The Athenian Trireme by Morrison and Coates is one of the most thorough explanations of the trireme to date. The book was written on the advent of a project to reconstruct and sail a trireme. There are four reasons given to recreate such a ship. The first reason is to attempt to reconstruct a vessel to historical requirements and archaeological evidence, a model whose performance matches historical accounts. Second, to improve understanding of Mediterranean naval operations from the fifth to third centuries B.C.. Third, to broaden appreciation of technological, economic and naval achievements of Hellenic society by storing and displaying the ship in a Piraeus ship shed, and launching it for research and demonstrations at sea. Finaliy, to recreate an important artifact of Hellenic civilization, and a unique ship-type of interest to naval historians and architects.

The method of trireme construction has been in debate since the fifth century A.D., Morrison and Coates suggest that the few triremes used by Constantine may have been the last of these ships. The method of trireme construction was forgotten within two centuries. Since the middle ages many chroniclers have tried to determine how many banks of oars the trireme had, and how it was rowed. Using ships of their own day as models, chroniclers often decided that three men sat together on a bench and shared a single oar. The alternate explanation was that three men shared a bench using different oars. Theories that consider three levels of oars were discounted as ridiculous. Such speculation continued until the writing of this book and the reconstruction of the trireme.

This is not, however the first trireme to be reconstructed. In 1860, Napoleon III had a trireme built, however the ship did not work. Several other attempts to build a trireme followed, all were unsuccessful. The reason none of these reconstructions had worked, was due to the length of the oars. Until very recently, historians had supposed that three banks of oars were not possible because they would have oars of three lengths. Scholars after so much trial and error have finally come to the conclusion that a trireme had three banks of oars, and oars of the same length. This three banked oar system, taken for granted today has only been reached in the past few years when Morrison and Coates were able to produce a working model.

The majority of the book deals with the well known naval confrontations of antiquity. These banles are well presented and clearly explained. The authors also draw attention to commonly neglected details of naval combat. First, the dependence of the trireme on land forces and friendly ports is oflen neglected in discussions of the naval banle. This book demonstrates the interaction between the two groups. Presenting the sea battles in this way improves understanding of the battles and the reason why they occurred close to land.

This book also imparts a more thorough understanding of the use of the trireme itself. It is often taken for granted that the ship was used primarily as a ramming weapon. This technique was widely used only in Athens. Triremes from other cities were used differently. In fact two styles of naval warfare were conducted simultaneously. The authors take great care to use examples from battles that utilize the different methods.

The chapters on the crew of the ship demonstrate the complexity of manning and maintaining a large navy in the ancient world. It also highlights the reasons for the decline of Athens' navy, and the carelessness of Athens in regards to maintaining her navy. The epigraphical and literary evidence used to support their conclusions is well presented, thoroughig explicated and convincing.

The final chapters of the book trace the building program of Athens. Explicit details of the construction of these ships, and the materials used in their construction are given. Problems and methods of construction are demonstrded through the actual recreation of a trireme by the authors. Although the reconstuction is of great interest for archeologists and naval historians, it is very complicated for average readers without good knowledge of naval engineering, in spite of the authors clear explanations.

The greatest weakness of the book is that its introduction to Greek seafaring is oversimplified ( this book is seen by Morrison to be the companion to his earlier work, Greek Oared Ships which he assumes readers to be familiar with). The transition from a single deck ship, to a bi-level ship, to three is not explained in any detail. And although the book imparts an excellent understanding of the trireme at war, other details are skipped. Other functions of the trireme, as a pirate chaser or escort ship receive no mention. The importance of the Piraeus port to the naval program of Athens is also neglected. On a whole, however, this book gives a far better understanding of the Persian wars, the Peloponnesian war, and the reasons for Athens demise as a sea power in the fourth century.

Oared warships have been part of Greek history from earlist times; many Minoan and Mycenean representations of warslips have been found. The extensive use of ships is attested to as early as the Iliad and eighth century vases from tne Dipylon tomb in Attica show ships. Even Thucydides chooses to begin his history with a great emphasis on naval developments and exploitation of the sea. Although the ship played an extensive role in the formation of Greece, it was not until the sixth century that the ship became an offensive tool. Early ships show a ram, but no naval battles are recorded with a ram being used. Another early portrayal, on thc Aristonothos vase, shows an Aegean ship with a ram and a Carthaginian or Etruscan ship with a curvus. But fighting is being done by soldiers on tne deck, rather than the ships being used as weapons.

