by Wally Simon
I set this game up for a solo battle to see how an attacking force would do if it was of the same size as a defending force. We've all read of the 3-to-1 ratio required for a successful attack… I've always thought this was hogwash… invented by Avalon Hill to justify its board-game combat tables. I've never read anything about 3-to-1 odds in the battles of history… the texts seem to refer to a reserve unit or two which are tossed in as the coup de gras when the opposition seems to be on its last legs, but nothing about a huge wave of reinforcements required to be called upon to swamp the opposing forces. In this battle, I set out 5 British divisions in a defensive position, as you'll note on the map. One division was perched on Grand Ridge, one on Mont Pierre, one on Darne Ridge, one just to the north of the town of darne, and the last division, in reserve, to the north of Mont Pierre. The French came on from the south, massing two divisions against Grand Ridge, three stretched across the field from Mont Pierre to Darne Ridge, while two divisions were initially held off board... before they were committed, the French High Command wanted to see what would develop. In effect, then, I pitted five British divisions against seven French, with the initial French attack consisting of 5 divisions... initially a 1-on-1 battle. I set out my 15mm figures... each stand, about 1-inch square, representing an entire regiment. The 1-stand regiments were grouped to form brigades, with 3 to 5 regiments per brigade. And the brigades, in turn, were grouped into divisions. With an average of 4 regiments per brigade (4 stands), and 3 brigades per division, a division consisted of an average of 12 stands. Which means that the British defenders, 5 divisions stretched across the field, totaled around some 60 stands of troops. The scenario also provided me with an opportunity to test the Simon Theory Of Fire Power (STOFP), applicable to the horse and musket era. My contention has always been that rules for this era must give a stationary, immobile defending force more fire power than an advancing force. Loading and firing and reloading a musket takes an appreciable amount of time. And then add some more time for leveling the weapon and aiming and pressing the trigger. According to STOFP, this places an advancing force at a huge disadvantage in terms of fire power. Whatever time the game turn is defined to consume, the troops that are moving up and attacking have way less opportunity to issue fire than their stationary opponents, secure in their positions, who can devote all their time to the procedures of load and fire and load and fire again. What the above means is that all those wonderful rules systems which allow both sides an equal opportunity to fire per game turn, are out of whack. FIRE AND FURY, NAPOLEON'S BATTLES, just to name two, should be tossed in the garbage bin. My own way of implementing STOFP is to give both sides a number of actions...an action permits a unit to either move or fire...the defense can use its actions to fire, andteh attacker can divide his actions between firing and moving. And not content with that, I give both sides additional opportunities to react to the opposing force's maneuvers. Each side has a number of Reaction Points (RP) and the defender, if he so wishes, can use his RP for additional firing, while the attacking force again has the option of using his own RP for either fire or move. The STOFP sequence contains a number of phases, which can be explained by looking at what happened to the 1st French division, commanded by General Narco, when it attacked Mont Pierre on Bound #3. Phase 1. Reaction Points. Both sides diced for their RP, and the entire British force of 5 divisions received a total of 6 RP. They already had 5 RP 'in the 'kitty' (RP can be accumulated from turn to turn), hence there were 11 RP available to the Brits. Phase 2. Initiative and actions. Now the sides diced for initiative, and the Brits tossed high and would go first. Another dice toss determined that the Brits had 2 actions, i.e., every unit (brigade) on the British side could do two 'things'... move or fire or change formation, etc. Phase 3. It's the Brits' action phase and the defending brigade on Mont Pierre, the 321st, fired 2 volleys with their 2 actions. Their target was the approaching 8th French Infantry Brigade, now within the 321st's 10-inch musket range.
b The 321st scored a single hit on the approaching 8th, which didn't even notice. When a target is hit, loss points are marked on its data sheet. A toss of a 1 always results in 20 loss points, and any other hit results in 10 loss points. Loss points add up, and the critical level occurs when the unit totals 30 loss points... at this time, the unit is given a casualty marker, crosses off one of its Efficiency Factors and takes a morale check. When 4 Efficiency Factors are crossed off (a total number of 120 loss points) the unit is destroyed and removed from the field. c Here, the 8th merely marked down a loss of 10 points on its data sheet. Phase 4. This is a reaction phase for both sides. To cause a unit to react, two things must happen... first, there must be 3 RP available, and second, there is an 80 percent chance that the order is received by the unit. On previous turns, the French had used quite a bit of their RP, and only had a total of 5 RP left.
b The 8th had to toss 1-to-7 to run up the slope... alas! they couldn't do it. c This left the French with only 2 RP in the kitty... no more reactions until the kitty could be replenished. d It's the British reaction, but they saved their points. e Normally, this would be a melee-resolution phase... but there are no combats to resolve. Phase 5. It's the French active phase, and they dice for, and receive 3 actions. The 8th decides to fire twice (toss 2 dice) and use its remaining action to charge up the slope for a second time. The 8th has 4 regiments (4 stands),and so a hit will be registered on a toss of 1-to-4. Both of the 8th's hit-dice fail. But this time, it succeeded in getting up the slope. It appeared there would be a melee. Phase 6. Another reaction phase. Remember the Brits had a total of 11 RP available, and the British commander chose to have the 321st pour it on the incoming 8th.
b With 4 stands, needing 4 or less to hit, the 321st successfully hit the 8th three times, tossing a 1 (20 loss points), a 1 (another 20 loss points), and a 3 (10 loss points), 50 loss points in all. c The 8th already had 10 loss points scored on it, and it now had a total of 60. Which meant it received 2 markers, crossed off 2 Efficiency Factors (30 points per factor), and took a morale test. d And it failed! Down the hill ran the unfortunate 8th. What happened here was that the Brits had used up virtually all their RP to repel the attack of the 8th on Mont Pierre. e The French didn't have enough RP to react. f Again, there were no combats (at least on this part of the field) to resolve. For some 5 bounds, it was slow-going for the French. They charged and charged again, and each time the defending Brits, via their diced-for actions and a judicious use of their RP, managed to beat off the attacks. The Brits were recording loss points, but the French were recording even more. The center (Mont Pierre) and the entire left flank of the Brits (Darne and Darne Ridge) were holding firm. My thought was that if there seemed to be no break in the British line, I was going to have to call in the French reserve of two fresh divisions. But the break did, indeed, come. On the western half of the field, there were two French divisions concentrating on the single defending British division on Grand Ridge, and the French finally drove the Brits off and commenced to hook to the east, to their right, forcing the Brits back. Now the British were truly in trouble, as the force on Mont Pierre was in danger of encirclement. It seemed to me that, once the two French reserve divisions appeared, that would be the beginning of the end. And so I called the battle a tactical French victory, and let the Brits withdraw. To my mind, STOFP proved itself out. In the eastern half of the field, where the combat was essentially 1-on-1, the ability of the defenders to devote their actions to firing, when contrasted with the attackers' need to keep advancing, provided the British with enough defensive fire power to keep the French at bay. This could not have happened with a set of rules permitting both sides to have equal firing capabilities. Back to PW Review March 2000 Table of Contents Back to PW Review List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2000 Wally Simon This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |