In mid-1984, the REVIEW published a set of Seven Years War rules, called Pour Le Merite (PLM). Scott Holder took the set, re-made it, re-formed it, and re-molded it in his own image, and it appears that it's soon to be published by Arty Conliffe. First things first. The term 'Pour Le Merite' references a medal, an award created by Frederick the Great. The name, therefore, is clearly inapropos for the American Revolution, and as of this writing (late April), Scott is still looking for a title with 'oomph!', with 'pizzazz!'. For ease of reference, therefore, I shall refer to these nameless rules as No Name Rules (NNR). Scott sent me a pre-publication copy of his epic (rules, army lists, scenarios... some 50 pages in all), and asked that we run a game or two. He really didn't ask for comments (at this time, the NNR rules are pretty much set in concrete), but I thought that I'd set out my thoughts in terms of my own 'druthers'... that is to say, if I come across something I'd do differently, I'd give it the old "If I had to do it, I'd druther it was done this way..." The first druther popped up right at the beginning in the setting-up stages. Sections 3.7 and 3.8 deal with 'Leadership Points' and with the artillery ammunition supply, respectively. Toss a 10-sided die for Leadership Points, but toss percentage dice for the ammunition supply. There are other tables, which bounce back and forth between use of a single 10-sided die, and percentage dice, and if I had my druthers, I'd stick solely to percentage dice. Druther #2 arose during my reading of Section 7.6.2, concerning the risk to officer figures that assist in combat and morale testing. Officers may 'toss in' a certain number of points to help their units out. The text read: The risk value is the number of percentage points the general officer contributes to the unit morale test subtracted from 100... The player then tosses percentage dice, and if his throw is under the risk value just calculated, the officer is safe, i.e., no danger. If the toss is over, then, one might think, bad things should happen and you're referred to a second table, wherein you toss a single 10-sided die for the result. Ten outcomes are listed... not all of them are bad for our officer, and this is where my druthers come in. Depending upon your die roll, you're then referred to other dice throws to find out exactly what happened to the officer. Lots of dice tossing here. Shenanigans? Why all the shenanigans? Seems to me that when the initial 'risk' roll was failed, that was the key toss that told us that the poor officer was down and out. And so under my druthers list, I'd prepare a single percentage-dice chart, based upon the initial risk percentage, wherein one toss tells us of exactly how badly the officer is injured, and how many turns he's non-functioning, and so on. There are several scenarios at the back of the rules booklet, and I set up the one for the battle of Princeton. Here, under the OOB listings, a single brigade of British troops faced four brigades (of varying sizes) of Americans. The key difference in the quality of forces was that the Brits all had Morale Levels of 80 percent or better, while the American units were down to 60 or less. John Shirey arrived to handle the British forces, and I took the Americans. The first two turns consisted of 'positioning' moves... neither force on the field could come out of road column until it 'saw' the enemy. The Brits 'saw' us first, and they deployed and commenced their advance. Each turn, the active side diced (percentage dice) for its 'actions', which ranged from 2 actions to 4. An action permitted an infantry unit to advance about 4 inches over clear terrain. And, for each type of unit, there was a minimum number of actions required to change formation. In one of my brigades, militia quality, every one of the regiments required 3 actions to deploy. At the beginning of the battle, when I diced for actions, I received only two actions, hence this wimpy brigade (commanded by Cadwalader and which contained 3 infantry regiments plus 2 guns), even though the enemy was clearly visible, couldn't even get out of road column. Receiving 2 actions resulted in yet another horrific problem for the active side. In effect, the actions received represent the efficiency of the side for that particular turn... 2 actions say your troops are fairly inefficient, while 4 actions indicate your efficiency rating is maximum. And so when you receive 2 actions, the opposing side, seeing your efficiency momentarily downgraded, gets a chance to 'preempt' your units in whatever it is they desire to undertake. And so, when I tossed for, and received 2 actions, not only did Cadwalader's wimpy brigade remain in road column, but the Brits, already in line and facing, chose to fire on them. Each British unit