The abiding popularity of the ACW together with the popularity of Mark Herman's work should make this a big hit. Yet we found it less than totally inspiring. After a recent scenario (1863) we played a game of We The People and reminded ourselves of how exciting and unforgiving the latter game is compared to For the People. For the People is closer in feel to Hannibal. This is bad news for me as I dislike the latter game, but good news for Mark Herman since Hannibal is much more popular that WTP.
If I may summarise the problems of FTP they centre on the level of abstraction necessary to achieve the speed of the game. For while not a short game it covers a large subject and a long session would accommodate the whole war - no small achievement. In abstracting matters Mark has sought to press the same item into use in several locations (cards, for example, move armies and reflect politics) at certain key points I find the abstraction does not work and the gameyness bursts through on me. But this is a very personal view, depending on it does how each of us view the conflict.
The most obvious linkage to Hannibal over We The People is the operation of the strategy cards. In We The People each card was either an operations card or an event card. This could mean that you engaged in little fighting while the political events sped past but that (short of discards) a certain level of political events would occur. In For the People most of the cards are double-usage and in very exciting passages of play (and much of the game is at a game level very exciting) nothing non-military happens. Now pardon my suspicions here but I do not for a moment think that the choice between an operation by the Army of the Cumberland or an Indian Rising is in any way linked, if indeed I can even employ the word choice in connection with them. The result is (particularly in scenario play) a suspicious lack of non-military events.
The Hannibal model was greeted by many gamers who want to be out and about fighting and who find those turns in We The People where activity is reduced to the British discarding a lot of 1s and 2s and the Americans clearing up a few points just too unexciting. There is also an important point to consider in this area, at the We The People level (one turn a year) and ground scale historical campaigns could be completed providing you had two Operations Cards. Since there were not often two campaigns rolling out at the same time this meant you could pretty much ensure one side did not find themselves stranded by a poor hand. In For the People the scale is such that more military activity is required or armies will have to slow down dramatically. It still seems to me that some level of non-military events is required.
Of course the fact that you now have seven Operations in your hand does not of itself produce a regular pattern of activity in all theatres. For the People uses the We The People activation rule of Leaders being ranked one to three (with three being General Foppington, and one being US Grant) and they activate on an Operation Card or the same or higher value. Most gamers have noted the risk of a Lee (activated by any Operations Card) going on repeated activations until his army vanishes from bleeding feet. There is a similar effect with Sherman or Grant. Additionally, the Union Player can find so many of his leaders are threes that if a two-strategic value leader appears he is suddenly faced with a staggering work-rate. In the 1862 scenario poor General Pope (from memory) marched and fought as the sole Union offensive representative for two turns. Unfortunately I had a heap of two cards, and my few threes were reserved for Army of the Potomac attacks on Lee to try to bleed his forces off before he took Washington.
That takes us to an area of some weakness. After lots of moaning from the assembled rabble about the Battle cards in both We The People and Hannibal Mark has dumped them. Instead what happens is a simple CRT is used. The result though causes just as much moaning! Moral: when it comes to simulating battles you are not going to win. The battles are decided by using one CRT criteria - size of both forces. Small battles may cause no more than one SP loss a side, but a big one can cost eleven SPs in total. The defender's losses tend to be smaller in the bigger battles but on the whole battles are bloody if big. The dice scores are what bring the result differentiation. Here modifiers are very important. Mark has identified that the size of armies is not a material fact, unless one side has an advantage of at least three-to-one. At this stage the larger side gets a modifier. I have not analysed the battles and so cannot comment, one can however see that up to a certain point extra numbers may not have much effect where the difficulty is deploying them effectively (or even getting them down the road system to join the battle).
Where the modifiers really awake though is with the leaders. Lee has, for example, a battle rating of three, so if attacking McClellan (whose rating is zero) will lose 3.5 SPs and inflict over 4 SPs (on average). Back up Lee with Longstreet and Hill, and place Stuart in cavalry command and the modifiers of two of these join Lee - making a modifier of nine and a guaranteed kill of 5 Union SPs (6 if the Union attack the Confederates). This can represent over a third of the Army of the Potomac, and it is a no-brainer cast-iron certainty. Of course, the AoP can still win a defensive battle (if I have read the rules correctly) by scoring a ten and inflicting 6 losses, because the defender's losses (in that case) cannot exceed five. This is not, however, something you will see that often until losses thin the Confederate ranks and new generals appear for the Union.
Fortunately, once beaten the AoP may retreat before combat to avoid a total pasting. The Union can of course also employ its own Corps commanders and the result should be enough to lift losses of the Union towards 5 (though not with my dice throwing). Since interception is not the strong point of the period for McClellan (although with a cavalry commander he can catch one in three) he can only block where he stands. The Army of North Virginia accordingly has a good chance of reaching Washington and taking it (since victory goes to the side inflicting the biggest losses and the garrison probably lacks commanders). The campaigns in Virginia thus become a matter of the AoP hurling itself on the Confederates knowing they will be defeated but that they can inflict losses on the Confederates at a higher clip than the Confederates can breed them.