It is not until the construction of the bireme that ramming becomes a possibility. Penteconters with a double bank of oars may be discerned on a vase painting as early as the eighth century (Williams 122). A Corinthian vase from the late geometric chart shows a two level ship and may also be dated to the eighth century (Williams 125), and Attic fragments of a slightly later date also show a double bank of oars (Williams 126). These two level ships then, represent the transitional stage between single level ships and triremes.

In considering how two banks of oars might be adopted, two possibilities are plausible. The first is that the ship stays the same length and the number of men doubles. This solution is ideal for the transportation of troops. This solution increases the number of fighters on board for raiding (oarsmen at this time were also fighters). The second solution is to shorten the length of the ship and keep the same number of men in different levels. The advantage to this is a lighter, faster ship, perfect for ramming.

It is this socond solution that was adopted. By placing oarsmen in the top of the ship and the hull, the ship was light enough to gain the speed necessary to ram, and light enough to disengage after ramming. This was accomplished by splitting the crew into four ranks of twelve, two sets to a side of the ship. The rowers in the hull plied oars inserted through ports (Casson 85). The oars on the upper level was staggered between these to avoid tangling the lower bank. In this way, the maximum number of men was retained. This innovation made the boat 33 and 1/3% smaller, and this compactness led to a more sea worthy craft (Casson 86). By placing oarsmen in the hull there is less room for supplies, making this even more pointedly a warship.

The first sea battle in literature is in Herodotus (Herod. I. 165). It is fought by Phocaean pentaconters on the one side, and Etruscan-Carthaginian alliance on the other. The date of the clash between these ships is 535 B.C. The first recorded ramming was done in this battle, but many rams are twisted or broken off, indicating that ramming was still experimental. Although the trireme had been invented earlier in the fifth century, the penteconter still seems to be preferred. All the Phocaen ships were penteconters, and the enemy was able to sink their ships, they probably were penteconters also.

It is unknown when exactly the trireme was invented. It became possible when technology allowed someone to build the outrigger. The addition of the outrigger and another bank of oars was specifically designed to increase ramming power. Thucydides claims the Corinthians were the first to build triremes (Thuc. 1.13). The first time they are spoken of is in 542, by Hipponex, an Ephesian poet (Morrison and Coates 40). The best sources for the trireme are Herodotus and Thucydides. Both have a great familiarity with the skip, Herodotus was an island dweller, and Thucydides was a former admiral.

Thucydides sees the invention of the trireme and the development of naval warfare as simultaneous development (Morrison and Coates 40). He also believes that the invention of the trireme occurred under tyrants and that the Sicilians were the first to possess a strong navy (Ibid. 1.14). This is probably because the trireme requires much money to build, and tyranny usually enjoyed economic prosperity. Triremes were also very expensive in terms of crew maintenance (Morrison and Coates 40). Thus, the spread of the trireme can be traced througb the Greek world by the economic strength of various states. Thucydides is probably correct in granting Corinth the first triremes. Corinth, with its early monopoly on trade, and being under a tyrant during this time, is a logical choice for the first trireme, as it possessed sufficient wealth.

Athens came to possess triremes later, and not until the democracy. It is well known that Athens did not have a fleet of triremes until the lucky silver strike at Laurium. On this occasion, Thanistocles, the great Athenian admiral, was able to legislate for a building program. The Ionians, poorer than these Greek states, also had many triremes, but these were build and maintained by Persia (which was land-locked), the Ionians were simply the sailors Morrison and Coates 41).

