Firepower in the 18th Century Weapons and Doctrine

Firepower in the 18th Century

Weapons and Doctrine

by Perry Gray

In the late 17th Century, muskets, pistols and artillery became the most important weapons on the battlefields of Europe. Despite this ascendancy, they did not have impressive rates of fire and they required skilful handling to be most effective. By the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-48), musketeers were operating in shallow formations, which enabled more to bear on any opponent. This change was due to the endeavours of influential commanders like King Gustav II Adolph (Gustavus Adolphus) of Sweden. He introduced a lighter matchlock musket, cartridges, light “battalion” artillery, new tactics and formations. The latter included the use of a more linear structure for musket units rather than the previous deep and narrow columns. Deep formations evolved because of the slow rate of fire and numerous drill movements needed to reload. Swedish armies favoured increased firepower to oppose columns supported by artillery arranged in larger batteries.

Many of these innovations were copied by the armed forces of other European states; some quickly, and others slowly. The most significant change was the reduction of the number of pikemen and the increase in musketeers. By 1685 pikemen comprised as little as about twenty percent of a typical unit, with their main role being to protect the musketeers from cavalry attack. Less reliance was placed on the attack en masse to attempt to overcome him by "push of pike." Unfortunately, fewer pikemen meant that it was more difficult to resist attack by cavalry. Thus training to integrate pike and shot was still required.

Battles tended to be contests in which opposing infantries engaged each other in prolonged firefights, then the cavalry charged to decide the issue. Hence, cavalry remained important in the achievement of victory.

During the 1680s three innovations altered this trend: the introduction of the flintlock firing mechanism to replace the matchlock, the development of the bayonet and the widespread use of cartridges. All were gradual changes. For example, French infantry did not completely switch to flintlocks until 1708.

The flintlock musket was lighter than the matchlock, and was easier to use and to manufacture. The flintlock mechanism was more reliable and easier to operate, leading to fewer misfires. It took about 26 movements to load and fire a flintlock, compared to the 42-46 for a matchlock.

When using matchlocks, safety required that a space of at least three feet between musketeers. With flintlock muskets, the space was reduced to the point where men could be “shoulder to shoulder” in each rank. This meant that formations were shallower, a minimum of three ranks, and each rank fired faster. These advances in efficiency made possible by the adoption of the flintlock musket doubled, or even tripled the effectiveness of infantry firepower compared to what it had been during the matchlock era.

With regards to bayonets, there was an evolution in types before a satisfactory version was introduced. The first attempt, the plug bayonet, was a double-edged weapon, with a blade about one foot long, and a handle that fitted into the barrel of the musket. Its advantage was that each musketeer could convert his musket into a short pike that allowed him to defend against cavalry. Unfortunately, it often took longer to fix the bayonet than for an opponent, cavalry and infantry, to contact. It also meant that the musketeers could no longer fire their weapons.

Next came the ring bayonet, which allowed for continued musket fire, as it did not block the barrel. Its drawback was that it sometimes was loosely fitted to the barrel and thus fell off.

Finally, the problem was solved by the introduction of the socket bayonet. The socket slid over the end of the barrel. A lug braised to the barrel slid through a slot in the socket. When the bayonet was then turned 45 degrees it was secured onto the barrel. Variations of the socket bayonet remain in use today.

Brown Bess socket bayonet

The flintlock musket combined with socket bayonet was a major development in weaponry that increased the effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility of infantry. Now musketeers could dispense with pikemen, which meant more firepower for every unit. As well, bayonets were the main influence on the offensive tactics of the infantry, commonly referred to as attacking with “cold steel”.

By 1703 most countries had adopted the paper cartridge. The cartridge encased both powder and ball, which further eased the task of loading. These efficiencies increased rate of fire significantly. Such cartridges remained in use until the development of non-paper bullets and the breech loading weapons.

All these technical improvements in arms allowed for a significant change in infantry tactics, known the "Linear System" of warfare. It can be argued that the linear system is the father of all subsequent western battle tactics. Gone were the large square or rectangular blocks of men representing the traditional battle formation of mixed pike and shot.

One drawback of this change was that the linear formations had vulnerable flanks. So it became necessary for the units in the line of battle to abut each other, providing mutual support. Thus arranged, the deployed battalions formed a solid wall of musketeers that stretched across the battlefield. The shallow firing line remained the tactical staple from the Battle of Blenheim (1704) to the end of the 19th Century.

Deployment Doctrine

The deployment doctrine of the 18th Century army differed from that of the pike and shot era and this evolved as armies increased in size and complexity. The largest permanently organised unit was the regiment, which could contain a varying number of sub-units or battalions. These had developed from the smaller Dutch, Swedish and other units that replaced larger formations such as the Spanish tercios and columns. The former emphasised manoeuvrability and were easier to deploy. Regiments and battalions fit into a specific position within an overall plan for the deployment of the army as one entity. The details of army deployment could vary from battle to battle, and there were always instances where large detachments were made to perform specific missions away from the main army, but the general principle was that the army was to form as a solid whole when a battle was imminent.

