While reading Saga #64 (May 1998), I came across a letter written by George Dullaghan (page 41) who liked to read about armies and their use by wargamers. I too like this type of article and researching armies' tactics has been one of my main interests in this hobby.

Most of my recent columns have featured information concerning the Maurikian and Nikephorian Byzantine armies. One of the key points which I have been trying to study is their tactics. My aim is to replicate these tactics in my games. This has become quite a challenge because of the unusual deployment of some Byzantine armies. Let us now consider the rules and how to such armies would fair.

Most rules, including WRG 7th, DBA and DBM, Tactica and Armati, the editor's Ancient Warfare and others, encourage a linear deployment. Generally speaking the Byzantine armies are well suited to linear deployment and can be rather simple in structure relying mainly on a few basic troop types.

I provided one view of the Maurikian army in the May issue. This lends itself to the typical linear deployment envisioned by most of the mentioned rule books. There is plenty of scope for modifying the army so that it has troops suitable for fighting in rough and difficult terrain. The basic formation described in the Strategicon is of two lines of cavalry supported by infantry in depth and light cavalry on the flanks.

10th Century Byzantine Army Formations

The 10th Century Byzantine army as described in the Praecepta Militaria of Nikephoros Phocas had two main formations. The cavalry formed the forward lines in what is best described as a supported army wedge with the infantry in a defensive square in the rear. The alternative was to form the cavalry within this defensive infantry square from which the cavalry could launch attacks.

In the case of the first formation, the cavalry deployed in three lines behind a small skirmishing force of 300 to 500 cavalry (one tagma). The first main line consisted of a wedge of 300 or 500 kataphractoi supported on each flank by a unit of conventional cavalry (each of 300 to 500 men). On the flanks were two small detachments of about 100 cavalry in looser formations, which were tasked to prevent flank attacks. A second line comprising of four units of conventional cavalry was aligned in the gaps behind the first . The third or reserve line (known as the saka or rearguard) consisted of three unit of conventional cavalry also aligned to cover the gaps in the second line. Behind this cavalry formation was the infantry, the baggage and a small baggage guard of cavalry (300-500 men).

Deploying the army in this manner could result in a quick defeat unless the supporting lines move up quickly. Most rules permit troops which overlap their opponents to fight. Should the first line of a Byzantine army contact an enemy line, it would be at a disadvantage as the enemy units would both overlap and outnumber each Byzantine unit. To avoid this, the second line could fill the gaps resulting in a solid line of cavalry. This might be a good idea using Armati, DBA and DBM but what about other rules which discourage cavalry charging infantry centres? One could use the alternate set up with the infantry square bearing the brunt of the enemy's initial attack.

Formed Square

According to the manuals, the infantry were formed into a large square or rectangle. The size and shape determined by the number of infantry units. An ideal formation had twelve units divided into a main unit of 700-800 men (400-500 spearmen and 300 archers) and a support unit of 200-300 javelinmen, slingers, archers and spearmen. The twelve main units would form a square with each face consisting of three units between which were the support units. Four of the main units were situated at the corners facing in two directions. The light troops could sallying out to strike the flanks of the enemy or could be interpenetrated by cavalry performing the same mission.

The major drawback of using the infantry square is its vulnerability to disorder. The square would have to be very large to allow the cavalry to move freely inside. The infantry on the corners would be subject to disorder if hit on two sides or forced back onto supporting units.

Since the manuals advocated these two formations for general use regardless of opponents and terrain, there must be some justification for doing so. If the formations can not be used properly with the rules of choice, then one could say that the rules are flawed. This is a difficult point to argue because the various rules do not follow the same principles.

I found myself in a quandary as I do not have any detailed historical accounts of the battles of the 10th Century. My main source, "Sowing the Dragon's Teeth" by Eric McGeer (Dumbarton Oaks 1995), has a few examples but does not elaborate on how well the army worked using these formations. The author does provide lots of detail about how the army deployed for battle but he does not specify how the army operated once fighting began.

There are many questions that need to be answered like when did the second and third lines of cavalry advance to support the first line? Was the single unit of kataphractoi suppose to operate like a forlorn hope and crash into the enemy line with the intention of disrupting it? If so when did the rest of the army attempt to exploit this breakthrough? When did a commander know which formation to use before the start of a battle and when did he switch to the alternate formation? Since these questions require further research, I shall not try to conjecture about possible answers. In stead I shall move on to practical examples of the Byzantines as used with the rules.

