We the Kane

We the People

Savaged by the le Comte de Drury

Richard Kane's eighteen points (four more than President Wilson's if memory serves) against WtP went largely unnoticed in the Drury household, as I was in the aftermath of a strategic redeployment. The move north put me out of touch with regular opponents, so it's been a couple of years since I've battled for the colonies. Having found some local opposition, WtP seemed a good starter because it's easy to learn and you can guarantee finishing the game in an evening, even if your enemy's plan includes topping up your glass with an Aussie Merlot rated at 14%. Previous sessions suggested a slight bias in favour of Washington and his chums, but the last few games have ended with the would-be first president chased into the backwoods (cue much haw-hawing and cries of 'where are your rebel friends now?').(CHV: Bloody good show Drury, slave-owning swine!).

To save the reader from opening the book cabinet to extract his leather-bound collection of past PAs, I'll repeat the 18 points as we go.

    1. PC marker placement is a nice mechanism, but has no correspondence with reality. It is abstract, I agree, but its effect is excellent: triggering military campaigns to prop up a losing local political position rather than focusing purely on the armies. I still suspect this is the basis for a Vietnam game too. Experience suggests that over reliance on the military or the political aspect of the game is fatal to either side.

    2. and 3. The Congress is over-rated and its dispersal to the backwoods is actually useful for the Americans. True, and this rule could be jettisoned without affecting play.

    4. and 5. Richard Kane's list of top American leaders differs from Mark Herman's. So re-name them. What matters is that the Americans have more leaders than the Brits, so can operate more armies; the identity of said leaders doesn't worry me.

    6. PC placement at start does not correspond to history: South was mostly loyalist, middle states evenly divided, New England thoroughly revolting. Also true, but an American player who fails to pack New England with PC markers early on will lose. New England is a concentration of small states, and when it comes to victory conditions it is states that count. I submit that if the start position isn't quite right, the effect is neither ahistorical nor unbalancing.

    7. Generals shouldn't be forced off the board for a turn if co-located with another. It's silly, but it's never handicapped anyone that I know.

    8. The British should be allowed to enter the board via Florida. Much as they do today then. I don't know why the board was cut off where it was: maybe box size trumped history here.

    9. Performance of the French Navy too predictable. Its ability to control the coast of any one area, regardless of RN counter-measures is undoubtedly odd. I'd welcome any ideas how better to simulate its sporadic, but in one instance decisive, contribution to the war.

    10. (and 15.) American Control of the coast prevents British landings, thus forcing a 'coastal garrison' strategy on the British. I'd rationalise this as 'the logistics rules'. The British could only supply themselves when within a few miles of a navigable river or the coast. It all started to come apart the moment they pressed inland. The effect of the rule is to lead the British to intervene regularly to keep control of various coastal areas, retaining access to the hinterland when they need it.

    11. The Caribbean's importance isn't recognised. Bad news here: there was serious discussion in London as to whether it was worth intervening in America at all. The Caribbean was worth far more to the UK economy than the 13 colonies, which were basically a market for finished goods (and continued to be so, even under blockade, lots of British smugglers making money in the process, and proving the cabinet opposition to be correct). The game assumes that Lord North has won the argument for military intervention in the Americas. If he'd have lost, we wouldn't be playing the game.

    12. The Militia are too predictable (+2 battle cards) whereas in reality they were a random element. The battle card system needs more chance? It's a something of a lottery as it is. Can't say I favour an additionally random militia value rule.

    13. 'PC Fighting' in so far as this is the way the game tends to simulate the guerrilla campaign in the south is too abstract. Subjective really: as a means of replicating the low intensity war there and its interaction with the major military campaigns, it might be abstract, but it works — and helps shorten playing time.

    14. Why tie the 'British regular advantage' to a battle involving 3 combat units: shouldn't the difference be Washington's army before and after von Steuben? I might try just that: ignore the 3pt battle rule and have the Brits lose their +1 once the von Steuben card is played.

    15. (see 10, above)

    16. Several event cards enable the American player to remove British combat units. This is indeed far too powerful: we play a house rule that whenever any event card causes either side to lose combat units, the side losing them chooses who goes.

    17. Sullivan's Indian expedition missed out. At risk of descending to facetiousness, this hasn't spoiled the game for me.

    18. Petty complaints. Causes and consequences on some event cards don't gel with Richard Kane's view of the war. I'm not sure I agree with them all either, but then one can always change them. I have no idea who is right about Nathan Hale or the possible impact of British peace overtures.

Conclusion

To conclude: all games could and should be tweaked in the light of new research. Game design is — or should be — a dynamic process, a never ending dialectic (has this man been drinking?) fuelled by historical research, play testing and the inspiration of other rules mechanisms or games. The enormous strength of WtP is that it you can set it up in ten minutes and play it within another 90. This is not to say that speed of play trumps all other considerations, otherwise we might as well play 'snap'. But WtP is played and played again, while a bunch of other games I own languish in the tea chest in the garage. One day, they may emerge, blinking in the daylight, but probably not till the children are at university. . .like I'll care then. A lot of new games touted on manufacturer's websites look fine and dandy until you see the statement 'playing time 4 to 50 hours'. Well pardon me for having a life. (CHV: Phew! Thank goodness he never reads my reviews.)


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© Copyright 1999 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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