As the troops assembled around the Simon ping-pong table in mid-November, I had to apologize to them. "Today, boys and girls, we revert to an order-writing game, a throw-back to the days of old. Please forgive me."
They forgave.
Ordinarily, to me, an order writing requirement ranks on a par with the use of casualty caps. But I am always willing to try out any silly idea that comes along, and as the wheel of historical gaming continues to circle, I thought it worth while to have another go at the concept.
'Twas in the early '80's that George Jeffrey's concepts of the 'variable bound' circulated widely. George's gaming system never took off... it couldn't be formalized, i.e., set out on paper with a systematic, rigid set of rules laid out to govern play.
But one concept that George set forth was one that had to do with "local initiative". Here's a brigade commander, General Crumpett, orders in hand to, say, take Hill 107.., how much leeway does the General actually have in carrying out his orders?
Under the Jeffrey scheme of things, there was no leeway at all. The General must proceed post-haste to Hill 107, looking neither right or left, unless... and this was a fairly big 'unless' ... unless impending disaster was about to overtake his own units.
If Brigadier Crumpett noted that a regiment of French lancers was about to skewer his men, he could order them to form square. But once the Lancer threat disappeared, Crumpett and his men were on their way again to Hill 107.
If, however, Crumpett noted that his fellow commander, Brigadier Whistle, was in trouble, that Whistle's men were being chewed up by several brigades of French line infantry, Crumpett was not empowered to help poor Whistle. In the Jeffrey rulebook, orders were orders, and those possessed by Crumpett, focusing on Hill 107, permitted no deviation at all.
In July of this year, during a conversation with Bob Wiltrout, I made some notes concerning a game employing Jeffrey's mandate of a commander's single-mindedness in carrying out his own orders with minimum deviation. Bob probably remembers nothing of this discussion, and can therefore plead innocent to all that I am about to relate.
One of the topics discussed was a specific commander's reaction to danger. If, during the time his orders are in effect, a threat is posed to a commander, the issue arises as to his capability of reacting, i.e., how many of his units can he coordinate in response to the threat?
The suggestion was made that this could be answered, in part, by giving each brigade commander a rating which affects the number of units he may call into action when the enemy appears.
Under the mechanics of the game, only if a threat to his own units occurs, may a commander react. If no enemy threatens his brigade, i.e., all enemy units are out of his 'threat zone', he must proceed to carry out his orders, advancing to his objective, and he cannot, therefore, voluntarily and on his own, come to the aid of a fellow commander.
For gaming purposes, I defined a threat as an enemy unit approaching to within 8 inches of any of the commander's units, in effect, giving them an 8-inch zone of control, a ZOC, which, if about to be penetrated, would permit him to react.
The definition of "orders" is always a hairy one, giving rise to many a discussion concerning what 'take the hill' means, and what 'occupy the town' entails, and what this term means, and what that phrase indicates, and so on and so forth. I wanted to avoid all this and I hoped to bypass a lot of table-side argument on the meaning of terms.
To ensure that orders were quite specific and subject to as little misinterpretation as possible, orders had to be given in terms of a march to a specific geographical objective along a fixed route. Only if enemy units came within this line of march could the commander respond.
On the 9' by 5' ping pong table, I laid out a river, an intricate road system, a number of towns, several bridges, etc. Each important junction, i.e., geographical location, was given a number. There were 15 road intersections, 4 bridges, 7 towns, and so on.
Each brigade's orders had to list, as its line of march, the specific numbered junctions through which it must pass on its way to its objective. With some 30 numbered junctions on the field, all lines of march could be fairly well defined.
Scenario
The scenario commenced with all forces off-board. A British force of some 7 brigades was to come on the field via the northern baseline, and take up defensive positions. The British objective was to prevent a French breakthrough. The French, 8 brigades strong, were to enter the field on the southern baseline, and force their way through the defenders, exiting via one of three roads.
A brigade consisted of 3 battalions of 15mm Napoleonic troops, wherein a battalion was composed of 3 to 5 stands. Each Brigadier diced for his Initiative Rating (IR), the rating which governed his ability to respond to danger. The IR values ranged from 50 to 70 percent.
When a brigade reached its objective, it would set up shop and sit, awaiting further orders from corps command. Each side had an unlimited number of couriers, who traveled along the road system at 20 inches per movement phase, or 10 inches cross country.
I was in charge of Brigadier Plotsky's brigade; Plotsky was a Russian reject employed as a French commander, whose IR was 60 percent.
Plotsky's orders were the essence of simplicity; they read as follows:
- Enter field at Junction 3, to Junction 4, to Junction 5, to Junction 6, and hold.
Plotsky's force commenced its journey north, passing Junctions 3 and 4 with no worry. Midway between 4 and 5, however, there, in the town of Simgrad, sat the defending British, and when the Plotskyites came to within 8 inches of Simgrad, they stopped and prepared to do battle.
It could be argued that when Plotsky saw the Brits in the way, he should simply go around them. But his orders permitted him no such deviation. Go to Junction 3, to 4, to 5, they said, and Plotsky obeyed. If the Brits were in the way, they must be beaten back.