Once the AoNV is down to five or six SPs it begins to be at risk of elimination. In my view this advancing to certain defeat is not what the AoP (or Lee in reverse) experienced. I can grasp the abstraction but I think it misses a lot of the atmosphere of the thing. Perhaps a cynic reading the history would so construct matters, but the same process would make Marlborough ever victorious.
Of course the policy of battering towards Washington while it looks fun (and can zap the Union war effort) is a very dangerous technique for the Rebs. Confederate recruitment (before the blockade bites) is going to produce 13 SPs a turn. The Eastern Union recruitment alone is 8 SPs with a further 10 SPs in the Centre and West. Fighting the AoP means fatally weakening the Confederate effort in the West. [I am reminded of my solitaire play of Breakout Normandy in which my interest in British operations usually means I run out of impulses before I get to Utah and have to impose a rationing system on myself].
Of course losing all those battles for the AoP is a significant drain on the Strategic Will index (though it may not be a bad as losing the Capital, it depends on how many battles you fight over the game) so the game is not completely blind here. The Confederates risk substantial losses and strategic impotence to inflict even greater losses and to damage the Union Will (by maybe a third of its total!). This is a real set of game choices, add in the possibility (as I have done) of the AoP having lost Washington riposting by taking Richmond (only half as many Strategic Will points though as the Butternut Boys gained) and you have a real game. It is exciting but it is not (in my view) the American Civil War.
To balance the Confederate Juggernaut is the leader loss rule. If one side scores a modified ten or more then you check for losses. The lower scoring side will lose on a 1, but the 10+ scorer on a 1-3. The losses are never the Army Commander (if an Army is being used) but one of his (randomly chosen) subordinates. After a few turns of this bashing the Confederate Roll of Honour will grow (though not while playing Gareth Simon who has the world's largest stock of sixes). This rule has driven many players to all manner of irritation yet it seems unexceptional to me in practice. The Confederate feeling of effortless superiority seems more offensive to me, but perhaps that is how it was.
For the People can thus feel very odd indeed. Generals go into battle certain of defeat but fighting beneath the Sacred Banner of Attrition (Haig would have loved it). The best leaders are often carried off the field on stretchers rather than the shoulders of their cheering troops. Finally, the cards can mean units sit supinely as others sweep past them, not because they are total yo-yos, not because there is inadequate supply, but because their commanders are 3s and you have no 3 cards.
It is also full of neat tricks. The Confederates derive valuable reinforcements from the coastal ports (in reality the weapons to arm the reinforcements) so the Union can throttle the South with naval landings. Frequently the Confederate is obliged to park a good number of reserve units in these ports to reduce the chances of a successful Union landing. At the start of the War the USN looks pretty ropy but the play of Strategy Cards can both improve the blockade and improve amphibious attack potential. Just as equally if these cards turn up in Confederate hands then the USN resembles the Italian fleet in World War II. It is an interesting design concept to assign parts of the major winning strategy to the luck of the draw.
The concept of Armies is also clever. Mark Herman has gone to a lot of trouble to show the difference between divisional, corps and army movement. Numbers impose limitations and give advantages (and these rules need very careful reading). Armies (with the attendant train and supply organisation) are the chosen method for major offensives. Their SPs are kept on tracks and the army represented by a flag counter. In addition, each army has a Leader and can have two other Leaders in support together with a cavalry commander. As noted above these give advantages in modifier.
Where you have armies you will have bigger battles (Mark has three levels of battle all with different combat levels) and bigger attrition. The latter is really quite fierce and is on top of any attrition from lack of supply. These armies really do bleed!
Forts are very important, not only to give a modifier (which just might wipe the smug grin off a well-led army) but can control stretches of river. The Confederates want to be able to invade the North but have to keep the Mississippi open, and it is easier to cut the river than catch a slippery CSA force.
The game provides annual scenarios so no-one should be able to complain about lack of accessibility. Its rules are short but not simple. The map has come in for some criticism but we found it serviceable for so large a theatre of war. The game is undeniably a work of some skill, and I am sure my criticisms have missed many subtleties. It provides a strong game mixing the traditional Avalon Hill game with the unknowns of the card deck. That it has some strange features is undeniable, but these are clear and recognisable and you can alter them if you want. Ultimately, in a straight out fight between For the People and Blue vs Grey (see below) I would always opt for the cards, but I would not object to playing further games of For the People. If it is not quite what I wanted, what I wanted was probably never in contention.
For The People Opening Moves [strategy] (PA#99)
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© Copyright 1999 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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