One problem that I have encountered when gaming is the proper employment of cavalry. According to most historical accounts, cavalry are usually best when relegated to the flanks of an army. Unfortunately, some of the club’s games leave little space in which cavalry can manoeuvre properly and this has resulted in the cavalry being exposed to massed infantry firepower.

Using cavalry can be a hard task to learn. One is seldom able to read articles on the subject, although there is a wealth of information on infantry tactics. By the end of the 17th Century, cavalry was definitely subordinate to the infantry with the latter expected to win the majority of battles.

There were several different approaches to how best to use cavalry. They could advance and engage a target with pistol fire (caracoling like pistoleers and arquebusiers of the Renaissance) or charge with swords or lances. Most offensive actions were against cavalry as musket-armed infantry, either well supported in line or in square, were capable of defeating cavalry. So cavalry versus cavalry were the typical engagements. A flank attack or charging disordered infantry were likely to be successful, although these were often elusive targets. A good example of the typical cavalry-infantry clash occurred during the Battle of Minden in 1757, where the majority of the French cavalry opposed the advance of the English infantry. Despite its numerical superiority, the English foot units drove off the French cavalry. This must have been quite the sight, as thousands of charging horses would unsettle most opponents.

One cavalry tactic was to use firearms at short range and then engage with swords. When properly performed by resolute troops, this tactic could inflict considerable casualties among the first rank of the defenders. There was one potential weakness; if the defending infantry were in good order, then the cavalry would usually suffer more casualties and withdraw. Only when a disordered or flanked unit was attacked did the cavalry usually succeed. The men could see the enemy quickly approach while they were standing still, and the men in the end files would often flee in the final moments. If the ranks were not sufficiently compact others would follow and the line would be overthrown.

There is a tendency to view the use of firearms when fighting enemy cavalry as a feeble tactic, one that would invariably lead to the destruction of those using it. This stems from an awareness of the cavalry developments that would lead to the defeat of the French cavalry using those tactics by the Allied horsemen at Blenheim, not to mention those that would allow Frederick the Great of Prussia to create the finest cavalry of the entire epoch. Be that as it may, the tactic of firing at an enemy before charging was a common one, at least up to the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession.

By the late 18th Century, the majority of European cavalry had discontinued the practice of using pistols (and in some cases carbines) in charges, and attacked with cold steel. According to regulations, the cavalry started at a moderate trot, which was maintained for most of the time, in order not to tire out the horses. They then changed to a slow gallop at approximately 200 paces from the enemy, and started to charge home at some 60 paces, after the trumpeters signalled the change to full gallop. In practice there were deviations from the rules. Often these were because of the cavalry commanders, specific situations (being ambushed, charging from ambush, exploiting an unusual situation) and the status of the cavalry (fresh or tired).

Regiments usually formed in line, with squadrons one beside the other, if there was enough space, or in column, with squadrons or companies one behind the other. Heavy cavalry usually attacked in columns formed by companies, with about 25 men abreast; in this way, each company was formed in two lines. Another often-used formation was that of squadrons in echelon, also known as the chess formation (en echiqiuer). In battle formation, the cavalry's place was on the wings, or in the centre, behind the infantry. It was usually strongest in the direction of the main thrust, which was executed in waves, and prepared and supported by artillery. The tactics of the Napoleonic French cavalry under Murat, Grouchy, Lasalle, Kellerman and other brave commanders were very simple: when a favourable position in relation to the enemy was achieved, the attack was launched.

Only in clashes with superior enemy forces was flanking attempted. The battle formation consisted of deeply echeloned masses of regiment or brigade width, which was not only a reflection of the new mass tactics, but of the insufficient training of lower units.

Regiments, or brigades, were ranked one behind the other, with very little space in between, so that an attack looked like a series of repeated charges. In attacking enemy heavy cavalry, or a firm infantry front, the first line usually consisted of cuirassiers and the second one of dragoons. Light cavalry protected the flanks. Russian cavalry used a formation of line in two rows, or column of platoons. The attack was started at the walk, changed to a trot and then to full gallop at about 100 paces from the enemy.

British cavalry (and some other European cavalry) were capable of changing formation on the move, rather than to form up while stationary and maintain the same formation throughout the battle. Obviously, if changing formation on the move went wrong, it could lead to an appalling disaster, but if properly executed would have an enormous advantage in speed and surprise. This innovation was made by Seydlitz, the outstanding Prussian cavalry commander during the Seven Years War.

