by Robert Drews
Princeton University Press, 1993, ISBN 0-691-04811-8

This recently published book caught my eye one day while browsing through one of our local "Borders" book stores. Since the era of the chariot is one of the most fascinating of all eras of ancient history to me, I snapped up a copy and plowed right in to reading.

The focus of the book is on the events around 1200 BC, which Drews calls "the catastrophe'. During this period many of the mighty "Bronze Age' kingdoms which had ruled the Eastern Mediterranean basin fell, and the cause of these falls, often violent, remains a source of debate. Palaces and cities throughout the region were burned during a fairly brief (in historical perspective) interval of time. Drews argues for a new interpretation of how and why this happened.

Those who are put off by "scholarly" writing, or who prefer popular history, should probably avoid this book - Drews, a professor of classics and history at Vanderbuilt University, makes his presentation in the classic scholarly fonnat, with extensive footnotes and convincing examination of each possible alternative.' For someone with a strong interest in the military technology of the time, however, this book is a veritable gold mine of information, and the extensive footnoting and bibliography form a starting point for an even more in depth examination of the period using the other sources available.

The first section of the book lays out the chronology of the catastrophe. Drews then proceeds to examine the impact of the catastrophe throughout the region, including destruction its Anatolia, Cyprus, Crete, Syria. Mesopotamia, Greece, the southern Levant and Egypt. In this section he draws heavily on archeological research at sites in each of these areas.

Once the reader has a firm grasp of what happened, when and where, Drews proceeds to examine each of the alternative explanations that have been put forward by scholars to explain these events. They are:

• Earthquakes
• Migrations
• Iron working
• Drought
• Systems collapse
• Raiders

Drews' refutation of most of these theories is well argued and quite convincing. He is particularly convincing at debunking the iron working hypothesis, arguing that archeological evidence cannot support it. The traditional *iron working" explanation has involved a variation on the theme of an ironusing elite (often from Anatolia/Haiti) using their superior metallurgical technology to upset the prior social order. Drews summarizes the archeological evidence available, which shows iron implements not coming into general use for more than a century after the period in question. Basically, iron working postdated the catastrophe, and therefore could not have caused it.

The chapter on iron working provides a good example of some of the useful detail captured in this work. Anyone who has painted figures of this era has agonized over the depiction of their weapons should any Sea People have iron or bronze weapons? When was the changeover general? Drews summarizes the available scholarly evidence. and concludes that iron weapons generally supplanted bronze ones around the tenth century BC (circa 1,000 BC.

Though most of Drews' arguments are convincing arm] well argued. some remain somewhat unconvincing to me, even after multiple readings. I was not convinced by his argutuents, for example, that drought had no impact on the events of this era (a general drought during this time period is well documented). His argument centers around interpreting scanty written evidence which might indicate that there was no food shortage at several -of the destroyed locations. and the considerable evidence that the destruction was carried out by "enemy" forces, which he uses to support his military explaration.

I found the evidence of a military immediate cause quite convincing, but am left with the feeling that drought and food shortages throughout the region played some role in the root cause of the military action.

This leads to a discussion of perhaps the most controversial argument made by this work - his rejection of the existence of the "Sea Peoples." In short, Drews argues that the Peleset/Philistities were not immigrants to Palestine, but native to the area. The other "Sea Peoples" were not wandering tribes, but mercenaries from Sardinia, Sicily, Italy and Lycia. The following table summarizes Drews' hypothesis:

People	Traditional Identification	Drews' Identification
Peleset	from the Aegean or Anatolia, via Crete	native Palestinians
Lukka	Lycians	mercenaries
Ekwesh	Achaca	mercenaries
Tursha	Tyrrhenia(S Italy)	mercenaries
Shekelesh	Sicilians	mercenaries
Shardana	Sardinia	mercenaries
Tjekker	settled north of the Philistines on the coast of Canaan	native Palestinians

The only migrations that Drews acknowledges in association with the Catastrophe are those of the Libyans and Palestinians on the fertile part of the Nile delta. Drews' arguments do cast some doubts on the traditional hypothesis, I was not yet convinced that his explanation was more likely than the traditional. In particular, I was unconvinced that the Peleset/Philistines were native Palestinians.

