Bob Hurst and I faced each other, each commanding a 30mm force, he with the Confederates, and me with the Yanks. We each had 3 infantry brigades, and in each brigade, there were 3 regiments of 4 stands each.
That gives 12 30mm stands per brigade, plus one battery. Out on the flanks, we each had a small cavalry brigade of 2 regiments, again with 4 stands per regiment.
Bob had just whopped me in a battle the day before, using the same terrain, the same figures, the same rules, the same forces. My honor demanded a chance to redeem myself.
The basic maneuvering and firing element of the battle was the 4-stand regiment. These units would fire on each other and charge in to assault each other, and, on occasion, fail a morale test and run back. But the regiments themselves recorded no losses, had no figures removed, had no stands removed.
The entity that recorded the casualties incurred by the regiments was the “mother” brigade. When a regiment was hit, the brigade’s losses were tallied on a data sheet, and if the regiment took a morale test and failed and ran back, the brigade would record more losses.
Each Brigadier was given an “Efficiency Level” (EL) of 45, or 40 or 30. As his regiments took losses, his EL would be reduced and when it reached zero, his force would be removed from the field.
In this battle, a regiment’s morale level was calculated at:
- Morale Level = 50 + (Brigadier’s EL)
As the brigade took losses and the EL dropped to zero, the morale levels “bottomed out” at 50, so that, even in the worst case, there was a 50-50 chance a test would be passed.
In our previous battle, the morale level of a regiment was defined as:
- Morale Level = 2 x (Brigadier’s EL)
This formulation meant that, as the EL went down to zero, so did the morale level of the testing regiment, i.e., there was no bottom. And the result was that, toward the end of the first battle, regiments simply couldn’t pass their morale tests.
For this battle, I took my three infantry brigades, placed all 9 regiments shoulder to shoulder, and went straight up the center of the field, heading toward the key town of Kerrville. In the first battle, I had placed my forces out on the flanks, and, because they were separated, never could amass enough firepower to drive Hurst’s men out of Kerrville.
I should modify my previous statement, for although it was my intention to go straight up the field to Kerrville, the sequence hindered me. For example, when my Yanks were the active side, I tossed 10-sided dice to see what each brigade would do for me. With 3 regiments per brigade, a brigade would toss 4 dice. And then we’d examine the numbers:
- Toss of a 1,2,3,4,5: A regiment assigned this die could advance 10 inches
Toss of a 6,7,8,9,10: A regiment assigned this die could fire
Each regiment would be assigned a die, hence by assigning low dice to a unit, i.e., 1,2,3,4,5, to a regiment, it would move up. Tossing 4 dice for each 3-regiment brigade gave us a little leeway, but movement wasn’t guaranteed. With no low dice, no movement.
Initially, I had selected my Zouave Brigade as my lead unit, the one whose 3 regiments would bash through to Kerrville. But the dice failed to get my Zouaves moving, and I had to settle for my 3rd Brigade, while the Zouaves watched.
Late in the battle, I managed to toss enough movement dice to get the Zouaves moving, and one regiment actually tried to charge into Kerrville, but it failed its morale test after absorbing defensive fire, and that was the only offensive action taken by the Zouaves all during the encounter. Even the brigade battery performed poorly. This was not a good day for the Zouaves.
The 3rd Brigade kept moving and moving, and eventually bypassed Kerrville and drove back just about every regiment trying to support the one Rebel regiment defending Kerrville (the “stacking limit” for a town was defined to be 1 regiment plus a supporting battery).
As I explained above, when active, a 3-regiment brigade tossed 4 action dice which were then assigned to the brigade’s components. A regiment could be assigned only one movement die, but one of the moving regiments could also be assigned a fire die… thus it could move up and fire.
