by Wally Simon
We actually dusted off our collection of 15mm Napoleonics the other day and set up a large scale game. Our previous efforts in the grand- grand-grand tactical mode were documented in the February 1985 issue of the REVIEW... that'll show you how often we do this sort of thing. The February '85 article spoke of our first attempts in this scale: the basic element was the one-stand battalion, the maneuver element was the 2-stand regiment, the field force was the 16-stand (approximately) divison, and the rules were titled POINT OF ATTACK (POA). What started us off on our current effort to up-date POA was a suggestion set forth by Terry Sirk concerning the sequence. I had been discussing with Terry my thoughts on an English Civil War game and Terry's comments on that era looked good enough to try out with POA because of their potential applicability to games beyond the tactical level. Note that under POA's definition of about 16 stands to the division, a typical POA set-up will easily involve a battle between two army corps on either side. Our intent is to go a shade higher in scale than the grand tactical rules such as EMPIRE and the like in which one still pushes companies of men around as the maneuver element. If the enemy cavalry commence a charge in EMPIRE, the corps commander has got to worry about whether the individual companies in each battalion form square. He also focuses on individual batteries: should they fire ball or canister? To my mind, therefore, EMPIRE and its contemporaries are sort of two- faced; on the one hand, the game loads up the table with a ton of figures to give you the impression that you're truly in command of a vast force of men and therefore have to concentrate on the "grand tactical" aspect. And on the other hand, despite your promotion to corps commander, you're forced to focus on the nitty-gritty concerned with the combat characteristics and formation of each individual company of men and battery of artillery. Our thought in POA was to forget about the nitty-gritty ... as Tom Elsworth expressed it, if the enemy cavalry institute an unsupported charge against our infantry, we'll assume our battalion commanders have enough smarts to form square, and we'll give our infantry a "plus" in combat. If, however, the enemy cavalry are supported in their efforts and participate in a combined arms attack, then we'll assume our boys are in trouble and it's the opposition that gets the plus in combat. In the POA scale of things, the range of musket fire is too small to be separately resolved and it is absorbed into the combat procedures between units. But back to Terry Sirk's ideas Take careful notes, men, this is all good stuff. Bear in mind, however, that this is a first cut at a lot of these procedures and that the final product will, no doubt, be vastly different from what is described below. Now, here's whatcha gotta do:
b. Second, make up a Command Card (CC) deck with the following content:
c. Third, mix up the CC deck, and deal out cards randomly to the division commanders as follows: Each Good commander
receives 3 cards.
d. Fourth, each side examines the cards, i.e., orders, of each division and SELECTS ONE for that division. Note that a Poor commander, who only gets one card, doesn't have too much of a choice. Whatever card he receives ... he's stuck with it. A Good commander, on the other hand, can choose one out of three... he, therefore, has a little leeway. e. Next, the position of the Army Commander (CINC) is noted on the field, and the distances to each of his division commanders are measured. The unit that goes first, i.e., carries out the orders on the assigned card, is the division closest to the CINC. The thought here is that, this division being closest, it would receive its orders first, hence must act first. f. Every division on both sides, in turn, carries out its orders, with the sequence governed by the distance between the division commander and his CINC. The sequence, therefore, jumps back and forth between the units of Side A and Side B, depending upon the measured distances. The unit furthest away from its CINC moves last. Note that each type of division commander has an assigned Competence Level (CL) of either 90, 89 or 70. The CL plays a role in the efficiency with which orders are carried out. For example, assume that in command of the 1st Division is General Sczyp; his status is Good, his CL is 90, he received 3 cards and, of them, an Action card was selected to permit him to advance and enter the town of Glintsk, on the other side of Hill 107. Szcyp is 29 inches from his CINC, and his division awaits its turn in the sequence. Finally, it's the 1st Division's turn to move. Step 1. Glintsk is measured to be 34 inches north of the 'present location of the 1st Division. Szcyp, as a Good commander, with his CL of 90, has the following chance to reach Glintsk with his division this turn: % = Commander's CL - Distance to Objective. In this case, is (90-34)/ or 56 percent. Dice are thrown, a 46 occurs, and the 1st Division starts to move out. Step 2. There is one hitch here... between Sczyp's Ist Division and Glintsk lies Hill 107. There is a chance that Sczyp's unit won't make it over the terrain obstacle, but will get hung up at that point. Our rules specify that whenever "rough terrain" is encountered, there is a 30% chance that a unit stops completely, i.e., 70% chance that the unit goes on. Once again, therefore, the dice are thrown, and an 01 to 70 result mandates that the 1st Division pours over Hill 107 and into Glintsk. Otherwise, it just sits and ends the turn on top of Hill 107. Step 3. If, in Step 1, the original dice throw was unsuccessful, indicating that the lst Division wouldn't even reach Glintsk this turn, the question becomes: how far did Szcyp's division actually move? Our solution is to examine the unit's digit of the dice throw. Thus if there was a 56% chance to reach Glintsk, but a 68 was thrown, the unit's digit is "8" and the 1st Division advances only 8 inches. Note in this scheme of things that:1. A division can attempt to zip along any distance it desires. The greater the attempted movement, however, the greater the distance it won't make it. 2. Two divisions can attempt a concerted attack if they are moved up, side-by-side, and their co-located commanders sit at the same distance from the CINC. Then, in the sequence, both being at the same distance, they can attempt to move together. They both might not make it into contact, however. For example, if the enemy is 15 inches away, a Good commander has 90-15, or 75%, to make it, while a Poor commander has a 70- 15, or 55%, chance to advance into contact. 3. When one division contacts another, combat is resolved by pairing off regiments (ala Larry Brom's procedures in THE SWORD AND THE FLAME). Each time a regiment gets bumped back, the division commander's Competence Level (CL) goes down by 5 points. After one or two encounters, therefore, there are enough 5 point decrements to render a division almost incapable of any action. The "5 pointers" serve, first, to make it difficult to move, and, second, in combat, they give an advantage to the opposition. And in conclusion, mes amis, POA thus presents a picture in which a force's effectiveness is in direct proportion toits commander's capability, i.e., Competence Level. As the Competence Level goes down, so does the mobility and the fighting value of the unit. Back to PW Review August 1987 Table of Contents Back to PW Review List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1987 Wally Simon This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |