The operations of the French and Prussian armies in September and October 1806 in Saxony have received scant attention from the hobby despite the endless popularity of Napoleon amongst American gamers. Although these operations were arguably the most brilliant of Napoleons career, I cannot think of any game that attempted to simulate these events on an operational level. I was very interested therefore to see the release of Iena from Clash of Arms as the game scale seemed to be just right for this level of simulation. I do confess however that I suspected that the game would be another anodyne NLB clone with little to offer as a representation of Napoleonic operational combat.
To Ed Wimble's credit, Iena is a good deal better than I had feared and I applaud the thought and ingenuity which he has shown in producing a playable game which gives a much better flavour of this level of combat than previous efforts I have encountered. However, I do think that the game misses the mark quite widely in a number of areas and, as Charles has already reviewed the game in PA, I hope that Ed will forgive me if I concentrate on those areas and not on the game's strengths. If nothing else, Iena has revived my interest in Napoleonic boardgaming and for this, I have a great deal to thank him!
The first aspect of the game that disappointed me was the Command system. In Iena, the Command rules for the French are the same old system used in these types of game since the early versions of Napoleon at Leipzig. Army commanders (Napoleon and Murat) are always in command and can command subordinates within a certain distance. Distant subordinates have to provide their own command through Initiative ratings. Unsurprisingly, Lannes and Davout rate highest as '5' and can act in independent roles while the much-maligned Bernadotte is a slothful '2' and will need close supervision from Napoleon or Murat in order to ensure his movement.
In my view, this system tells us very little about the way in which the French army actually functioned during this operation and conceals a fundamental reason for its success. In particular I think it misrepresents the role of the corps commander and of Napoleon in the French system. As a comparison, the workings of Napoleon and his staff during this operation are analysed for this very operation in Vachee Napoleon at Work which gives an illuminating insight into French practice and shows how little initiative was allowed to French corps commanders in determining the destination of their marches.
Vachee shows how dependent the French were on Napoleon himself. On the night of 11-12 October, Napoleon spent the hours between nightfall and midnight awaiting the daily reports of his corps commanders. Having spent the next three hours analysing this information, Napoleon issued seven orders to his corps commanders (including one to Murat) issued between 3 and 5 a.m. Examining Vachee's figures, the average speed of the couriers delivering these orders in delivery was around 10km/hour (10 hexes). The delay between receipt and the start of the day's march for the various corps ranged between one hour (Davout) to four hours (Lannes) with the average being two hours.
Perhaps surprisingly, these general orders actually contain very little in the way of instruction. There is no information given regarding the enemy, or of the nature of the manoeuvre or of the role of the various corps. Where a corps commander was likely to come into contact with the enemy Napoleon might send a further personal letter direct to the commander to give some further explanation (for example as he did to Lannes and Murat). However, most noticeably, the general orders did not specify the routes to be followed by each corps or the zones in which each would operate but simply the destination to be reached. The specific road to be taken was left up to the specific corps commander.
Without this work by Napoleon the French army of 1806 would have operated in much the same manner as its opponents. French Corps commanders were not expected to operate on their own initiative as can be seen from Lannes message to Napoleon on the 13th October where he pleaded for orders as he dared not assume responsibility for a false movement.
Similarly Davout commented to Loison in 1813 that "I do not interpret orders, and I form no opinions as to intentions". Where Napoleon was capable of directing the army personally the system worked. Where distance intervened as in Russia or where the size of armies made this impossible as in 1813, the system failed disastrously.
Vachee notes that the most notable characteristic of the French system is the speed at which it operated due to Napoleons exceptional capacity for sustained personal effort in directing the operations of the army. The contrast seems marked when the activities of the Prussians are examined. I have not seen a Prussian equivalent to Vachee but by trawling through the various general accounts of the campaign that I have it is possible to get a general idea of the comparative lack of efficiency in the Prussian system.
In the first instance, the Prussian subordinate commanders seem to have been slower at reporting their actions to their commanders than their French equivalents. As an example, when Louis at Saalfeld reported that the French had occupied Grafenthal on the 8th, this message did not reach Hohenlohe till mid morning on the 9th despite the short distance between the two (approx. 35km). Consequently Hohenlohe could not expect any orders resulting on this information to be implemented before the 10th. If the information had reached Hohenlohe on the evening of the 8th, his orders for the 9th might have been different.
This slowness was compounded by the wide spread of the Prussian forces and the increase in time necessary for couriers to cover the distance. Thus Tauenzien at Schleiz was 70 km from Hohenlohe at Kahla. Even moving at the French courier rate of 10km/hour, a courier leaving Tauenzien at 5 on the 9th to report his retreat to Auma could not have reached Hohenlohe before midnight.
Compounding this problem of slow intelligence, Hohenlohe and his staff do not demonstrate the same speed of execution and of effort as does Napoleon. Thus when Hohenlohe sent an order to Louis on the evening of the 9th (say 9pm) to concentrate at Rudolstadt, this order does not arrive with Louis until 11 am on the 10th when the latter was already engaged at Saalfeld. 14 hours to travel 35 km is a very poor performance in comparison with the French. Moreover, Hohenlohe does not appear to have worked through the night as Napoleon does. His orders are generally sent during the day and consequently do not reach their destination in time to be executed that day. The problem of distance also worked against Hohenlohe in this respect. Having received details of Muffling's report of the movements of the French army on the 8th Hohenlohe ordered a concentration of his army at Mittel Pollnitz on the 10th. This order was sent at 10 am on the 9th but can hardly have arrived with Tauenzien at Schleiz before 5 p.m. that day even if we allow a French rate of courier movement. By the time the order was received it was already too late for that command.
Interestingly, Ed does use something that approximates to the reality of the situation in his rules for Prussian command. The Prussians have two phases each day where the Player can issue orders to the subordinate commanders to march on a particular point. These rules give a better representation of the command structure than do his rules for French command but still fall short.
In particular the Prussian Command rules make no allowance for distance or for the historical slowness of Prussian command to react. Thus in the game, the Prussian Player may order the retiral of Tauenzien on Mittel Pollnitz at 4 am on the 9th and this order will be immediately put into effect by Tauenzien on the next turn (8 am). As I have suggested above, this was simply not feasible for Hohenlohe historically given the rate at which information and orders were distributed in the Prussian army.
To be constructive, I don't think that it would be too difficult to devise rules for a system of orders that approximated reality based on Vachee's figures and scaling down for the Prussians. These ideas would require a good deal more work. For example, I would suggest dropping the Orders phases for the Prussians. Instead dice each turn and deduct for the Command rating of the Commander (say rate Hohenlohe and Brunswick both 1). If the throw is less than or equal to the turn number then he may issue orders. They may only issue orders once per day. ADC counters could then be used to transmit the orders to their destination. The French on the other hand do have an Orders phase (12 am to 4 am) when Napoleon can issue orders. ADC counters similarly carry these orders. They may start to move on the 4 - 8am turn.
In addition to this, I would institute a Reaction Test rule to determine the actions of a commander when his troops encountered the enemy. This would encompass the possibility of retreat along the line of march or stand and observe or attack.
This could, in turn, affect the transition from March mode to Battle mode that Iena fails to cope along with every other operational Napoleonic game. Personally, I believe this is where the abilities of the French corps commanders were displayed and where initiative is a valid concept. The aggression of Lannes at Saalfeld and of Davout at Auerstadt was the quality Napoleon looked for in his subordinates. Vachee is surely right that it was in this regard that Bernadotte fell short and that Napoleons recognition of this lay behind his orders of the 12th which sent Davout direct to Naumburg and Bernadotte to Zeitz despite the relative distances each had to travel. As he notes, given Bernadotte's record it is unlikely that he would have won or even fought the battle of Auerstadt.
Combat
Turning from Command to Combat, I think that Ed has developed a much better system but that it is still not quite what I would like to see. Charles discussed Auerstadt in his review so I will concentrate on the other two main actions of Saalfeld and Jena.
The first problem with Saalfeld is the map. I know that Ed has a penchant for creative map design and tries to achieve a feel with his maps rather than strict accuracy. However there seems little reason why the map should be so inaccurate in this case. In reality, Saalfeld was situated at the mouth of a defile where the road from Grafenthal exits heavily wooded hills to the southwest. Garnsdorf is between Saalfeld and the defile with Scharza about 4 hexes north west of Saalfeld. I assume that Ed had some reason for designing the map in the way he has but it is difficult to see what it might be. Personally, I would prefer the map to display the terrain as it was.
