In the February issue, I called upon the Select Committee On Matters Pertaining To Tank Operations (SCOMPTTO) for input concerning proper tank tactics when the enemy starts pulling the trigger. The questionable area concerned a situation in which two opposing tanks parked next to each other and kept firing away until one of them disappeared in a cloud of smoke. Below is a reply from the Chairman of SCOMPTTO, a fellow PWer, Hank Martin, who speaks with first hand knowledge of the use and operational requirements of the armored beasties. To: W Simon From: Hank Martin, Cpt, USAR Armor, Chairman SCOMPTTO Subj: Response To Article Titled "A Problem In The Rules" Ref: a) FM 17-15; Division 86 Tank Platoon Operations b) Combat Leader's Field Guide, 9th Edition c) TT 71-112; The Abrams Tank Battalion Guide d) TM 9-2350-255-10; M1 Operations Manual 1. The kill ratio in the rules works fine for WW II tanks, but modern NATO tanks average a 90% kill ratio on targets within 2500 yards. The M-1 achieves a 95% kill ratio out to 4000 yards. The M-1 commander enters barometric pressure and temperature each morning. A laser range finder gives the range to the target out to 4000 yards just before firing. The targeting computer figures canto wind, distance, speed of target, speed of firing tank, barometric pressure, temperature, barrel droop, ammo type, and the lead for each shot. Mistakes on targeting the crosshairs or entering ammo type, or even forgetting to lase the range to target can cause misses (nerves??). And you must, of course, spot the enemy and be alive to shoot him. 2. Tank commanders actually command their tanks from an open- top name-tag defilade position (approximately chest-up exposed). They would be very leery to close to less than 300 yards (effective rifle range). The exception would be if the enemy were occupying their specific objective. Even then, they would try to destroy the enemy first, and would only assault directly if in a combined arms team with infantry support. 3. Tanks attack in a coordinated effort, not in single one- on-one private feuds. Artillery, mortars, and/or smoke, would support the attack. One group (platoon or section) would assault as another would provide fire support from a base of fire. Armor is a shock or firepower weapon of great mobility. It is preferable to flank the enemy and hit him where his armor is thinner, or even bypass strong points and isolate them. Remember the old axiom to mass and overwhelm your enemy at the point of attack. 4. The defender, having been sighted, would fire and fall back to secondary or supplemental firing positions after two to three shots. This would help ensure his survival and next ambush success. HOLD AT ALL COST is a rare order given only in extreme circumstances, and morale may not allow this to happen anyway! Reference (a): "The danger of the (...tank...) assault is that dismounted enemy infantry can engage ... with a variety of weapons after the tanks pass over or around their positions. For this reason, tanks do not operate alone in areas where enemy infantry is concentrated. Care must be taken not to crest an objective on high ground since enemy anti-tank weapons are positioned on the reverse slope... In tank-pure operations, the tanks will rapidly sweep across the objective with all weapons firing... ( ... in defense... ) the company commander will position the platoon so that it can fire into a kill zone... between 1200 to 1500 meters and 2000 to 3000 meters. Movement of individual vehicles must be coordinated to avoid having all vehicles out of position at the same time unless covered by another platoon"... Back to PW Review March 1988 Table of Contents Back to PW Review List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1988 Wally Simon This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com