A recent article in KMT A Journal of Ancient Egypt, caught my eye. It covered the battle of Kadesh.

I recently slogged through Norman Mailer's Ancient Evenings, which combines an excellent sense for the look, smell and taste of Ancient Egypt with a very entertaining view of the battle of Kadesh, as told by the charioteer of Rameses, Menenhetut or "Menny". I've always found Kadesh to be an interesting battle, because it is so well documented compared to countless other battles during this early era, and I enjoy the chariot era.

The article on Kadesh appeared in Volume 8, Number 4 of KMT, labeled "Winter" 97-98. I picked my copy up from Barnes and Noble for $8 in the magazine section. The author, Omar Zuhdi, did postgraduate studies about Egyptology at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and serves as a contributing editor to KMT.

Kadesh occurred, depending on the chronology you believe, during the summer on or around 1286 B.C. Zuhdi uses all of the major sources available on Kadesh, including the reliefs related to the battle carved in 5 separate temples, and the associated inscriptions, including the longer "poem" and the shorter "bulletin" or "record", which cover the battle.

After detailing the sources, and discussing their credibility, Zuhdi goes on to describe the background to the clash. He then provides a narrative of the events during the day of battle, as drawn from the sources. No new ground is turned here, but the recap is precise and well written.

Instead of stopping with the first day's action, Zuhdi also describes the events of the following day, including the significant punishment inflicted on the units which had routed the day before.

His conclusions about the results of the battle are also very mainstream, believing that Rameses won a bloody tactical victory, but suffered a significant strategic defeat. He goes so far as to compare it with the American experience in Vietnam, citing Rameses' ultimate failure to take "the ground" (ie Kadesh itself) as leading to the strategic setback.

The central thesis of the article, though, revolves around why a pharoah such as Rameses would publicize an action which was far from an overwhelming Egyptian victory. Zuhdi's answer centers around the role of the nearin, the reinforcements which enter from the west of the beseiged Egyptian camp.

He bases his conclusions regarding this unit on the facts that: "This unit is not listed among those which set out from Egypt on this campaign. Their route to the battlefield was different from the remainder of the army".

Zuhdi believes the source of these troops, described in the poem as from "the shore of the land of Amor", as the Phoenician coast.

Zuhdi interprets the publicization of Kadesh, and the stress on the singular bravery of the pharoah, as a reminder to the Egyptian forces which let down Rameses during the actual battle. In particular, the specific thrust regarding those forces which let their pharoah down and the cruel punishments inflicted on them must have served as a reminder to those who took their duties lightly.

Zuhdi's "New Interpretation" revolves around the identification and importance of the Ne'arin. He specifies them as being non-Egyptian allies from the coast of Phoenicia, and speculates that they were Egyptian officers sent to muster the forces of his ally, Benteshina the King of Amurru, and the troops from that muster.

There are several more traditional interpretations of the identity of the Ne'arin: "A regrouped portion of the division of Amen".

The corps of recruits stationed behind the division of Re "A special corps of shock troops detailed to approach Kadesh from another direction". Scholars have believed them to be Canaanite mercenaries, or Egyptian soldiers who a scribe used a term for their station rather than origin to describe the unit.

Zuhdi defends his hypothesis because: "The term Ne'arin is clearly Phoenician. They are shown in the reliefs as arriving from the west of the camp, rather than the south as the rest of the Egyptian army. The detailed inscriptions regarding Egyptian forces do not mention them." Though the sources do not specifically credit the Ne'arin with saving the pharoah, the reliefs make it clear that their appearance, at a critical juncture, was the difference between survival and utter defeat.

Some other interesting points made in the article: Zuhdi believes that both chariots and infantry took part in the devastating cross-river flank attack which opened the battle. He does not cite any particular source to justify this belief, only labeling the contrary view (that only chariots took part in the attack) as "what is generally reported in modern literature".

A final point from the article is that the chariot horses of Rameses' personal chariot were named "Victory-in-Waset" and "Mut-is-content". This can be an important piece of information to describe to your wargaming opponent, as he or she probably doesn't know the names of their leader's horse(s).

I would recommend that anyone interested in early Egyptian or Hittite warfare locate a copy of this article. I found it both interesting and thought-provoking.