The Aspect of Psychology
and Morale in Wargames

by Terry L. Gore


When reading narrative histories, or the contemporary sagas, gesta and chronicles of the ancient and/or medieval period, one is struck by the sheer strength of will which individuals possessed to endure the horrific conditions of war in the pre-gunpowder eras. Certainly, technology has resulted in humanity's ability to destroy their neighbor in ever diverse and calamitous ways, but when dealing with your enemy at sword or spear's length distance, seeing his fury...or fear and hearing the screams, shouts, clash of weapons, dust and seeing the bloody ground upon which you stand assaulting your senses and primeval survival instincts, warfare in the pre-gunpowder period was made much more personal than most war waged since.

How to replicate the tactical nuances of edged-weapon warfare might seem on the surface to be simpler than later periods of history. Yet, with the personal warfare situation, there are many facets which must be dealt with, not least of which is the psychology of the warrior. How was he motivated and brought to the field of battle? What caused him to stand fast, madly assault his enemies or run away in fear? What would enable him to leave hearth and home and fight alngside his neighbors, some of whom he hated far more than the enemy army facing him? How did he react within a given situation? Answering these questions, or at least attempting to answer them, can give us a beginning point at which to start constructing a rules system which directs itself at dealing with these situations on the wargames table.

First of all, men always seem to be in search of adventure. Not only does life get a bit boring down on the farm at times, but poverty can be psychologically debilitating. War always promised the rewards of victory. Until very recently, it was an accepted aspect of battle for the victors to strip the vanquished of anything of value. Enriching oneself upon the bloody field of battle certainly became a strong incentive for impoverished peasants and nobles alike.

Secondly, warrior societies rewarded prowess in battle with commodities, either of a monetary nature, of arms and armor, or a combination of the two. Armies were usually relatively small, insofar as actual numbers of combatants went, and Roman histories are filled with the names of brave fighters (Horatio is one we are all familiar with) who were neither generals nor wealthy land-owners. Viking sagas are an even more vibrant example of this exemplification of the brave warrior. A fighter in pre-gunpowder battles knew that he was under the watchful eyes of a commander, whether he excelled in combat or ran away in fear. The rewards for excellence were monetary and/or an advance in status. The penalty for running away could be disfigurement or death. Thus, men had strong incentives to impress their superiors.

Once a fighter had earned his rewards, he often found himself better accoutred than before. He could wear the armor of a vanquished foe or have been given armor by his grateful commander. He may even have been asked to join an 'elite' unit of bodyguards or high morale fighters, such as the Theban Sacred Band or the Byzantine Varangian Guards. His status among the fairer sex could be another stimulus to his striving to be recognized and to have high honors. It seems that in warrior societies, all of the positives are there to excell in battle. Only the actual and very real fears of death, dismemberment or capture for torture worked against a fighter trying to do his best in battle.

Fear can never be quantified. Some men would blithely fight in the most hopeless of circumstances, Leonidas' three hundred Spartans at Thermopolae, for instance. Others would run at the barest hint of misfortune, as did the Turkish armies attempting to recapture Antioch from the Crusaders during the First Crusade. Wise commanders would do everything in their power to infuse their troops with a sense of their inevitability of victory. The Normans at Civitate, outnumbered and starving, were still confident of their superiority over the Papal army and carried this confidence through to total victory. Charismatic generals (Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Caesar, Alexander, Robert Guiscard, Harold Godwinson and Genghis Khan, for starters) could inspire their men to win no matter who or what they faced. Having supreme confidence in their commander could ensure victory when all other factors spelled defeat. In my research and study of seventy battles for Neglected Heroes, over 1/2 of them were won by the numerically inferior army, sometimes outnumbered by more than 10-1!

Men would often be encouraged in battle by the fact that they were armored, and with good reason. Looking at the grave finds from the Battle of Visby in 1361, over 1,000 individual skeletons were found and studied. Wounds were classified into three areas: those from swords and axes (456), those from "piercing weapons" such as arrows, lances and morning stars (126), and others from maces, warhammers and clubs. Very few of the skeletons (29) had severed bones, because the commbatants were mail armored, which caused the blows to be much less effective than if delivered upon an unarmored fighter. Shielded fighters, the Visby combatants suffered 15% of their injuries to their arms, and fully 65% of the remaining injuries were evidenced on the lower body, as the upper torso was protected by their armor (above information from Tombs, Graves and Mummies, ed. Paul G. Bahn, Barnes and Noble, 1996).

Unarmored men would of common sense felt inferior, even the Gallic warbands which would initially throw themselves in frenzied abandon upon their Roman enemies, quickly realized that their nakedness did nothing to stop a Roman short sword, and their initial elan quickly died, as did they. Feeling that one's armor protected a fighter from enemy attack cannot be overstated. Though usually slowing movement, armor did indeed become valued for its physical protection and psychological quality as well.

Superior tactical position leads us to another, very important psychlogical situation. If uphill of an enemy, ot behind a physical obstacle, in a sheltering position or on a wall, looking down, you would naturally feel in better spirits than in the open field. The enemy had to overcome physical barriers to get to you. Meanwhile, you get to watch, shoot at him, and rest while the enmy is becoming tired trying to get at you. Conversely, the enemy would not be especially enthused to be huffing and puffing up a hill to fight a prepared and rested enemy who had the advantages of higher ground.

All in all, morale rules have to take these factors into account, as Medieval Warfare and Ancient Warfare do. Without these factors, the rules writer is leaving out some very fundamental items which influence how men perceive their tactical situation...and in tactical level rules, such as mine, this is a major theme.


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© Copyright 1998 by Terry Gore
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