There is no doubt that culture, religion, social attitudes etc. do set the peoples of various nations apart and affect their suitability or performance as soldiers, even if they do encourage stereotypes. Such stereotypes can be useful providing they are not taken to extremes; there are many examples of French élan, Russian stubbornness and British steadiness, but also some when the opposite was true.

National characteristics have been factored into some rulebooks, which identify such things as pluses and minuses when compared to each other. French are rated well when attacking and Russians on the defence, for example. A British first fire may be rated better because of the practice of firing at close range. The Prussian army of the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War might be considered the best as could French armies of the Napoleonic era.

In most armies there is a tradition and history, which is held up for the present generation to emulate. This is particularly true in the British Regimental system. This inheritance of a proud and glorious history is still used to motivate soldiers and to give them a feeling of pride in their regiment and a desire not to let their fellow soldiers down. The maintenance of this military ethos is guarded jealously and is found in all armies of the world. Belonging to a regiment that has distinguished itself in previous encounters with the enemy is a powerful incentive and confidence builder for a new recruit, just as joining a recently decimated or poorly regarded regiment is likely to be an ill omen.

The British, Russian and Prussian armies had a reputation for the harsh enforcement of discipline: "The ingrained habit of unhesitating obedience". There is no doubt that a battle was no place for debate, and instant obedience was indeed a key requirement. This was equally true to ensure soldiers did not start drifting away when the fire got hot.

The French, and various German states, had a rather more relaxed approach, in line with their more revolutionary ideals. This relied on the motivation of the soldier to keep him in the line of battle rather than the threat of retribution if he did not. Those armies with the most severe discipline were generally the ones most noted for their stubbornness and the ones whose drill manuals placed a greater number of officers and NCOs in a position where they could control rearward movement. Savage and inhumane it may have been but for some, "the scum of the earth", perhaps it really was a necessary evil.

Whilst the British persisted with a small, all volunteer army, which was perhaps motivated by pride and the threat of severe punishment, other European states were forced to raise larger armies. Each had their own motivation, whether it was the simple devotion of the deeply religious Russian serf to the Czar, or the more dubious loyalty of a member of the heterogeneous Austro-Hungarian Empire. The strength of this loyalty will have determined how hard they were prepared to fight and what hardships they were prepared to endure. There can be no doubt that nationalism played no small part in the resurrection of Prussian arms in 1813/14. A well-trained soldier is far more likely to perform well on the battlefield than one who is not. Almost without exception the armies, formations or even regiments who made a name for themselves during the wars were those who had a reputation for having had good training:

• The British Light Division drilled by Sir John Moore in Shorncliffe is an excellent example and it is no surprise to discover that the British reputation for devastating musketry only reflected that they fired more rounds during training than the other armies; and
• Having had two years training in preparation for the invasion of England in 1803/4, the Grand Army was at peak efficiency when it gained the victories of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena/Auerstädt, and Friedland.

Napoleon developed an outstanding military machine from Revolutionary French armies: forged in war and with a tactical doctrine that had been tailored to the requirements of large conscript armies. It introduced columns of attack, and greatly improved French battlefield mobility. This enabled Napoleon to run rings round his opponents who practised linear tactics more suited to the battles of the Seven Years War. In order to defeat Napoleon, his opponents had to learn many a harsh lesson from their defeats and failures to enable better performance in later campaigns. Defeat is often a necessary catalyst for change and improvement. The European armies copied the tactics, organisation and procedures that had been used so successfully against them. It is essentially for this reason that the French armies were less successful in later campaigns, which often lacked the sweeping victories Napoleon was able to gain between 1805 and 1807, and made many battles hard fought and less decisive.

It does not matter how good individual soldiers or even units are, if they have weak leaders they will almost certainly lose. As Field Marshal Montgomery said: "there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers". Whilst this may be a slight exaggeration the message is clear and true. A good example is the Battle of Albuera in which the pick of British forces were almost led to defeat by the French on 16 May 1811.

The French marshals enjoyed an enviable reputation on the battlefield, but Napoleon's close control of them in this environment had its shortcomings. In the later campaigns of 1813/14, the large numbers of armies involved meant Napoleon was forced to give many of them independent commands. After years of detailed direction from Napoleon, some had only limited initiative and very few of them proved equal to Napoleon.

Opposing commanders were of varying competency, which meant that some were severely outclassed by Napoleon and others were capable of much better performance. It is difficult to compare commanders because few faced Napoleon regularly during the complete span of the Napoleonic Wars on an equal footing (similar number of troops, similar experience level and as independent commanders). The only one who might have been Wellington, who is considered the obvious equal to Napoleon, but they only faced each other once at Waterloo (and the arrival of the Prussian army was a significant event in assuring an allied victory).

One thing that can contribute to improving command and control is an efficient staff system. Napoleon was once again lucky to have inherited a rather effective system; although there is no doubt that he perfected it. Once again the other nations tended to play catch-up and some were way ahead of others by the time the wars ended. This was a noticeable advantage in many of the 18th and 19th Century wars. Marlborough could not have succeeded at Blenheim if he was not well supplied and assisted by an ally of the calibre of Prince Eugene. Frederick the Great benefited from a good group of subordinates that could implement his designs (and save the Prussian forces from catastrophic defeat after losing battles).

There is no doubt that there are many other factors which determine how well armies fight and which might set them apart from others. Certainly the importance and applicability of each of these factors will be different from war to war within each army as circumstances changed and problems were addressed. The Prussian doctrine of Frederick the Great may be one factor in the losses during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic campaigns. Heavy French losses in 1812 may have been a factor in the unsuccessful campaigns of 1813 and 1814.

National Characteristics and training influenced morale, and it is often morale that distinguishes the fighting qualities of various nations. The fact that many are immeasurable and almost indefinable is insufficient reason to dismiss them as inconsequential given that they all make a significant contribution to success or failure in war.