Up to that point, the 3 battalions in Plotsky's brigade were in march column, undeployed, unready for battle. The question now arose: how would Plotsky respond to this threat, these British troops sitting squarely across his path to Junction 5?
Plotsky referred to the following chart, and tossed percentage dice:
- Dice Throw
100 ------------------------
- Deploy 1 battalion
- Deploy 2 battalions
- Deploy 3 battalions
With Plotsky's IR of 60, he had to toss 30 or below to deploy all his units.., alas, the dice throw was 70, and all Plotsky could do was to deploy a single battalion.
Now we have another basis for argument. Here is our Plotsky, facing 3 deployed British battalions with only one of his own. Shouldn't our Brigadier simply say "Enough's enough!", fall back a wee bit, and send out, to corps headquarters, a message to the effect that he's met up with an overwhelming enemy force, that it's senseless to continue on, and that he's awaiting new orders?
Under the concept on which the game was based, our answer was a definite 'No!'. Plotsky had, in his hot little hands, specific orders to reach Junction 5... no if's, or and's, or but's... no deviation was permitted, and hence, Plotsky had to plow ahead.
Fortunately for the good Brigadier, help was on its way. A French cavalry brigade, also wending its way to Junction 6, arrived at Simgrad at the same time that Plotsky's infantry did.
The cavalry commander managed to deploy 2 of his squadrons, and these, together with Plotsky's lone battalion, advanced on Simgrad. The combat procedures were fairly "symbolic" in nature. The deployed units of both sides were set apart, a distance of 8 inches from each other. Then we went to a 10-card combat deck, on which, commands such as the following were annotated:
- Infantry advance 2 inches, cavalry advance 4 inches. Infantry advance 4 inches, cavalry advance 6 inches. Infantry advance 6 inches, cavalry advance 8 inches. Deploy, and bring into action, 1 additional unit. Hold all units.
Cards were drawn alternately by the sides from the same deck. The attacking force drew the first card, and carried out the prescribed functions. Then a round of "fire" followed. Each battalion "fired" by adding the number of stands it possessed (from 3 to 5) to a 10side die roll. The results were:
- Total of 1 to 9 No effect
Total of 10 or 11 1 hit
Total of 12 or more 2 hits
These hits were crossed off the target battalion's track on its data sheet, and the target unit then took a morale test. A unit that failed its test fell back, out of combat.
The second card of the combat deck was then drawn for the defender, followed by a second round of fire. The third card for the attacker, then fire, and so on.
As we drew the cards, the attacking units gradually closed, having to take casualties from fire as they did so. If they were lucky, they could close rapidly... note that there were 2 cards, on which cavalry could zip into contact immediately with a large 8-inch advance.
Once contact was made, we used 10-sided Kill Dice (KD) to decide the outcome. Each toss of 1,2,3,4 or 5 on a KD produced a hit and knocked off one box on an enemy unit's data sheet.
Each battalion had around 10 to 12 boxes to be crossed off before it was declared unfit for battle.
The number of KD assigned to each side was:
- a. Each unit first received one 'intrinsic' KD
b. Each stand in a unit was then valued at 25%, and each 100 points yielded a KD.
The winner was determined as a function of the two parameters:
- S=The number of your side's stands in combat
H=The number of hits you scored on the enemy side
The winner was the larger of the product, P:
- P = 10-sided die x (S + H)
Plotsky's single battalion, together with its cavalry support, managed to close with the defenders of Simgrad, tossed their combat KD, and with the help of a high die roll, threw the defending Brits back. The way was again clear for our Brigadier, and so Plotsky formed his units into column of march, and was on his way. One move later, however, up popped more Brits, and once more Plotsky had to deploy.
And once again, his deployment dice throw, based on his Initiative Rating, was not a good one... only one battalion deployed. Combat deck cards were then drawn and the single battalion slowly advanced. This time, however, Plotsky profited by the draw of a combat deck card annotated: "Deploy another unit"... and now two units advanced on the Brits.
Two battalions were enough for Brigadier Plotsky, and once more the defenders lost the combat and fell back. Note that I've tracked the adventures of Plotsky to indicate the flow of the rules. While our Brigadier was advancing, Brian Dewitt's French troops were trying to force two of the bridges. They eventually succeeded, but at great cost.
It was found that under the rules structure, it was "easier" to keep a unit moving than to give it orders to sit and wait. For example, a British cavalry brigade entered the field, and advanced to the town of Noburg, quite close to the British baseline. The cavalry order sheet stated that Noburq was its objective, and that once it had reached the town, it should await further direction.
At Noburq, the cavalry sat and sat and sat... the cross country courier, traveling at 10 inches per turn, never arrived with new orders, hence the mounted brigade played no part in the battle, and the British were deprived of a large portion of their command.
For a first cut at the concept, it wasn't perfect, but it wasn't bad. And, it should be noted, it wasn't Jeffrey's 'variable bound'. We followed a simple you-go/I-go alternate sequence. A second (third?) edition is called for... more later on this.
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© Copyright 1993 Wally Simon
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