Having set up his argument by considering and rejecting traditional explanations of the *catastrophe", the third section of the work goes on to argue Drcws' new explanation. Basically. his thesis is that the development of new infantry tactics, relying on skirmishing and the javelin and slashing sword transformed the balance of power from the small, expensive elites (chariot forces of the Bronze Age kingdoms) to the mass of infantry warriors.

The third section of the work is easily of the most interest to the student of warfare in this era. Drews starts off by cataloging the works covering warfare in this era - I found this to be one of the most valuable parts of the book. A wide variety of works, including books, journal articles and graduate theses in English, Gentian, French and Italian are summarized for their content and contribution to our knowledge in the area.

Drews then proceeds to examine the nature of chariot warfare and the role of infantry in the Late Bronze Age. News argues that chariot tactics throughout the era focused on the chariot as a mobile missile platform, with archers launching volleys of arrows from composite bows. These tactics were developed to overcome the typical tactics of the Early Bronze Age, which were primarily infantry centered, relying on formations of spearmen combined with archers armed with a simple or self bow (range approximately 60 motors), who softened up opposing formations before the spearmen closed. The age of the chariot ran front roughly 17-1600 BC to the Catastrophe around 1200 BC.

More controversially, Drews argues that chariots in the late Bronze Age were primarily missile platforms. even for areas where the traditional weapon of the charioteer has been thought to be a spear (like Mycenaean Greece and the Hittites). Drews argues that the lance, or long spear, was certainly carried, but was only useful against enemy foot soldiers or chariot crewmen who had fallen the ground.

On the role of infarury in the late Bronze Age. Drews believes their role was to be used as supporting "runners" for the decisive chariotry, and had a larger role in sieges and in terrain unsuitable for chariotry. States such as Assyria and Haiti had more effective infantry due to their exposure to large amounts of such terrain.

Drews then goes on to examine the role of chariotry and infantry in the early Iron Age. This section 4 as interesting as the previous, with interesting detail about the later Assyrian, Hebrews and others. Drews uses this examination to argue that the chariot was of little importance in the early iron age, noting the virtual disappearance of the two horse chariot (whose role was replaced by true cavalry), and characterizing later four horse chariots like those of the Neo-Assyrians as *cumbersome." Though the case seems somewhat overstated (the chariot definitely played a role in later Assyrian, Egyptian and Hebrew warfare), the argument does lend credibility to his thesis.

The last section of the book is also fascinating, for in it Drews examines the changes in armor and weaponry at the end of the Bronze Age. On the subject of armor and shields, for example, he argues that "the armored infantryman was in large part a creation of the Catastrophe" (p. 180), citing as examples the *Sea Peoples" kit. In the area of weaponry, he argues that two major innovations occurred at this time, the advent of the first true slashing sword (the Naue Type II) and the appearance in large numbers of a large dart / small javelin sized weapon. Drews feels was used for 'bunting' chariot horses. Whether you agree with his conclusions or not. his arguments arc very well presented, and serve as an excellent overview to the arms and armor of the era.

Finally, Drews concludes by summarizing his thesis. In short, a revolution in warfare, involving a new type of infantryman (armored, with darts and a slashing sword), made the expensive chariotries which rise Late Bronze Age palace states depended vulnerable. These civilizations either fell violently (Haiti, Greece, Ugarit. etc.) or hastily adopted the new tactics (Egypt, Assyria) to survive.

All in all I found this to be a fascinating work, The level of detail. on all manner of subjects, is first rare. The summaries of other works on this era. and the extensive bibliography and footnotes, are a researcher's dream. And the writing style, though scholarly, is interesting, and draws the reader along toward the author's conclusions. Highly recommended for anyone with a serious interest in the period.