The dangers of equipping a subject people with powerful weapons soon became evident. When Ionian revolted from Persian they were ironically using Persian-built triremes. The revolt failed ending with the battle of Lade, and Herodotus blamed this on the laziness of the Ionians. To use a trireme as a wapon required discipline and hard training, characteristics he does not ascribe to Ionians, who had placed themselves under a Phocean admiral, who drilled them in keeping line togetehr and the diekplus. After seven days of hard work, the Ionian rowers had a general mutiny and refused to drill any longer (Herod. VI. 11). Thus it was that a fairly incompetent component of 353 Greek triremes sailed to meet the Persians. The Persian fleet composed primirily of Phoenicains, who also had triremes, but of a different type than the Greeks--they are always referred to as faster. A force of 600 ships had been prepered against the Gresks, and it is probable that these were not all triremes, since the Persians expressed doubt over defeating the Greek force (Morrison and Coates. 41).

As it turned out, the Persians had an easy victory (Herod. VI. 11ff.). When the time for the battle at Lade came all but seven of 60 triremes from Samos sailed off before the fight. These were soon followed by Lesbonians and many other allies of the Ionians. In the end the 100 from Chios were the only full complement. These did engage the enemy and the diekplus was used, but the trireme was not used in its full offensive power. Each Chian ship carried a compliment of forty fighting men, which slowed them down and demonstrated the intention to fight from the deck of the ship rather than rely on ramming (Herod. VI. 16).

Both styles of fighting appear to have continued simultaneously, and it is uncertain if ramming ever really replaced reliance on marines (Morrison and Coates 44-5). Analysis of several naval battles show both of these styles used through the era of the trireme. The battle at Artemisium was the first large scale battle to make use of the trireme (Herod. VIII. 1ff.). Persia mustered a force of 1,207 triremes manned by Greeks or Greek iinfluenced crews. Each trireme had its normal force of ten soldiers, four archers and thirty crew members. In addition, they carried thirty Persians or Medes to guard against treachery or desertion to the Greek side (Morrison and Coates 50). This was a disadvantage for the Persians as it made them 8% heavier than the Greek ships (Morris and Coates 50). In addition to the triremes, there were 3,000 supply ships, transports, and other small vessals. The Greeks could only provide 271 triremes and nine penteconters against this force.

Fortunately for the Greeks, a storm wrecked about 400 Persian triremes and a vast number of supply ships before they sailed for Artimisium. After gathering the remaining sea worthy vessels, the Persians continued their advance. Persia divided her navy before reaching the Greeks and sent 200 ships east to blockade the Greek escape route from the narrow channel. These are described as fast ships by Herodotus, and is possible that they were part of the Phoenician contingent of ships. This passage has however been regarded with some skepticism. It has been suggested that Haodotus inserted this passage only to decrease the number of ships the Greeks would have to face. The reason given is that triremes could not carry provisions for such a long voyage, and there were no friendly ports to put into to purchase food (Green 129).

Although the Greeks were still outnumbered, the Persian fleet that they saw was more manageable (Themistocles knew of the detached force but held the Greeks in place). Themistocles urged the Greeks to attack the large feet. This was probably because the Persians had their fleet scattered at different moorings and were still weakened by the storm (Green 133). The Persians moved in to position and tried to execute a periplus. The Greek fleet responded by forming a kyklus. Then while the Persians were sall circling they surged forward ramming and capturing thirty Persian ships.

Meanwhile another storm had blown up smashing the 200 detached Persian ships into the rocks. 0n the second day of the battle another 53 Athenian triremes arrived as reinforcements. As dusk approached the Greeks again attacked, destroyed the Cilian contingent, and withdrew again to Artimisium. On the third day the fight was renewed.

This time the Persians attacked adopting a crescent formation. The size of the Persian feet caused confusion as ships collided, and the Greeks took advantage of this and attacked. Rather than draw up line abreast and try to hold against the attack, the Greeks drew up in columns and attacked the Persians (Morrison and Coates. 54). The battle was inconclusive and the Greeks used Persians both took casualties. Among the Greeks, the Athens had the worst of the fighting, helf her ships were damaged. After the fighting broke off, the Greeks withdrew to Salamis, leaving Attica and Eubea to the Persians.

The Greeks regrouped at Salamis, and were aided by ships from other cities. The Greeks now had 378 warships to perhaps 1,000 Persian ships (Morrison and Coates 55). Many of the allies wished to leave and take up the Greek defense elsewhere, but Themistocles succeeded in a rouse to make them remain. He sent a message to the Persians saying that the Greeks were going to run. The Persians, fooled by Themistocles, detached a force of 200 ships to block the channel and prevent a Greek escape. The rest of the navy rowed through the night to reach the site of the battle. Already tired by six hours of rowing the Persians arrived at Salamis. The Greeks, seeing no chance to escape, were now forced to fight.