Looking at the forces engaged at Saalfeld, we have Suchet (11 battalions) and Treilhard (8 squadrons) with Lannes divisional battery against Louis with 10 battalions, 10 squadrons and 2 and ½ batteries. The historical result was a rout of the Saxon forces after 4 hours (2 turns) of fighting. In the game the Saxons seem to be somewhat underrepresented in their infantry numbers as Belvilaqua has only 3 SP (6 if you include the fusilier battalions and jaeger companies) as opposed to Suchet's 11. The difficulty with representing the Prussians at this scale is that, unlike the French, the composition of their brigades and divisions changed often and this is a problem here.
Despite being understrength I question whether the Saxons are likely to be routed in two turns using Ed's system. What the game cannot represent is the flexible way in which Lannes handled his forces at the battle. In reality Lannes extended his frontage to over 4 hexes in game terms, screening the Saxon left with skirmishers and crushing their right with superior numbers. His performance in this battle was impressive and Foch later used Saalfeld to illustrate how to handle a division in an advance guard battle.
Even ignoring the map problems I think it is difficult to simulate Saalfeld as the game stands. In the first place, it would probably need some ability to break down the existing units into their component regiments. If Ed ever produces a La Battaille on Jena then that would be ideal! Then we would need some ability for Lannes to control units in multiple hexes whereas Louis would have a limited ability to do so. Then again, an area game would not have this particular problem. In the meantime, I would suggest that the French should be given some kind of bonus to represent their tactical flexibility and that the relative ability of commanders in battle should be recognised in some way.
It would be reasonable to argue that Saalfeld was a minor encounter and that the game combat system was designed with the main battles of Jena and Auerstadt in mind. The map problems are less serious at Jena than at Saalfeld although Lutzeroda should be two hexes west of Closewitz and not north. Once again, the system has difficulty representing the initial Prussian deployment as Tauenzien had one battalion from Zechwitz (Prinz August) in his first line and three grenadier battalions from Prittwitz in his second. The regimental nature of the Prussian army and the consequent difficulty in co-ordinating formations is not clear from the game.
Like Charles in his review of the Auerstadt scenario, I have tried to replicate the actual sequence of combat at Jena and found this very difficult. I would agree that retreat should not be possible without some kind of loss and that combined arms bonuses are not appropriate for the Prussians (or perhaps for anyone – I have a problem with this concept which I think is based on miniatures rules and not reality). I think would also be more appropriate to restrict defence of village hexes to fusiliers and jager although I recognise that a village hex contains a large area of open ground for the musketeers to operate. I simply think that this would give a better representation of the Prussian inability to defend villages at Saalfeld and Jena.
I also doubt whether the relative effectiveness of the units on both sides is accurate. Just because a unit has a grenadier title doesn't necessarily make it any good as Bresonnet's description of the dismal performance of the grenadier battalion Hundt would testify. Although I do accept that the revisionist work on the Prussian army of 1806 has illustrated that it was far from being a poor army, nonetheless their French opponents were largely veteran troops and I don't think that the game represents this sufficiently.
I would also question whether Ed's odds based approach is the best way to simulate the attack/counterattack nature of the combat at Jena. The only game which I have ever played which came close to this was Le Beau Soliel [CHV: That's my Austerlitz game] where a formation could generally only attack with one SP with three others providing support.
Somewhat similar to Ed's system the combat results would then lead to counterattacks under the same restrictions. This gave an excellent flavour as the 17 Leger routed the grenadier battalion Horwarth only to be checked in pursuit by the steady volleys of the Infanterie regiment Xavier. Something along these lines might work better here although the hex layout is a bit of a problem.
Aside from these major areas of difficulty which I have with Iena, I also see problems with the movement rates (for example Davout's march from Mittel Pollnitz to Naumburg) and with the Victory conditions which seem distinctly odd. However, these are relatively minor in comparison and probably not worth substantial comment. In sum, therefore, while I applaud Ed's effort to produce a game that gives a better representation of reality while retaining the simplicity of the NLB system, I'm afraid I don't think that the basic system is worth the effort. It may be that my suggestions would result in a game that is much more difficult to play. I would almost certainly hamper the Prussians much more than Ed has done which would upset any play balance in the game. In doing so, I'm bound to say that this is in the nature of the historical situation and I would personally prefer to play a game that encompassed these realities. Whether others would agree is open to question as few of the comments on the game on the Internet have touched on these issues. If I can ever get around to putting my ideas in a more concrete form then we'll see!
CHV: Histoire et Collections have published the beautiful Iena-Auerstadt from Dr Hourtoulle, it is a worthy accompaniment to Ed's game which, while it has far to go, has come a very long way.
Iena Response to Review (PA#100)
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© Copyright 1999 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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