A typical army marched onto the battlefield in long march columns. Using a "processional" (follow the leader) system of deployment that took hours to complete, the infantry switched from columns into lines of infantry. One or more supporting lines to the rear supported the main line of infantry units. These reserves could be replace forward units, or deploy elsewhere to oppose enemy actions.

Additional units were often deployed at right angles ("en potence”) on the flanks, between the first and supporting lines, connecting them. The basic concept of this deployment was to form the infantry into one great rectangular box presenting no flanks that could be exploited by an attacker, particularly cavalry.

It was considered ideal if one or both flanks of the infantry mass were protected by impassable terrain, such as a river. If a flank was not secured in this manner, cavalry was deployed on the exposed wing in order to provide support. Cavalry was usually posted on both wings, but in certain types of terrain might be deployed in rear of the infantry. If the army was large enough, a third line usually composed of both infantry and cavalry acted as a reserve.

Another reason units needed to abut neighbouring units was that it took them a long time to form from line into anti-cavalry defensive formations, such as closed column or square. The Prussian Army introduced the tactical evolutions to quickly change formation in the 1740s.

Using the analogy of a machine, every element of an early 18th Century army was an integral part of the whole. There was a place for everything, and everything was to be in its place (the general philosophy behind human activity during the Age of Reason). The universe was thought to work like a clock mechanism. To be regarded as a machine was the highest compliment. Therefore, subordinate commanders were expected to obey the orders of the senior commanders to assure that the troops kept their formation and place in the battle line, supporting comrades to right and left.

This often hampered the effectiveness of officers when they were entrusted with the execution of an independent manoeuvre, or presented with an opportunity when in action, because they were not accustomed nor encouraged to act on their own initiative. Communication of new orders and the clarity of instructions remained problems well into the 19th Century. The formula for disaster can be summed up as “order, counter-order, disorder”.

While infantry became the prominent branch of most armies because of increased firepower and the ability to fend off cavalry, there was still a role for mounted troops. The Duke of Marlborough relied on cavalry to exploit the gaps in his opponent’s linear formation that were created by infantry and artillery firepower during the War of Spanish Succession. There were a few instances of cavalry falling like a thunderbolt on the flank of infantry and destroying it in an instant, usually only after the strictly regulated order of the infantry had been completely disrupted by tactical circumstances and casualties. There still remained a need for wariness when cavalry manoeuvred. Cavalry tended to be massed on the flanks as mentioned above, and melee between the cavalry wings could result in the victorious units positioned to fall on the flanks and/or rear of the infantry.

For many generals, forming a line of battle was straightforward; however, such deployments were ideal for a defensive stance. Trying to manoeuvre in the face of the enemy proved to be more difficult. Offensive tactics tended to be based on the traditional doctrine incorporating single and double envelopment, echelon movements, and the very basic advance with some or all of the main battle line. Attack columns were used to push the enemy units back and this concept was used until the rate of fire from rifles, machine guns and artillery made mass targets a suicidal prospect (although many commanders were reluctant to change despite the horrendous casualties inflicted by enemy fire). Generals were still trying to solve the salient tactical dilemma of whether the enemy could best be beaten with attack by fire, or was shock assault more likely to bring success?

Once the armies made contact, one of the major challenges for generals was to maintain the line of battle. For example, consider how difficult it was to march a line of attacking troops often a mile or more long across any type of terrain while maintaining formation and coordination, even when advancing straight ahead. In order to avoid crowding battalions to right or left, commanders had to use reference points towards which the troops advanced, usually at a slow rate with halts to dress lines. During such an advance, the troops were exposed to artillery fire and the resultant smoke (hence the fog of war at its basic level), plus ignorance of what they were attempting.

Troops had to be well trained to try changes in direction and formation, otherwise the possibility that the entire line would fall into confusion and/or break connection with adjoining units increased significantly. Add to this that the soldiers of most armies were not marching in cadenced step, which hampered the maintenance of order even within each unit, and was a recipe for disaster. While this would suggest that a defensive stance was superior, it would be incorrect to assume that increased firepower gave total tactical ascendancy. In fact, the close assault with bayonet and sword still won many a conflict. The massed firepower of troops armed with the flintlock musket did not create an impenetrable zone of fire in front of a battalion, such as is the case with modern automatic weapons, and there was no guarantee that the musketry alone could stop an enemy charge.

Many factors militated against the realization of the musket's potential, so mass assault could still overrun a defending line. One reason for this was that the musket had a very short range, so the deadly fire zone was short. It was not very effective at ranges in excess of one hundred yards, and many contemporary writers believed that under combat conditions it to be truly deadly only at ranges under fifty yards.