had a 70 percent chance of 'preempting', or in this case, firing. They were successful, and the air was full of British bullets. When a unit fires, there are 3 multiplying factors taken into account: First, the number of stands firing. Here, the British regiments each had 7. Second, the number of volleys. In 'preemptive' fire, the number of volleys was defined to be one. In regular fire, the number of actions received by your side governed the number of volleys. For each successive action, the procedure was 'fire'-'load'-'fire'-'load'. Thus both 3 and 4 actions enabled a unit to fire twice, while 2 actions permitted only a single volley. Third, a range factor. Alas! Scott had failed to give me the fire factors, and we made our own up, based on the examples in the text. It appeared that muskets reached out to 30 inches... for the first ten inches, we gave a range factor of 3, the second ten inches we gave a range factor of 2, and at long range, we gave a factor of 1. Here, on this preemptive firing phase, the Brits received a factor of 2 (they were 15 inches away). Now here's the interesting part about this rules set. When firing, the firing player does not toss the dice... all he does is to indicate the firing unit and the target. Then the targeted player tosses percentage dice, as his unit takes a morale test to see if his men withstood the volley. Multiplying the above 3 factors (7 stands x 1 volley x 2 for range factor), we get a product of 14. And the target takes a morale test, subtracting 14 from its base Morale Level (ML). Cadwalader's crummy militia units each had an ML of 50 percent... the deduction of 14 brought the ML down to 36. And we weren't finished yet. Deduct another 15 percent for getting caught in road column. There are modifiers you can toss in to help a unit out, but here, so low was the ML, down to a net of 21 percent, that I decided to let the unit go. No one was surprised when it failed the test, and ran back. Other British units preemptively fired, and other Cadwalader units retreated... bad things were happening on the American left flank. The American left flank was... or had been... Cadwalader himself, and we were obviously in trouble. Druthers Now for my druthers on the firing procedures. In the original set of rules, muskets also ranged out to some 30 inches. Looking at the figures and stands and scales on the field, this range of 30 inches was way, way beyond the range at which the actual musket balls could reach the enemy. The rational of the 'morale game' approach was that it wasn't so much the actual impact of the inch-size lead balls hitting the men in the unit under fire, it was the very thought that they were under enemy fire, hence they took a morale test to see if they could hold their ground. Scott has followed through on this 'morale game' philosophy... musket range extends way, way out, well beyond its 'normal' impact range. But where I'd toss in my druthers is in the area of the range factor. I have to admit the original version of the rules did include such a factor, but, now, having grown older and sadder and wiser, I'd eliminate it. If the men in a unit see an opposing enemy regiment pointing muskets at them, do the men care if the muskets are 80 yards away, or 100 yards away, or 150 yards away? They see musket barrels, they see puffs of smoke, and they hear an occasional 'whiz' as a ball passes near them. And so I'd get rid of the range-variable factor, and merely toss in a single range-independent factor. Back to the battle. It was around Bound 3, and already the Americans were crumbling. I didn't help any when, whenever the Americans were the active side, my dice tosses produced only 2 actions, presenting the British with opportunities to fire, not only on their own half of the bound, but also on mine via the preemption rule. Under NNR, each time a unit fails a morale test, it receives a marker... I use prone figures as casualty markers. And each time the unit receives its marker, three things happen: First, its Morale Level goes down by 10 percent for each marker. Second, each unit has a maximum number of markers it can bear... when the level is exceeded, then the unit is removed from the field. Third, each time a unit gets a marker, so does its brigade. When the brigade markers exceed a given level, the entire brigade may go off the field regardless of the markers on the individual units. The rule was that the maximum number of markers taken on by a regiment was equal to the number of stands in the unit. Each of Cadwalader's 3-stand infantry regiments, therefore, could take on a maximum of 3 markers. But the scenario gave the entire militia brigade a threshold of only 6 markers before the entire brigade (five units) would test to flee. Cadwalader received his sixth marker around Bound 6. His brigade had to pass a