Frederick the Great

Frederick (the Great) realised that there was a causal relationship between the troop's morale and their method of attack. Frederick knew that his cavalry's advance to the enemy at the slow trot did nothing for his men's morale, and reduced the cavalry encounter to a chance affair whose outcome was entirely dependent upon the corps elan and the skill of the individual troopers in the action, rather than the ability of their leaders or the superiority of their doctrine.

Frederick observed that the slowness of the charge at the trot had two undesirable effects. It gave the trooper too much time to think, thus providing an opportunity for cowardice. At the same time there was a greater chance that that both sides would come to blows. This prospect displeased Frederick since this meant the melee would be a series of individual fencing matches, and he was always loath to have any outcome depend upon the individual skills of his soldier. Consequently, when altering his cavalry's charge doctrine, Frederick sought to give his troopers a tool that would bolster their morale at the critical moment, while simultaneously serving to crush that of their opponents.

Drawing upon the experiences and example of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII of Sweden, he concluded that this could only be achieved by increasing the speed at which his cavalry was advancing in those critical moments when both groups of hostile horsemen were separated by less than 50 paces. It was at this point that one side or the other would almost invariably swerve, break, or check their motion, handing the contest to the other side. The Comte de Gisors said to him in 1745 "I make the squadrons charge at a fast gallop because then fear carries the cowards along with the rest - they know that if they so much as hesitate in the middle of the onrush they will be crushed by the remainder of the squadron. My intention is to break the enemy by the speed of our charges before it ever comes to hand-to-hand fighting: officers are no more valuable than simple troopers in a melee, and order and cohesion are lost”.

On p. 169, Frederick is quoted as saying "So long as the line is contiguous and the squadrons well closed, it is impossible to come to hand-to-hand combat. These squadrons are unable to become mixed, since the enemy being more open than we are and having more intervals, is unable to resist our shock." Soon, however, the distance charged while at the gallop was increased beyond the existing standards of the age. In 1742 the distance galloped was 100 paces. In July 1742 the gallop was to start 200 paces from the enemy.

P 170: "In 1748, Frederick demanded that they charge 700 yards (trot: 300, gallop 400). In 1750 this was increased to a total of 1200 yards (trot: 300; gallop: 400, and full speed: 500). This was increased to an incredible 1800 yards in 1755 with the last 600 yards at full speed.

This protracted charge developed by the Prussians during the 1751-1756 period was totally dependent upon a very high standard of horsemanship, especially in regard to moving and manoeuvring in large bodies. The Austrians became disordered after only 50 yards at the gallop.

P 171: “The Prussian cavalry was made more effective by a second tactical development, one rarely discussed in modern literature. This was the use of cavalry columns to attack enemy infantry in formation not previously softened up by either infantry or artillery." From "The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon" by Gunter E. Rothenberg, Batsford (1977).

P72: "The charge itself was delivered with gradually increasing speed, usually starting out at about 600 paces with the trot, changing at 400 to a canter, the next 150 at a restrained gallop, and only the last 50 paces before impact at full gallop.”

When cavalry met cavalry in a countercharge there was much noise and commotion, but surprisingly few casualties.

'When cavalry meets cavalry', General Marbot concluded, 'the slaughter is much less than when it is opposed by infantry'. At Waterloo, Captain Mercer witnessed the clash of two cavalry regiments. They rode at one another, but the ranks opened and the men passed through, slashing and stabbing, but with little effect. This is called 'Threading'. Whilst cavalry combats often saw units passing through one another with little damage, heavy casualties occurred when weapons were unequal or when one side was driven to flight.

P105: "In 1791 the heavy cavalry and the Dragoons had formed three squadron regiments, while the light regiments had four squadrons each. By 1798, Carabineer regiments fielded four squadrons, a total of 703 men, while the four squadron Dragoon regiments had an establishment of 943 officers and men. Light regiments had the same establishment, while the Line regiments, with only three squadrons, numbered 531 officers and men each."

P142: "Normally cavalry charges were preceded by a heavy bombardment and supported by horse artillery. Murat's great charge at Borodino was supported by 100 horse guns. Unsupported charges such as Murat's at Eylau, or the epic dash of the Polish light horse at Somosierra Pass in 1808 were exceptional. " "Reminiscences 1808-1815 Under Wellington", Capt. W Hay C.B., Simpkin, Marshall (1901).