Two versions of the battle at Salamis are found. The first, and most commonly known account is that given by Herodotus. According to Herodotus, the Greeks lured the Persians into the narrow chaned by backing water. Then when the Perians began to crowd each other the Greek line attacked. Aeschylus, in his play, The Persians, gives a different account. According to Aeschylus, most of the Greek fleet lay hidden behind the Georgius island. As the Persians advanced through the chained thinking the Greeks were gone, the ships that had been hidden behind the island came out, and using the diekplus smashed the right wing of the Persians. Taking Aeschylus play as more credible than Herodotus, who received his information from the Persians, the Greeks were the first to attack, not the Persians (Morrison and Coates 58). It has been suggested that these two strategms are not exclusive, rather that Herodotus simply omitted the surprise appearace of the Greeks (Hammond 46).

In botb of these battles, the Greeks used the ram as a prinury weapon, and concentrated on holing enemy ships rather than fighting from the decks. It is probable that the Persians , with 40 marines on board the Greek ships relied more on stopping to board Greek ships. At least one ship from Samothrace defeats a Greek ship by clearing the deck with javdin, (Herod. VIII. 90). But this cannot be stated with certainty becaue Persian ships also used the ram (Herod. VIII. 89-91).

After the Persian defeat, Athens concentratedon improving her navy. In the 50 years between the battle of Salamis and the Persian wars, the trireme was inproved. Athens became the ruler of the seas with the best trained rowers and shipwrights in the Greek world. (Morrison and Coates 61). It was about this time that Athas defated Aegina, her only serious rival in the Aegean, and that the long walls to the Piraeus were constructed.

The port of Piraeus played no small part in the success of a naval power. Themistocles is given credit for the plan which conceived of the long walls and the development of Piraeus as port (Plutarch. Them. 19). The walls that connected Athens to the sea were 4 miles long and 200 yards wide (Warry 44). This port provided a secure place to both receive supplies in times of siege and to build and maintain a fleet.

The triremes were stored in sheds at the port. Priaeus was divided into three quarters, and the fleet occupied one of these quarters (Amit 75). The best known ship-sheds were located at Zea harbor, which were excavated in 1885. The sheds were cut into the bedrock and built up with blocks of local stone (Morrison and Williams 181). These are graded off into the sea, and possibly had wooden runners attached (Morrison and Williams. 181). The individual shipsheds were partitioned, seemingly by solid walls, perhaps in order to prevent the spread of fire (Morrison and Williams 181). The sheds formed a continuous line then, and ran down into the water. It is uncertain how the ships were transported from the sheds, but it is likes that rollers or pulleys were used Morrison and Williams, 181).

At the begining of the Peloponnesian War it is possible to examine a battle with non-Athenian trireme tactics (Thuc 147 ff.). At Sybota a battle took place between Corinth and Corcyra with only ten Athenian triremes as observers on the side of Corcyra. Corcyra had 110 ships not including the 10 Atbenisn triremes. The Corinthians had a force of 150 ships. Both sides were supported by land force. During the night the Corinthians tried to launch a surprise attack on the Corcyreans. The ships that went to meet the Corcyraens were cleared for action (sails and extra gear removed and left on land) but they carried three days rations and extra troops (negating the weight advantage of clearing the ship). The Corcyraens were already at sea, so the effort was wasted, and they drew abreast to meet the enemy.

Corcyra divided her force into three even squads; Corinth put 90 ships on the left, 21 in the middle and 39 on the right. In the ensuing engagement, neither side made use of ramming, but permitted the fighting of the hoplites to determine the outcome of the battle. When the ships broke apart the Corinthians beached their ships at Sybota, where they stayed their ground forces and the Corcyreans went opposite the gulf to Leucimme. The next day both sides went out to fight, but the Corinthians spotted another Athenian fleet of 30 ships approaching. When they saw this they broke off the fighting and returned home rather than face a fleet skilled in tactics. (Morrison and Coates, 67). This was probably a wise decision as the complement of fighting men made the ship too heavy to perform defensive maneuvers that would allow them to avoid being rammed. This battle also indicated that not every navy was yet proficient in naval maneuvers.

