.

Henry deployed his army in four divisions. Henry placed himself in the middle with his own army and retainers along with the Silesian knights, Moravians, some Hospitallers, and the detachment of Knights Templar (who in peacetime acted as something of a personal bodyguard for Henry). Also in the middle was the division headed by Boleslav of Moravia that included knights from various nations and a contingent of infantry drawn largely from gold miners from the town of Goldberg in eastern Germany. On one flank (most likely the left) was Sulislav of Krakow with the remnants of the Krakovian army from the earlier battle of Chmielnik along with the knights and conscripts from Welkopole. On the other flank were the forces of Duke Mstislav of Opole along with a strong contingent of Teutonic Knights under Poppo von Ostern. It appears that cavalry deployed in the front ranks of all four divisions.

The Mongols appear to have deployed in standard fashion with both wings consisting of light horse archers and a vanguard primarily consisting of horse archers backed by a central reserve of more heavily armed and armored cavalry. The Mongol yurts (mobile tent wagons) would have been kept well to the rear, but the mobile Mongol field artillery (manned by expert Chinese technicians) was probably deployed near the reserve cavalry.

THE ARMIES

The troops of the Polish/German army contained mostly well armed and armored feudal knights and conscripted peasantry which was generally unarmored, ill-armed and without training, this due in part to the hasty nature of the mobilization. There were exceptions to this, however. Henry and the other leading rulers maintained permanent armies of retainers containing veteran, mail clad halberdiers, spearmen, axemen and some crossbowmen. The Teutonic contingent, whatever its actual size (about which there is much argument and speculation), was well-trained and superbly equipped from top to bottom and the Military Order contingents, though probably numbering no more than several hundred, were first rate disciplined formations.

Standard Mongol field tactics called for a Mangudai to conduct the initial assault against the enemy army. Mangudai is generally translated as 'suicide troops', but this should be taken as a tribute to their bravery and determination rather than an actual job description! The Mangudai, which in some campaigns/major battles utilized as much as ½ the army, was supposed to draw out the strength of the enemy army through their assault, retreat, and feigned flight. When the enemy was drawn out away from its support and vulnerable the wings of horse archers would attack from both flanks and further weaken and disorder the enemy. This would be proper preparation for the coup de grace to be delivered by the heavy, lance-armed cavalry of the reserve – the final phase of virtually all Mongol battle plans.

Mongol armies of this time were founded principally upon the light horse archer equipped with a powerful composite bow (with a greater average pull than the famous English longbow) and at least two full quivers of arrows. Included in these quivers were light long-range arrows as well as heavy armor piercing arrows and other specialty arrows used for signaling or other purposes. Horse archers generally wore a simple leather shirt and pants with a raw silk undershirt (useful for minimizing the effects of arrow wounds) and carried a small shield, a few javelins and a saber along with food and other non-combat items. As soldiers acquired loot and spoils they might begin to acquire some metal armor (shirt) and helmets, but this was by no means standard or even, for the army of Liegnitz, particularly common.

Heavy troops were generally armored with lamellar metal armor and metal helmet and a fair proportion had equivalent barding for their horses. They were armed with lances and swords, but also retained and effectively used the powerful composite bows of their lightly equipped fellows. The Mongol artillery, adapted from Chinese designs and improved after the campaigns against the Moslem empires in Central Asia and Persia, was mobile, accurate, and well integrated into Mongol battle-tactics.

Against the Hungarians at Mohi, a few days after Liegnitz, the main army under Batu utilized a rolling artillery barrage to force the heavier Hungarian knights off of a contested bridge, allowing the Mongols to deploy and bring battle against Bela's army (and defeat it perhaps as decisively as Henry's was).

THE BATTLE

The battle began with the Mongol mangudai advancing towards the center of Henry's forces. Boleslav's cavalry and some Silesians advanced to stop them but were turned away in disorganized retreat by the arrow barrage of the Mongols. At this point Henry sent in Sulislav and Duke Meshko's divisions to restore the situation and drive off the Mongols. Under this overwhelming pressure the Mongols began a slow fighting retreat, probably characterized on the part of the Mongols more by short, quick charges, feints, and hit and run attacks than actual toe-to-toe trading of blows. Henry then sent in his last significant cavalry reserves, from his own division, to finish this fight at which point the mangudai conducted what was presumably a feigned flight.

By this time the wings of the Mongol army were poised for a strike against the flank of the European chivalry before them. Darting in and out they delivered hard volleys of armor piercing arrows. When the arrows couldn't penetrate the heavy armor of the knights the Mongols would deliberately target the horses, leaving a mass of unhorsed, disorganized knights for destruction at their leisure.

Henry's infantry, which could conceivably have moved up to support the besieged cavalry or provide a safe haven for the cavalry to shelter behind and reform, was at this point cut off from the cavalry and their leaders by a smokescreen. This screen was almost certainly produced by setting fire to the reeds on the right flank and/or the use of the artillery to fire incendiary missiles. This would account for reports of foul-smelling smoke and demonic attack (sulfur from the incendiaries could easily explain this – and the Mongols are known to have used incendiaries in other battles/sieges). Battered, wounded, exhausted, disorganized and partially unhorsed, Henry's cavalry was in no position to withstand the charge of the Mongol heavy cavalry.

Proceeding to the attack in complete silence and in perfect alignment the lancers are given the signal, let out a single war cry and plunge into the fray at full tilt. The Europeans are smashed and broken. The Templars die to a man and no group survives unblemished or even intact. Henry himself attempts to flee with three retainers but they are shot down one by one. Henry's horse is shot and then, after a short attempt to flee on foot, he is caught, slain, and his body stripped. He is only identified a few days later by the sixth toe he had on one foot.

The Mongols burst through the smokescreen and disperse and slay the panicked, leaderless infantry to bring the battle to a final, disastrous close (from the allied perspective).

AFTER THE BATTLE

The battle won, the Mongols take ears from the enemy dead and fill 9 large sacks to send to Batu in recognition of the victory -- at least 20,000 dead. In line with their strategic purpose, the Mongols set off to the west attempting to draw Wenceslas' army with them and away from the decisive Hungarian theater. They succeed and, mission accomplished, break up into small groups and cross the Carpathians, ravaging and looting all the way, for a rendezvous with the main army in Hungary. Much of Silesia and Bohemia are so depopulated that German colonists are brought in with tax exempt status in order to reestablish civilization and restore a functioning economy.

At the close of the campaigning season in Hungary, during which time the Mongols secured a strong grip on all of Hungary east of the Danube, word was received that the Great Khan was dead. In accordance with Mongol custom, all of the Princes of the empire had to return to the capital at Karakorum to elect the next emperor. The weakening of Batu's strength by the return of veteran tumens to Asia (from where they had been loaned for the Russian and Hungarian campaigns) forced Batu to withdraw from Hungary to consolidate his conquests and prepare for future conquests. Internal dissension and the problems of governing the huge territories already conquered raised obstacles to the mounting of major new campaigns of conquest.

At right, Historicon '99 Battle of Liegnitz

These obstacles, added to the contentment of the victorious armies with their immense wealth, could not be overcome and except for occasional raids and one ineffective, poorly led campaign ten years later Europe, apart from Russia, was never seriously threatened by the "Devil's Horsemen" again.

Part II: Wargaming the Battle of Liegnitz April 9, 1241 (Saga 73)