P184: "When we entered the field there were three squadrons numbering fifty four, fifty three and forty eight files each. All that were left were formed into two. One of twenty four, the other of twenty three files - a sad havoc indeed!" "How truly dearly that short morning's work had cost the 12th." (Of note, most casualties appear to have been from cavalry v cavalry combat. The odds were 3:1 against. This combat took place before the charge of the Union Brigade.) "In The Peninsula With A French Hussar", Albert Jean Michel de Rocca, Greenhill Books (1990).

P75, 20 March 1809: "A little before our arrival, there had been an engagement between the mounted chasseurs of the 5th Regiment, who composed our advanced guard, and the Royal Carabineers of the enemy's rearguard, before that city (Truxillo). The number of killed and wounded on both sides was nearly equal. The Spaniards lost a field officer."

P 75, 21 March 1809: "Two hours before sunset, the advanced corps of the 10th Chasseurs reached the enemy's rearguard, which, finding itself close pressed immediately retired upon the main body of the Spanish army. The colonel of the 10th allowed himself to be carried away by too much ardour, and imprudently permitted his whole regiment to charge; it became animated, and pursued the Spanish cavalry for more than a league, along a causeway between rocky hills, planted with flex.

When a regiment or squadron charges in line or column, it cannot long maintain the order in which it sets out; the horses animate one another, their eagerness progressively increases, and the best mounted horsemen generally find themselves far beyond the others, which breaks the order of battle. The commander of an advanced corps should be careful not to make long charges, and should frequently form his lines, in order to let the horses take breath and have time to reconnoitre for fear of ambuscades. Besides, at all events, when one is too far advanced to receive timely help from another body, it is right to keep at least half the corps in reserve, to sustain the other, and to form for the attacking party a sort of rampart behind which they may rally, if they should be repulsed and followed by a superior force.

Not far from the village of Mia Casas, the Spaniards had placed several squadrons of their best cavalry in ambush; this chosen cavalry fell unawares upon the chasseurs of our advanced guard, who were marching without order and separate, at considerable intervals behind each other. Our horsemen were overpowered by numbers: their horses, fatigued by an excessive long charge, could not form to resist, and, in less than ten minutes, our enemies destroyed upwards of 150 of the bravest of our 10th Regiment." "1812", Antony Brett-James, Macmillan (1966)

P124, Lieutenant Roth von Schreckenstein: "I had almost reached that part of the Saxon Lifeguard Regiment which was gradually giving up its pursuit of the Russian cavalry, when my horse fell back, pierced by several case-shot bullets which had been fired from somewhere to the left Colonel von Leyser was unable to halt this vigorous pursuit, and I believe I saw several detachments attacking infantry, while a small section of the Regiment pursued the enemy dragoons beyond Semenovskoye...

To control and halt a regiment under such circumstances is a pious hope. Men who are imbued with true cavalry courage and attack the enemy for as long as they can and anyone who imagines that one can invariably control and direct a cavalry regiment just as one pleases by means of one's voice or a trumpet, as if on peacetime manoeuvres, has never been in an action where all arms of the services co-operated."

Minor Tactics

Finally the work of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Clery, titled "Minor Tactics", published by Keegan Paul (London, 1880) to give some more examples and to conclude. Clery had been the Professor of Tactics at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

P.100: "The distinguishing characteristics of cavalry in action are the rapidity with which its force can be applied at distant points on the battlefield, and the effect, moral, as well as physical, produced on the enemy by the shock of collision. The power of cavalry lies in the impetus derived from motion. Accordingly, its action should in all cases be offensive. It should, therefore, never await an attack, should if possible forestall one, but in all cases should advance to meet it. This is a fundamental maxim, which admits of no qualification. Column is the formation in which cavalry will most conveniently manoeuvre - line in which it will fight to most advantage."

P122: "Marshall Marmont says on this subject that "as cavalry should always attack the enemy, and the men fight hand in hand Isic). it should never fight in column. Cavalry on nearing the enemy should deploy. A column of cavalry surrounded is quickly destroyed...The normal formation of cavalry is two ranks..."

