by Ned Zuparko
So this week we're going to do the battle of Waterloo, huh? And I'm Napoleon? OK, letsseeese hmmm... well, first of all, I'll post some batteries and cavalry way off on the right. That way I'll be able to slow the Prussians down as they arrive. THAT means I can use Lobau for A while to support D'Erlon and still be-able to get him back to the right before Blucher comes in. Oh, you say we'll roll dice for the Prussian entrance? That's alright, I still know roughly when they'll be in, and my batteries will still slow them down, since only a Corps will be near Plancenoit. Oh, yes, speaking of D'Erlon... I better make sure he has cavalry support -- I don't want any Scots Greys sabeing MY Grand Battery. Since I outnumber Wellington 72,000 to 67,000 I'll want to attack much earlier than 11AM, so I'll be able to overpower him before those pesky Prussians show up. Too bad I don't get to have Grouchy here, too. Hougomont? Why mess with that place? Take a look at this map of the real battle... it would be better to.... Sound Familiar? Most wargamers are very proud of their "historical simulations". They proudly cite the names of famous battles displayed and refought on the tabletop. Unfortunately, the more "accurate* a game, or the "closer" a simulation claimed by the player, the more likely that a non-historical simulation occurred. Consider the Waterloo example above. The right number of troops were laid out, with accurate uniforms, terrain, time of entry, etc, etc. In fact just about every Important detail one could Imagine was Included in the Same except the one most important, though usually overlooked, factor - psychology. The psychological "frame of mind" of the historical participants must precede any other factor that is "simulated" on the battlefield. It is, unfortunately, the hardest to accomplish and probably impossible for us to duplicate 100%. We can, though, recreate some of the most important elements. Such things as the "fog of war" caused by lack of knowledge are among the most important elements in the commander's decision- making process. Doubt constantly surrounds any information that comes in to the commander. Decisions often must be made only after trying to form a judgement on the reliability of intelligence received. Referring to our Waterloo example again, we find the historical hindsight of the player totally dominates his approach to that battle. Even a fleeting, seemingly unimportant and irrelevant statement like "Too bad I don't get to have Grouchy" is indicative of too much knowledge. Decisions for the real historical commander, Napoleon, were just that much more complicated, precisely because he couldn't be sure of ANYTHING, even Grouchy's whereabouts. One step scenario-designers can take to begin to duplicate the psychology of the moment is to disguise the battle being simulated. This means attempting to substitute approximately equal factors for those present in the historical situation. For example, I recently laid out the battle of Quatre Bras, but the players didn't realize it. When they first saw the terrain (which is a factor almost impossible to disguise) they guessed it might be Quatre Bras. The French player, though, upon seeing Prussian Landwehr pop up in front of him, immediately assumed, therefore that it COULDN'T be Quatre Bras. He then lost his "historical hindsight" caution and played the game based on the knowns and unknowns of the game as they appeared to him in the game. What are some "disguisable" factors wargamers might use? One, as at the Quatre Bras game, is the substitution of historical types of units which, in your same system, might operate in an approximately equal fashion or have the same value. Another, though much more difficult to achieve, is terrain substitution. In that case one must determine the attributes of a. terrain unit, such as its cover or impediment to movement or visibility value. Perhaps the most subtle, yet effective area is in the presentation of the background scenario to the players. One must first determine what points were most important to the historical General based on his limited knowledge at the time. This includes strategic reasons for being where he is and why he is fighting. Reinforcements, estimates of his and the enemy's actual and potential strengths are important. If the creator of the scenario can establish those points, he can then create a fictional scenario for the players that tries to steer players in the proper historical direction, but for ostensibly different reasons. For example, if an historical General could only afford to lose a certain percentage of casualties because of supply line difficulties, the players might instead be told that the Emperor had passed along an order stating that a loss of "x number" of casualties would be unacceptable, since the player had lost "x number" last time and had almost been court- martialed. In this (admittedly awkward) example the hope would be to create a pressure on the player to worry about his casualty rate. If one had instead just told the player that his casualties have to be low because of the supply line, he might get a clue, based on his historical knowledge, of which historical battle he was recreating. With that knowledge he may then know too much, which would affect his play of the game. Though a much more realistic way to stage games, there is one one unfortunate side-effect to this approach; sort of dispelling the historical-simulation myth. At least, the knowledge of it as it occurs. In other words, If we say we are going to fight Waterloo, and then play it out, we haven't fought Waterloo. We have played something similar technically, but with a different set of knowns, unknowns and game choices or options to make. The problem solving necessary was different for our players than for the historical Generals. By disguising a game, the player won't know it at the time, and will experience many of the same problems and unknowns of the historical occurrence he will only find out what historical battle it was AFTER THE FACT. Thus, a player won't be able to say "So this week we're going to fight Waterloo." Instead, he'll have to say "So last week's battle was Waterloo? Boy, that's the last time I leave MY flank open." Back to PW Review December 1981 Table of Contents Back to PW Review List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1981 Wally Simon This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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