At Naupactis, the devastating effect of a trireme against troop transports can be examined (Thuc.2.83 ff.) In this engagement, the Corinthians tried to sneak 42 troop ships and five triremes past an Atheniun fleet during the night. The Athenians detected the attempt and under Phormio moved into attack position. The Corinthians were caught halfway between the two shores and formed a kyklus. The Athenians began to circle the formation in single file, tightening their circle as they sailed. The Corinthians, using crews not as experienced as the Athenians began to collide with each other causing confusion. In addition, the oarsmen could not control their oars, so many of them were dropped. After this the crews began shouting at each other, making it impossible to receive commands from their leaders.

Phormio, being experienced in these waters also knew that he could expect an evening breeze to blow in, making it even harder for the Corinthians to control their ships. When Phormio judged that the ships were beyond the control of their officers, he attacked, ramming and sinking the flagship and destroying many others. The Corinthians broke apart and ran for shore leaving 12 of their ships and passengers to be captured by the Athenians.

The second battle at Naupactis took place only a short time later (Thuc. II 85ff.). Brasidas was dispatched from Sparta for the express purpose of destroying Phormio, as the Peloponnesians did not understand that supenor naval tactics of the Athenians, rather than the cowardice of their own crews, had won the engagement. The Peloponnesians sailed with a force of 77 triremes. This time Phormio was at a disadvantage, and had to try to protect Naupactis with only 20 triremes. The only choice open to Phormio was to try to made a run for friendly land, so stringing out his ships single file he rowed for Naupactis, cutting a path in between the land and Brasidas. Brasidas kept pace and then turned his ships abreast and moved to ram Phormio's line. Nine of Phormio's twenty ships were driven onto the land. Those Athenians who were able to escape the ships did so, and were met by land forces. The Messenians waded into the water and engaged the Spartans, preventing the capture of several of the Atehenian ships.

Meanwhile eleven ships had escaped. The remaining ships sailed for Naupactis. As the first 10 reached the far end of the inlet they turned to await attack. The rear Athenian ship circled a merchantman that was in the harbor and rammed the pursuing Peloponnesians ship sinking it. This sudden action caused confusion among the pursuing Peloponnesians ships. At this time the pursuers began to lose formation, and some, unfamiliar with the waters, grounded in the shallows. The Athenians were able to rally, sinking 6 Spartan ships and recovering some of those they had lost. Fearing Athenian reinforcements, the Peloponnesians sailed away.

On account of such victories, Athens enjoyed a fearsome reputation at sea until the Sicilian expedition. The disaster then led the Peloponnesians to seriously think about challenging Athens at sea (Morrison and Coates 80). From this point on, although Athens wins at Cynones and Cyzicus, her ability to field ships with competent crews declines. At Arginusae, although the Spartans lost, Athens lost thirty of the seventy triremes sent in the first wave. The shortage of manpower is apparent; to crew the 110 trireme relief force, slaves and free men of all classes had to man thern (Morrison and Costes 88). In spite of the victory, Athens had still lost ships and crews crippling her naval power for several years. In addition to this, Athens enemies were now becoming proficient in naval tactics themselves.

In all of these actions, the success of the fleet was in some ways determined by the interaction between naval and land forces. It was essential for the navy to establish a support base. The reasin had to do with the trireme itself. The Athenians used the trireme as a weapon, and very little room was provided for carrying supplies. Drinking water and food were not normally carried on board. Nor did the sailors eat and sleep on board. The ship put to shore for the noon meal and to sleep. The men rowed at the same time, extras were not carried so these breaks were necessary (Morrison and Coates 96).

When it was not possible to camp by a friendly city, the ships still beached, but only for a short time and lookouts places. On these occasions the crews slept on board and food was brought, but this was not preferred. The trip from Corcyra to Rhegia showed that the trireme carried none or little food. It also travelled the open sea only with difficulty (Morrison and Coates, 101).