P125: The fighting formation of cavalry is the line. This does not, however, imply that the whole of the attacking force should be employed in the front line. The period of a charge at which cavalry is weakest is the moment after collision with the enemy. The act of collision produces disorder, and this is further increased by success from the natural tendency to pursue.

A fresh body of the enemy's cavalry, attacking at this moment, would encounter their opponents when least fitted to resist; and if, on the other hand, the charge had failed, may make the disorder irretrievable unless there were at hand some means of checking his pursuit. A body of cavalry, therefore, unless very small, should never engage its whole force at once. A portion should be held back as reserve; either to support the first line, to take up the pursuit, or to check the enemy if the first line is repulsed. Murat, charging without a reserve at Leipzig, had no formed troops at hand to check the enemy when his first line fell into disorder. Ponsonby's Brigade, previous to charging a French column at Waterloo, was formed with two regiments in the fist line and one in reserve. But the latter allowed itself to become engaged in the first line, and, the enemy being overthrown, took part in the pursuit. When the French cavalry in reserve attacked these regiments, the British commander had no reserve to meet them with, and, the whole force being caught in the disorder of pursuit, they were driven back with a loss exceeding half of the brigade.

In one of Kellerman's charges at Austerlitz his first line overthrew the cavalry opposed to it, and continued to advance until checked by hostile infantry. As he fell back the enemy launched some fresh regiments in pursuit, but his reserves advancing defeated these regiments, and so effectively covered his retreat that he at once re-formed and delivered another charge. Similarly, Nansouty, at the same battle, having overthrown the enemy's cavalry with his first line, completed their rout by launching his second line in pursuit. The position of a reserve should be such as to admit of its intervening most effectively in the fight. It may be in the form of a second line only, or of a second and third line. The weak points of cavalry are its flanks. These must be secured by troops, for advantage of ground cannot be relied upon, as, the action of cavalry consisting in movement, they may at any moment have to be abandoned. The most advantageous position for the second line will usually be in rear of the flanks of the first.

At Austerlitz Kellerman's division made nine charges. It was composed of two brigades, each of two regiments. With one or at most two regiments in the first line and the remainder in the second line or reserve. The distance between the lines was generally about 250 yards.

The distance between the lines should admit of those in rear affording timely support. Yet they should not be so close as to allow of a reserve in front paralysing the action of the remainder. Sufficient space should also be preserved for manoeuvring, as well as to obtain effective impetus in a charge.

At the battle of Soor in 1745, the Austrian cavalry of 50 squadrons was formed in three lines not more than 20 yards apart. Charged by the enemy's cavalry, the first line was thrown back on the second, and that on the third, and finally the whole in disorder on the infantry.

P 128: At the action of Saalfeld, in 1806, Marshall Lannes, perceiving some wavering in the enemy's infantry, ordered two cavalry regiments to attack it. The regiment in the first line, while charging, was attacked in flank by five Prussian squadrons, but the regiment in the second line dividing into two parts, fell on both flanks of the Prussians, completely defeating them, killing a great number and driving the remainder in the wildest disorder from the field.

Warnery says that in a fight the principal aim of a cavalry commander should be, after securing his own flanks, to seek to gain those of the enemy.' Bismark on the same subject says, 'Hostile cavalry seeks to gain each other's flanks - the side which succeeds in this is oftenest victorious.'

Jomini, in confirmation of the above, remarks 'With equally good troops victory will fall to that side which holds the last squadrons in reserve, and launches them at the proper moment on the flank of the enemy when engaged with one's own troops.' The cavalry action that decided the battle of Wurzburg in 1796 is a good illustration of these principles."

P129: "If a charge be successful it is important to follow it up and disorganise the enemy to the utmost. But it must be borne in mind that the victorious squadrons are, while so engaged, unfit to resist fresh troops. If, therefore, it is wished to pursue with the first line, part of it should be rallied at once as a support whilst the remainder follows up the enemy.

The heavy loss to the Union Brigade at Waterloo was due to the disorderly pursuit after a successful charge. If the defeated force is much disorganised and out of reach of support, the rally may take place to the front, otherwise the engaged squadrons should be withdrawn to rally. These should be reformed under the protection of other troops, but not retired further than will enable them to reform in safety."

One thing I recommend from the observations above is that cavalry should never receive the charge of enemy cavalry at the halt. Lastly, a very important point that does not come out of the above is that of TIMING. This can only be learnt from experience. So practice like mad and enjoy your gaming.