(This is the text of a posting Evan made on the Blue vs. Gray area I opened up on Consimworld)
Hello, "gang", if I may be so familiar: As designer-developer-researcher of BvG, I thought I'd put in my $.02. And I feel I owe you all a few answers. I confess that I have remained "virgin" in re: all ACW strategic games (for obvious reasons) and I have not yet even seen FTP. But I suppose I won't be required to hold out forever; it does sounds great! (This is also the first time I have ever posted anything in a discussion group )
First, I want to thank Mr. Vasey for his extremely generous and thorough review. I really don't know what to say; I'm simply floored.
Second, my philosophy for combat (butcher-paper not included): When these dudes sent a big army out on campaign, there was no guarantee whatever of either the results or degree of bloodshed. On a strategic scale, anything could (and did) happen. Neither Lincoln nor Davis really knew at the outset of any given battle whose scalp would be hanging on whose pommel at the end of the day.
For example, Pope showed considerable promise before 2nd Bull Run. (He's the reason that Island #10 does not appear on either USA Kentucky map card.) So there was no way to know that Lee would prevail. After all, if Lincoln had felt there was little chance of victory, he wouldn't have tapped Pope in the first place. So (as there was during the war) there will be great weeping and gnashing of teeth. (And yes, those Reb divisions do suffer.) So, let's hear it for the "Big Fear"!
Third, it breaks my heart to become part of a controversy. I'd be happy to discuss amicably the differential vs. odds philosophy for ACW. For my own purposes, I simply set up the two armies against each other deployed for various major and minor historical clashes and tried out odds, percentages, differentials, etc. The only system that gave the right spread of (*ahem*, *cough*, *disclaim*) "historically possible" combat results was that of the differential. (It was also clean and simple*a major concern.) And often a strategically outnumbered unit could handily hold, delay, or just plain discourage a much larger foe (as at the Bermuda Hundred or early on at Petersburg). A loss in a battle might even represent a series of delays during which the men sit around in a swamp getting sick. But it all really depends on the scale of the game. For a conventional single-battle-type ACW game, I would probably use odds, after all. So as far as I'm concerned, both sides are right. Peace, my Brethren . . . ?
As for the game's accuracy, I have run the game "according to history" (*a-choo!*) until after Gettysburg (19 turns or so) and roughed out the remainder, and it works out to the supply point (within what I consider an "acceptable margin of flexibility"). I have roughed out the rest of the war (c. 29 turns in all*you'll note the flexible time-scale). After all, the "real war" has to be at least feasible in game-terms or it ain't much of a simulation, eh?
All in all, this has been a trip as has been your kind response to my little game.
Our Old World distributor is Gargoyle Games; you can access their website through ours (www.qedgames.com). By the way, has anyone tried the Historical Scenario? Now that's ripping. And how about the Optional Rules?
Further Minor Comments: Yes, the rules sure are "a bit wishy-washy," and that's putting it kindly. We want to thank Mike Siggins for gently lighting a fire under us with his earlier review. You see, I fell into the bad old trap of positing 'way too much knowledge on the part of new players, and, as a result, our rules-testing (such as it was) failed. I have no excuses; I know better. We have tried to make up for it via our website. We are also working on an insert to put us back on the side of the angels. And I'll be here by your side to guide you out of the Wilderness.
BvG is, in our corporate parlance, "Non-Collectible and Proud of it." Grant, Hooker, Bragg, Jackson (and others) have special rules stated on their cards which take into account their particular quirks. Hooker always loses a "Soldiers' Battle" no matter how big his army is (e.g., Chancellorsville). Bragg always gets a Stalemate in a "Generals' Battle" (e.g., Stone's River, Chickamauga). Grant always captures (or holds) his target city in a Soldiers' Battle, even if defeated (e.g., Wilderness). Jackson, if off on his own, can join a command to defend during the Yankee turn, they didn't call his men the "foot cavalry" for nothing (e.g., Antietam).
With equal armies in open terrain, Lee will take Grant's ground @ one-in-three, while Grant has a one-in-two chance of advancing against Lee (thanks to Grant's special abilities). Don't underestimate the effect of leadership: An initiative advantage provides a critical one in six advantage (on the attack) which often ends up deciding a game. Also bear in mind that up to half of the raw strength of a CSA army is likely to come from leadership alone (so a victorious CSA "Soldier's Battle" can often be considered partial tribute to Southern leadership.)
A CSA attack on a USA-held port tracing by sea is limited to a command with only one leader, but a CSA attack is NOT limited in attacking a non-port city that is tracing supply back to a port which is in turn tracing by sea. (This is very unclear in the rules and will be addressed by Errata.) So forget about those cross-country treks. On the other hand, those Union enclaves can greatly facilitate the occupation of the Confederate coasts (esp., USA Map Card J).