morale test, or off it would go. All brigades started with a basic Morale Level (ML) of 60 percent... the kicker here, however, was that 10 percent would be deducted for every marker received. With a total of 6 markers, therefore, Cadwalader's brigade had a net ML of zero... and you can't get much lower than that. <>What To Do? What to do? Not to worry. Enter George Washington. Unca George had come on the field on Bound 4, accompanying St. Clair's brigade. And in Unca George's saddlebags were 60 Leadership Points (LP), which he could give to any brigade on the field to help it out. Now here's my clever reasoning... I use the term 'clever' because it worked! Cadwalader had received his sixth marker during the British half of the bound, due to their fire effect. The brigade morale test took place after the Brits were finished and just before my half of the bound. And so, if I could keep Cadwalader's units alive for their half of the next bound, I'd at least get in some anti-British fire, and most important of all, Cadwalader's wimpy artillery units, which hadn't even loaded their cannons thus far, might even get in a blast or two at the Brits. And so I tossed in all 60 of Unca George's LP to help Cadwalader out. Once used, LP are gone forever, and so Unca George could no longer assist any of the American regiments. Unca George's 60 LP gave Cadwalader's brigade a Morale Level of 60 percent... and he passed! His brigade, battered and beaten and smashed, remained alive! And now, another crisis... as I diced for the actions for my half of the bound, I fervently hoped that I would not receive 2 actions, for that would give the Brits the opportunity to preempt, and it would take only a single volley to completely break Cadwalader's brigade. I lucked out, and Cadwalader and the other American units fired!. And Cadwalader's artillery actually went BOOM!... in fact, they went BOOM! twice, since they received 2 volleys. This must have been rather disheartening to the Brits, for two of their units, selected as targets, failed morale tests and fell back. I should note that this was Bound 7, and even though the Brits were pounding the whatsis out of the Americans, the Brits, too, had taken some hard hits. The single British 4-regiment brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mawood, had a brigade casualty-marker-maximum of 13... a total of 13 markers accumulated by his units, and Mawood and company would be in deep trouble. The British situation was not at all helped by John Shirey. I had prepared data sheets for each unit and each brigade. These sheets listed the Morale Level of each unit, its chance to preempt, its quality, and so on. For the first three (four?) bounds, John had misread the data sheets. The ML of each of his infantry regiments was 70 percent, and their chance to preempt was 60 percent. John had reversed these two numbers and given his units the lower number as the ML, in effect, gypping them of 10 morale percentage points. "Hard Cheese! War is hell!", said I when I learned of John's error. Fighting as I and my men were for liberty and freedom and Mom's apple pie, he'd get no sympathy from us. Despite Cadwalader's brigade's great showing on Bound 7, it broke completely on the following bound. But, to counter this, the British force reached its maximum marker level soon thereafter... the units had accumulated 13 markers, and the entire command had to take a morale test. Unhelpful Here's where the rules weren't too helpful. Mawood's brigade's ML was a basic 60 percent, less 10 percent for every marker on his units. Since they had accumulated 13 markers, it appeared that there was a deduction of minus 130 points to the ML of 60, producing a net of minus 70 (-70). Was this what Scott wanted? Or did he want to reduce the brigade ML to zero, thus giving the force a chance to recoup when the commander's Leadership Points were thrown in? Colonel Mawood, like Washington, had 60 Leadership Points, and we permitted him to try and stay alive... he tossed 'em all in to keep his troops on the field... no use. Mom's apple pie won the day. In all, an interesting encounter produced by an interesting set of rules. I have to admit that I'm slightly biased, since many of the procedures seemed fairly familiar, and I definitely recall having read about them in the pages of the REVIEW. The fact that I wrote the articles myself could, of course, in no way influence my thoughts on the situation. I should mention two procedures very much apropos to the 'morale game'. Scott had introduced two sources of morale points when units were fired upon. First, the 'regimental non-com' could toss in up to 20 percentage points, i.e., raise the testing unit's ML by 20 percent. The presence of this NCO was symbolic in nature... you couldn't see him on the field, but he was