Initially, Bob and I debated the assignment of dice to the brigade artillery. At first, the guns were given “free” movement and “free” firing, i.e., no dice were needed to be assigned, but the result was that the artillery began to play too much of a dominant role in the battle. And so, late in the game, we changed the rules… since a brigade had 3 regiments and one battery (a total of 4 components), we tossed 5 dice for the brigade and assigned dice to both regiments and guns. We recorded the EL points of all Brigadiers. There were two other items on the brigade’s data sheet. These were termed “Big Ds” and “Little ds”. When a regiment or battery fired, it tossed percentage dice trying to get under the Probability Of Hit (POH, usually around 50 percent). The hit table for the firing procedures was as follows:
| POH | LOSS |
|---|---|
| Above POH | 1d |
| ½ POH to POH | 1d, 1D |
| Below ½ POH | 2 D |
Target unit takes morale test if losing more than 1d during a fire phase
Note that when a unit was fired on, it always took casualties, even if the dice toss exceeded the POH. The lower the dice toss, the more effective the strike against the target. The final phase of each half-bound was an “administrative one”… the effect of all the “Big Ds” and “Little ds” accumulated by the brigade during the half-turn was assessed. Dice were tossed and a lucky throw could get rid of most of the Little ds… in effect, these were considered light wounds and were brushed off.
But an unlucky assessment throw could indicate disaster for a brigade that had accumulated a number of Big Ds… toss high and the number of Big Ds were doubled and instantly subtracted from the brigade’s total of EL. Several times during the battle, during the assessment phase, I heard Bob groan. On occasion, I groaned, too… for example, one of my brigades had accumulated 6 Big Ds, and an unlucky toss resulted in a deduction of 12 EL points from the Brigadier’s total.
There were three potential fire phases within the half-bound. The first was when the active side tossed its dice to move up… after moving a brigade, it could assign a fire die (6,7,8,9,10) to one regiment within the brigade and have it fire.
The second fire phase took place after the active side moved. This was the defensive fire phase, and here, the non-active side fired… that is, it tried to fire. Each brigade tossed 4 dice… looking for 6,7,8,9,10. If a die showed one of these numbers, it could be assigned to a regiment or battery which would then fire. Any dice showing 1,2,3,4,5 were simply wasted.
The third and last fire phase belonged to the active side. Its units were given an opportunity to fire again. But there was a potential penalty attached... this was not “free fire”. Each time a regiment or battery within a brigade chose to fire, the brigade recorded one Little d point, which might come back to haunt the brigade later in the assessment phase. I termed this “exhaustion fire”, since if the firing brigade were unlucky, the Little ds accumulated in this manner could eventually drive down the Brigadier’s EL points, i.e., exhaust the poor Brigadier until he pulled his troops out of the battle line.
I noted that as my troops got closer and closer to Kerrville, Bob kept using “exhaustion fire” more and more often.
In a sense, “exhaustion fire” was an even exchange. Although the firing brigade took a Little d, the firing chart shows that the target always recorded at least one Little d… and perhaps more, depending upon the POH dice throw.
With three infantry brigades and one cavalry brigade per side, we were essentially fighting a division-vs-division battle. Each side’s division commander was given a number of points to assist his units:
- First, he had 50 EL points. As the ELs of the brigade commanders dropped, the division commander could prop up the Brigadier by allotting him a couple of points. But he couldn’t raise the Brigadier to an EL above that with which he had started (45, or 40 or 35).
Second, the division commander had 50 morale points. The morale level of a unit, when taking a morale test, was obtained by adding 50 to the brigade’s current EL. To attempt to hold a regiment in place, the division commander could contribute his morale points to assist in the morale test. Note that this type of allocation helped only a specific regiment, while the EL allocation helped all the units in the brigade.
Third, the division commander had 50 combat points to assist a regiment in melee. The melee outcome between regiments was essentially decided by the sum of four parameters: (a) the current EL of the brigade, (b) a percentage dice throw, (c) a couple of modifiers for defending a town, etc., and (d) whatever combat points the division commander decided to toss in.
Bob ran his division commander’s spare EL and combat points into the ground, trying to hold onto Kerrville. But Kerrville fell, my honor was avenged, and once again, the Simon rules proved historically realistic… sort of.
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© Copyright 2001 Wally Simon
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