For all examples, I ask the reader to remember that the model formations are being used. This is important because I am trying to emulate the manuals. I have used DBM and WRG 7th Edition for these samples as they are both known the majority of readers. I apologise if some of my information is dated but I do not have the latest amendments for these rules.

In DBM

Using DBM, the first of cavalry (kataphractoi and two other units) will oppose cavalry and infantry. Against cavalry, the kataphractoi unsupported would have a tactical factor of four with rear support of one (the kataphractoi must be mounted on a double base according to the rules and noted in the army list) less up to two for overlaps (the enemy is in a line of three or more units) for a total of three. The opposing cavalry would also have a factor of three with a general and supported units (from a second rank of cavalry or other units) increasing to four. If the kataphractoi have flank support from the other two cavalry units, it increases its factor to five (but they in turn need flank support otherwise they could fight at a disadvantage). So the kataphractoi either fight at three or five versus three or four.

This is not an overwhelming advantage. And yet, Nikephoros Phocas and others suggest that the kataphractoi were superior shock troops capable of breaking through enemy forces.

Against infantry, the kataphractoi can actually be at a disadvantage. For example, opposing Arab infantry (defined as Warband (Ordinary)), the kataphractoi has a factor of three plus on for rear support less two for overlaps versus infantry at three with rear support of one for a total of four. With flank support, the kataphractoi fight at four. So the kataphractoi are either equal to or less than their opponents.

In all cases, the die roll is important as the kataphractoi could easily be recoiled or destroyed. Given the cost of the two elements of kataphractoi, a player should expect more from a first melee.

In WRG 7th

Using WRG 7th and the same two examples, there are different outcomes possible but some are very similar. Against Arab cavalry (defined as Heavy Cavalry (HC)), the kataphractoi (classed as Super Heavy Cavalry (SHC)) seem impressive. The wedge formation permits a total of seven figures to fight (a front rank of five plus two in a rear rank (1.5 rounded up)) at a base factor of four (lance versus HC) plus one for charging for a result of 28 casualties. The Arab cavalry have three figures at a base factor of three plus one for charging for a result of nine casualties. The outcome depends on the size of the two units but unless the dice favour the Arabs and it is a large unit, the kataphractoi can do quite well. The outcome could be more in line with the manuals as the katphractoi can either recoil their opponents or breakthrough. A second round requires the supporting units to join the melee to prevent the enemy from flanking the wedge.

Against infantry, the kataphractoi charge is less impressive. An unsupported wedge will fight at a factor of three (basic factor of four plus one for charging less two for facing Long Thrusting Spear (LTS)) resulting in 18 casualties. The Arab infantry armed with LTS respond with six figures (front rank of four plus half of a second rank of four) at a factor of two causing 12 casualties. Again the dice rolls are important as is the size of the Arab unit. The best outcome at even odds (both players roll even plus and minus dice) is a push back for the infantry. The supporting units need to enter the melee to prevent overlaps on the wedge in the second round.

However, if the infantry are Light Medium Infantry (LMI) instead of Medium Infantry (MI), they must test for being charged by cavalry. If they fail then the kataphractoi could cause a significant breakthrough in the opponent's centre. This is another example of an expected outcome according to the manuals.

Although the WRG 7th examples could be similar to what was expected, there remain too many factors that must be considered before initiating a charge. I have considered a charge by the kataphractoi while fresh and across clear terrain against an average size enemy unit (six to nine figures in the cavalry unit and 12 or 16 in the infantry unit) and receiving no shooting casualties. How often is this likely in a game?

Given the range of possible outcomes in these two rule books, one could agree that the kataphractoi can be more trouble than they were worth. This is given as a reason for their likely disbandment either by Emperor Basil (the Bulgar basher) or in the 11th Century by another emperor. Fortunately, most army lists have them as an option.

Solution

The obvious (at least to me) solution is to ignore the manuals and organise the army into a formation better suited to the rules and the terrain. The manuals do mention using two wedges of katphractoi on either end of the main battle line. These could then be supported on the flanks by cavalry with infantry forming the centre of the line. A support line of similar composition could be used. This would defeat the purpose of following the manuals to develop an army.

I shall have to play some games to find the best way to employ these armies. In the meantime, I shall be looking for battle accounts to study. There are a few more titles on my list which I hope to find soon.