there, nonetheless. There was a catch to this assistance, however. After the regiment took its morale test, then pass or fail, the NCO himself took a risk test. Subtract his points from 100, and try to toss dice under the result. If he assisted with 20 points, his risk factor would be 100-20, or 80 percent. A toss of under 80 and all was fine. But if he failed, instead of something happening to him, the unit would receive a casualty marker, indicating that its ML was down another 10 percent. Thus, on occasion, a unit could fail a morale test, receive a marker, and the NCO could also fail, producing a net of 2 markers. The NCO, good fellow, never died... he was always around to assist. A second source of points stemmed from the brigade commander. In our scenario, the commanders were each given from 20 to 30 points to assist. When they assisted, they, too, had a risk test, similar to the NCO's. In my opening remarks, under 'druthers', I spoke of this risk test, stating that I thought it went too easy on the officer. NNR has a lot of innovative ideas on its pages. Of late, I've noted that the wargaming world is more and more prone to accept new procedures, new ploys, as long as they are covered with the gloss of historical accuracy. Phil Barker has done this with his DBX rules, employing his pip movement methods and rather restricted combat systems. Arty Conliffe has essentially done the same thing with TACTICA and ARMATI and his latest CROSS FIRE. Bob Jones has also been active with his PIQUET procedures. Whatever its name turns out to be, NNR should join the best-seller ranks. One indication would be if Johnson Hood grabs the publication. <>Scott Holder Comments After composing the bulk of this article, I sent Scott Holder a copy for comment. Scott didn't cut me to pieces, as do most other authors whose work I review. The man is a diplomatist, and in fact, he said he had added a paragraph or two in places wherein, during our game, we (John Shirey and I) had experienced difficulty in translating just what it was that should be done. For example, the test concerning the brigade morale level. When a brigade reaches the maximum number of hits it can absorb (Mawood's force, for example, reached its critical level at 13), it tests to see if it remains on the table. And it has a basic chance of fighting on of 60 percent. But our reading of the text indicated that, from the basic 60 percent, you'd subtract 10 percent for every hit on the brigade... which would bring Mawood and company way, way down in the negative region. Scott said that one didn't subtract 10 percent for every hit on the brigade, only for those exceeding the brigade's critical number. Thus, for Mawood, you'd subtract 10 percent for each hit over 13. As for my comments on knocking off the leaders, Scott took issue with them. He said he'd seen too many players have leader figures assist in combat, with the result that the leader was lost or killed. He liked what had seemed to me to be a 'watered down' table for leader casualties... he wanted the leaders to stick around. The majority of my current rules - whether ancients, medievals, Napoleonics, etc., - employ generals or leaders or adjutants or staff members or couriers or what-not to assist in combat. I want the player to toss in a leader to help out, with the knowledge that the little fellow is voluntarily giving his life for the cause. The valiant warrior assists, and is immediately removed from the battle. And then, the next turn, the player dices to see if a replacement arrives. The replacement factor is usually high... I keep the percentage fairly high to induce the gamer to use the leader... the rule is 'use one, get one free'... well, almost. I can see that in publishing a set of rules to appeal to the 'historical crowd', Scott's leeway is rather restricted, much more so than mine, concerning the procedures for tossing in leader assistance. In fact, I was surprised that he allowed the NCO to play so prominent a role in assisting during morale tests. I think it's a very clever gaming ploy, and we'll see if 'Joe Wargamer' agrees. During our exchange of comments, Scott revealed that he had prepared an American Civil War version of the rules. Evidently, immediately upon the successful publication of NNR, he will deluge the public with yet another rules set! This is taking the WRG-DBM-cum-Phil Barker philosophy to the extreme... as soon as the door is open, shove yet another set forward through the crack before the public can properly respond. I asked Scott about his module for the Ashanti Wars, but he hasn't replied yet. Back to PW Review April 1998 Table of Contents Back to PW Review List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 Wally Simon This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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