Another reason fire was not as effective as we might suppose was that in order to achieve a rate of fire of three to five rounds per minute a musketeer had to be skilful, disciplined, and composed under fire. Although there is a fondness for describing well-trained troops of the 18th Century as machines capable of marching and delivering fire because of strenuous drill exercises, the reality was that they were only human beings, susceptible to a myriad of emotions and other human failings, such as fatigue. It cannot have been easy for them to act mechanically while coping with the confusion and stress encountered in battle. It was an awesome task trying to get a battalion of 600 or so musket-armed soldiers to perform coordinated defensive fire while a resolute mass of fierce warriors descended upon them with the obvious intent to kill without mercy.

Cold Steel

The Highland clans of Scotland proved in many engagements with the English during the various Jacobite wars that a shock assault delivered by a resolute body of troops was still an effective tactic. The battles of Killiecrankie (1689), Prestonpans (1745), and Falkirk (1746) - all of which occurred after the introduction of the flintlock musket into the English service - involved charging Scots armed primarily with swords, who swept the British from the field. There is a tendency to emphasise only the last and most famous of these battles, Culloden (1746), which was a disaster for the Highlanders. The most significant difference between these battles was that only at Culloden did the British have veteran troops capable of ignoring the psychological effects of the wild charges favoured by the highland clans.

Other armies also preferred to rely on “cold steel” to win battles. The French were equally committed to the close assault, and were often successful. For example, the famous Marshal de Saxe gave an eyewitness account that illustrates the effectiveness of a shock assault against defenders, who relied on firepower: "At the Battle of Calciante (April 19, 1706), Monsieur de Rentventlau, who commanded the Imperial army, had ranged his infantry on a plateau and had ordered them to allow the French infantry to approach to twenty paces, hoping to destroy them with a general discharge. His troops executed his orders exactly. The French with some difficulty climbed the hill which separated them from the Imperials and ranged themselves on a plateau opposite the enemy. They had been ordered not to fire at all....The Imperialists allowed them to approach to within 20 to 25 paces, raised their arms, and fired with entire coolness and with all possible care. They were broken before the smoke had cleared. There were a great many (Imperialists) killed by point blank fire and bayonet thrusts and the disorder was general." (de Saxe, Maurice); MES REVERIES; 2 Volumes, Paris, 1757; REVERIES ON THE ART OF WAR; (translated by Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips); Harrisburg, Pa., 1944)

French Model 1728 musket

So, the bayonet charge remained a viable tactic because it could win battles. The debate was really about whether success in the attack could best be achieved with fire, or by shock assault. Modern historians still debate the topic.

The short range of the musket encouraged another tactic that of holding fire until the enemy was very close (point blank range). This is what the Imperial Army attempted at Calciante without success. This tactic was more successful during the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (Quebec City) in 1759. The British infantry held its fire and then delivered a coordinated volley into the French. To ensure success with this tactic, it was often necessary to fire one or more additional volleys, and/or follow-up with a bayonet charge before the enemy could recover. As with most battle tactics, it was easy in theory, but not in practice.

During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and Seven Years War (1756-1763), Frederick William II, King of Prussia (Frederick the Great), opted for battle rater than strategic manoeuvre to win because limited resources compelled him to fight "short and lively wars." This was unusual during the earlier 18th Century, when one battle per campaign was more common. Unfortunately, this style of warfare often resulted in high casualties and gave rise to the “war of attrition”.

While Frederick had some brilliant successes, he suffered many defeats that further drained his limited resources. His opponents, who could rarely get their own infantry forces to manoeuvre or deliver fire with the machine-like efficiency of the Prussians, were forced rethink their doctrine, to copy what they could from him, and to develop new methods to frustrate Prussian superiority. Paradoxically, the defeats Frederick suffered at the hands of his enemies illustrated the defects inherent in his system and forced him to modify his approach. By the end of the war, armies were operating on the battlefield much differently than they had been when the war began. These tactical corrections and innovations, imperfect or embryonic as they often were, led almost imperceptibly away from the pure linear concept, to the more advanced tactical system which we know as "Napoleonic."

In conclusion, the technical advances discussed above were influential in reducing the variety of troop types amongst the European militaries. Musket and bayonet replaced pike and shot, and allowed for more streamlined military doctrine. The limited rate of fire and short range of the musket meant that firepower alone would not decide the course of any battle. Commanders still had to find the ideal mix of shock and shot to achieve success. This dilemma persisted until well after the introduction of breech-loading and rifled firearms and artillery. Often the assault with “cold steel”, the successor to the “push of pikes”, was required to decide the outcome. This state of affairs continues today as infantry still march into battle with weapons made to attach a bayonet.

Firepower in the 18th Century

Weapons and Doctrine

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