For the actual sailing of a trireme, most of the distance was by aer. Triremes had sails but these were never used in battle, and rowing was considered faster (Morrison and Coates 103). A long daty of sailing was 16-18 hours, with a one or two hour sbreak for a midday meal, with an average speed of 8.6 knots (Morrison and Coates 103). Thus 129 nautical miles could be covered in the course of a day. There is no recorded time in which the sail and oars were used together.

The crew of the trireme consisted of 200 men. The list of the components comes from the decree of Themistocles (Fornara 53). The person at the top of the ship's echelon was the trierarch, or captain. These men came from the propertied class (Fornara 55), and were responsible for their ship (see below). They had the job of commanding the ship. Below the captain are the hoplites, auxilisries and oarsmen. It is only possible to speculate as to the role of the hoplite on board the ship. They remained on the deck, their pwpose was either to fight at land or sea, or perhaps to help the captain keep discipline among the rowers (Morrison end Coates 110). There were normally only ten hoplites on board, and their position was the second highest after the captain. In addition to the hoplites, each ship also carried four archers, usually mercenaries (Warry 30). These men were probably a personal body guard to the captain, and protected him during combat.

The rest of the crew is referred to as auxilliaries. Sometimes the hoplites are included in this, and always the archers. Professionals with specific jobs are found among these: the helmsman, the bostswain, the purser, the bow officer, the shipwright andd the piper (Morrison and Coates 101). What the other ten men on board did is unknown, but is probable that they helped with the sails, and other tasks on board.

The oarsmen fell into two categories, thst of citizen and that of foreigner (Athenian allies). Oarsmen were special, considered too valuable to risk in battle (Morrison and Coates 114. Only in the most urgent circumsstances do we hear of osrsmen acting as soldiers. To become a good oarsmen takes years of practice and constant training were required. At the height of Athens naval power Pericles sent 60 triremes a year on training cruises for eight months at a time (Plut. Peril 11). As the Peloponnaisn War drew to a close there were fewer citizen rowers. It was probably the increasing lack of skilled oarsmen that led to the abandonment of the trireme in the third century.

Nothing is known about how the crew was gathered. It was probably the duty of Athenian citizens in the fifth century to take part in expeditions, and the allies were probably compelled to contribute men. All the crew members regardless of their function were paid the same rate (Morrison and Coates 119). At the time of the Sicilian expedition pay was one drachma per day by the treaty in addition to bonus paid out by the captains. It is also hinted that rowers were beginning to desert, as Sparta tried to tempt Athenian rowers to their fleet by promises of higher pay (Morrison and Coates 122). The crew received half the the pay each day on board, and were paid the remainder at the end of the voyage when they made it back to the Piraeus. They were probably not paid in full to prevent desertions. In addition to paying sea bonuses, each man received two obols a day for food.

Theoretically, the majority of this money was supposed to have been provided by the treasury. In practice, the captain of the ship was responsible for maintaining it. A lawsuit from 362 B.C. shows how expensive this was, (it alo shows that Athens was actually very weak with regard to its navy, since it now depended on the whims of mercenaries). When a man was assigned as a trireme captain he received a ship from the state. He could then draw gear if available from the public stores (for which he was financially responsible) or be would have to purchase it. Gear meant the oars, sail, cables and ropes. None of this was provided with the ship. After that he had to hire rowers and crew, all of which were demanding high wages in the fourth century. Even after people were paid and hired, there was always the danger that they would desert for a better paying ship, in which cue the captain had to hire replacements.

By the end of the fifth century, Sicily and Cartage were building quadriremes, quinqueremes and hepteremes. Alexander the Great used quadaremes and quinqueremes in addition to triremes. After the death of Alexander, Athens started to rebuild its navy, and commissioned 200 fours but only forty triremes. These were never built however, as Athens was defeated in a sea battle in 322 and ceased to be power thereafter.

Eventually the trireme disappeared and was superseded by these larger ships. There are several reasons for the eclipse of the trireme. The most important was that their were fewer skilled rowers to be found. Perhaps as important anotber factor was ships needed to be heavier to carry siege equipment. Several of the larger ships were now reinforced, to inhibit ramming. All of these reasons combined to end the era of the trireme, and with it, Greek supremacy on the sea.

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