The overland routes to those ports are, for the most part, swampy, restricted passageways that do not allow a large force enough access to bring its numbers to bear against a foe not also threatened from the sea. (Longstreet's corps made the only substantial attempt to retake a Union-held port and got gummed up at Suffolk. That's why he missed Chancellorsville). 3.) Moving inland from a port, a USA army's flanks and logistics would naturally be exposed and vulnerable to a theoretically unlimited CSA counterblow. Yet the USA forces are still restricted to invasion-sized forces by their own limited supply sources (until Late-War). 4.) A USA command attacking a CSA port overland is NOT bound by these restrictions because the CSA, unlike the USA, has to cover both the landward and seaward approaches to the city and hold open avenues of retreat (like Hardee at Savannah, 12/64). This creates a more open situation than vice versa. It is a different strategic situation. (*Aargh!* Think I'll come up for air!)
Actually, there is a pecial exception in the rules for Ft.Monroe in both of the above cases: no restrictions going either way (which accounts for the Peninsular Campaign). Ports are cities and are considered part of the rail nets. The odds of CSA or USA leader losses are identical: one in six. Remember, leader losses don't occur unless both sides have a (non-cav.) leader in the battle. (CHV: Whoops I got the odds wrong!) Union 2-corps force (with a commander) can invade with only 1 Naval Squadron in support. But it's nice to have extra attack points (especially those that don't add to your casualty level!).
You can get by with two (or even one) command per theater becaus you can split off part of a command to defend. You can also use a command to defend the same area twice. Furthermore, you can dump an infantry or cavalry out of your hand in an emergency. My own average is two commands in the East and two to three in the West (which was pretty much the case, historically). (CHV: Important point this The rule says " A command may defend more than once only when defending the same city or defending against an attack coming from (or through) a city it has just lost." So there is limited re-usability if pushing "down the line something the East will see more of with its narrow front. The detaching of commands can be a useful effect for the Confederates breaking up a major US stack.
You have to play "Rebel Yell", "Old Abe", etc., as reserves, before the die is rolled. In the event that the increase overturns a victory or fails to redeem a defeat, tough patooties; tell it to Grant at Petersburg (see "Infernal Machines"). Anyhow, I tried it the other way and the rebs always seemed to wind up cooling their heels in Harrisburg.
Note that Savannah is in the Eastern Theater. Foote appeared in the west, historically, but he can serve in the Atlantic, if you wish. Likewise, Lee (whether Robert E., S. D., or Fitzhugh - or S.P.) may serve in whichever theater will best serve the cause. c&Infantry without leadership can't attack, and it defends with an initiative of 0. Cavalry, however, has its own built-in leadership and can attack on its own.
You can limit your losses by withdrawing unnecessary units from combat. (Of course, this can cause your foe to do likewise and it's Mine Run all over again.) This concept is especially important for the South.
Historical Note: The USA seized New Berne (with or without the final "e") and Pensacola using small ad hoc for mations, which are somewhat "below" the scope of the game. The use of map cards allowed me to factor in the success (or failure) of these small but significant actions.
(Norfolk is taken care of by the USA Monitor Card.) Owing to the obvious logistical limitations, they were NOT considered major access points deep into to the Southern interior.
You may have noticed that there are no siege rules. This is most intentional! My "historical replay" turned out not to require them, and they were adding another (very cruel) two pages to the rules. So I deep sixed 'em. You have to draw the line somewhere. (If only I could have done so with the supply lines rules!) Vicksburg, etc., works out using the existing rules. (More on this another time, if there are any loud squawks.)
I'll discuss the "floating army" aspect in another post, if anyone is interested. And game balance (which has been a fixation throughout). (And basic strategy. And maybe even a couple of underhanded tricks I've acquired.)
I have done "starting points" for Shiloh, 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, and Chancellorsville, which are appearing on our website. The game, itself, includes the Historical Setup (pre-1st Bull Run) and Gettysburg. (Maybe, at some point, we'll "do the war", turn-by-turn.)
As a matter of fact, I have actually begun development of both a World War II version as well as a Napoleon (vs Josephine?) version. The sporadic nature of Napoleon's whims and alliances lends itself well to the Enigma system. For WWII I am looking into the use of "Mid-War" cards to help keep the plumbing in order. As for Odds vs Differentials visa-vis WWII, I intend to use Both! (And keep your eyes open for that "Enigma" Enigma.)
And yes, the "fashionable appearance" does indeed add appeal (not unlike miniatures), as intended. Just take one part numbers and stir in two parts fashion, overheat, and let gel; say I. And serve hot. (Ook-ook.) In the future, I will be briefer. Thanks again to Mr. Vasey for his delightful, immensely technical review!
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© Copyright 1999 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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