The only English works to offer an overview for this period is F. L. Taylor's The Art of War in Italy 1494-1529 and C Oman's The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1924). Cecil Roth's The Last Florentine Republic 1527-1529 (London, 1925) contains useful military detail, as does Piero Pieri's La crisi militare Italiene nel Rinasimento (Turin, 1970).

The first two books of Oman's work deal with the armies and campaigns of the Italian Wars from 1494 up to the battle of Pavia (February 24 1525) but his conclusions are flawed by following too closely Niccolo Machiavelli's disparaging views on the tactical shortcomings of Italian Condottiere commanders. A more balanced view is offered by Michael Mallett's Mercenaries and Their Masters (London, 1974) which recognises the technical advantages of the more sophisticated military theory practiced by the Condottiere without ignoring the disadvantages of their limited strategic ambitions.

For the broader aspect of the developing Art in War in Renaissance Europe the most significant works are those of Sir John Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London, 1983), War and Society in Renaissance Europe (London, 1985), Artists and Warfare in the Renaissance (New Haven and London, 1990).

A particularly interesting study on the specialist area of interaction between the offensive threat of artillery and the defensive styles of military architecture is Firearms and Fortification, Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth Century Sienna (Chicago, 1986) by Dr. Simon Pepper and Dr. Nicholas Adams.

Sir John Hale's work reflects his view that changes in military theory and practice, which he terms a "Military Reformation", are a process of progressive development from the late Fifteenth to the early Seventeenth century conflicts with Professor Michael Roberts' earlier thesis of a more abrupt "Military Revolution" between 1560 and 1660. Professor Roberts' thesis, introduced in 1955, focused on the interaction between the conduct of war and the growth of the nation state.

The crux of Professor Roberts' argument is the connection between the radical changes in tactics and deployment, which characterised the reformation of the Dutch and Swedish Armies, and a change in strategic thinking. In Professor Roberts' view, larger Armies with more complex tactical styles offered the opportunity for more ambitious strategies by concluding campaigns with success in pitched battle but were far more expensive.

The need for permanent rather than seasonal forces, imposed by the adoption of more complex tactical styles, and the sheer size of armies greatly increased their cost. This in turn led to greater state control to cope with the administrative problems of recruiting, equipping and supplying forces and finding means to finance them.

An alternative view, which modifies Professor Roberts' thesis but also puts forward the argument for progressive change, was presented by Professor Ceoffrey Parker in his challenging work The Military Revolution; Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1988). Professor Parker used his extensive knowledge of the Spanish Army of Flanders to show that the flexibility and professional competence of the Spanish tactical style rivalled the capacity of the reformed Dutch Army and he also concentrated more closely on the impact of new, more effective styles of fortification, the trace itallienne.

For Professor Parker, the presence or absence of this new fortified style was the key to changes in Army size as although small armies could operate in its absence, its presence required large garrisons for defence and even larger forces to successfully overwhelm.

This returns us to the Wars in Italy as it was the success of the French army's artillery during its march on Naples in 1494 which accelerated developments in military architecture with the use of lower, thicker walls and bastions to provide flanking fire along them, the trace itallienne.

The Italian Dimension and the "Military Revolution"

The French invasion of Italy in 1494 shattered the balance of power which had existed between the native Italian states and, as the Florentine diplomat Francesco Guicciardini so aptly observed (circa 1528) "the French, in their invasion of Italy, infused so much liveliness into our wars that up to the year 1521, whenever the open country was lost, the state was lost with it".

For the next forty years France and Spain with their German, Swiss and Italian mercenaries and allies struggled to dominate the peninsula. In the process they made it a cockpit where the different military styles of all the major European armies were mixed and tested.

The catalyst for these changes lay in the interaction of developments in technology and tactics, and the potential each allows for new offensive and defensive styles of warfare. In 1494 the French introduced a more advanced form of artillery to Italy and broke the defensive advantage of fortifications. In contemporary eyes, this forced armies away from campaigns centered on control of fortified strongpoints and into open conflict in the battlefield until the development of an improved style of military architecture, the trace Italienne reversed the process.

Improvements in fortification reduced reliance on battlefield solutions to campaigns but military leaders did not lose sight of the fact that a successful Army must have the capacity to fight in the open field even if its commanders prefer not to take the risk.

Fresh Tactics

Renewed emphasis on the ability of Armies to engage in battle forced fresh attention to tactics while the political implications of the struggle in Italy ensured the participation of different nationalities with their own tactical models. The scope for practical experiment which this melting pot offered forced the pace of change and by the 1530's had required in the creation of the Tercios of the Spanish Army in Italy, the core of the leading Army of the later Sixteenth century.

The Spanish Tercio formations succeeded in combining "shot", arqubusiers and (later) musketeers, and pikemen in a formation capable of both offensive and defensive action in battle, a blend of tactical styles which was seen by contemporaries as being as much "Italian" as Spanish.

The example of this evolutionary style was transferred to Northern Europe by German mercenaries returning home from Italy and by the wholesale transfer of veteran units as the Duke of Alva led an Army from Italy to suppress the Dutch revolt in 1567.

Alva's veteran soldiers brought their tactical expertise, the heart of the practical military theory developed in Italy, to a new theatre of war. However, the successes which made the Spanish "Army of Flanders" the leading Army of its day were not simply the result of superior military theory. German mercenary infantry, which used similar tactics, could be hired by any leader who could pay them and the latest advances in the use of cavalry, the pistol armed Reiters and the arquebusiers a cheval used to support them, were developed during the German Wars (1546-1553) and the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598). The great strength of the Spanish Army of Flanders lay in the professionalism it achieved through long service, a concept obvious to contemporary observers and usefully summarised in 1590 by the English professional soldier Sir Roger Williams with the comment:

"They have continued in the Lowe Countreyes three and twentie yeares. When the Duke D'alua brought them thether, he found them readie disciplined in Regiments....

The Armie was continuallie maintained with one purse and discipline from the first houre unto this, which must be about 50 yeares.

Evolutionary vs. Revolutionary

Where the tactics of Spanish Armies were evolutionary in style, a development of existing styles modified by practical experiment, the Dutch Army which Prince Maurice and his cousins trained to oppose it was revolutionary. The Dutch reforms required a quite different tactical structure with units in smaller, shallower formation deployed in successive battle lines. The basic concept was a combination of the tactical advantages of infantry firepower, pioneered in Italy by the Spanish Army with its Spanish, Italian and German components, and the greater scope offered by smaller, mutually supporting units copied from the example of the classical Roman army. Both elements of Prince Maurice's reforms were a part of the military debates of his day and his unique role lies not so much in inventing them as successfully integrating them into a new and effective military style.

The debate over whether there was a "Military Revolution" in Europe and, if so, when it began remains controversial. But whatever your opinion there are some key points which remain clear. The Wars in Italy which brought different European military styles together in a melting pot of practical experiment created in the Spanish army of Italy the first professional army of the Renaissance and a radically new style of fortification.

The transfer of these tactical experiments and developments in military architecture from Italy to Northern Europe affect both the Spanish Army and the development of its Dutch opponents. In its tum. the Dutch blend of evolutionary and revolutionary military theory influenced the developing military theory in Northern Germany from which the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus drew much of the inspiration for his own military reforms.